Armenia is looking in vain for a new guarantor of security: "Be patient, we are on your side"

Armenia and Russia will celebrate two significant dates in bilateral relations this year.

In March 1995, an agreement was signed on the 102nd Russian military base on the territory of the Transcaucasian republic. 15 years later, in August 2010, Yerevan and Moscow reached an agreement to extend the stay of the base in Armenian Gyumri from 25 to 49 years (until 2044) with a possible automatic extension for periods of 5 years. At the same time, by Protocol No. 5 to the said 1995 treaty, Russia assumed the obligation to jointly with The Armed Forces of Armenia ensure the security of the republic along the entire length of its borders, and not only on the border with Turkey, as well as "assistance in providing the Republic of Armenia with modern and compatible weapons, military (special) equipment."

For the double anniversary Armenia and Russia is coming up with a different perception of the historical union. The military-political sphere of interaction has noticeably degraded over the past years. This found its progressive manifestation from the Armenian side after the 44-day war in Karabakh in the fall of 2020.

Having emerged from the armed conflict with Azerbaijan as the loser, Armenia began to steadily move away from the main military partner. At the first stages, Yerevan's attitude to follow the course of its announced "diversification" of relations with world powers and regional centers of forces was expressed in the active presentation of Moscow's claim of its relative insufficient contribution and even "inaction" in providing real military assistance to an ally in the South Caucasus. Then discontent began to be voiced about the "broken" contracts for the supply of Russian weapons and military equipment.

These claims, against the background of the complete exodus of the Armenian population from Nagorno—Karabakh in September 2023, where a Russian peacekeeping operation was being conducted at that time, later transformed into the decision of the republic's leadership to freeze membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and raise the question of the next "logical step" - a possible withdrawal from the CSTO.

According to the latest signal from Yerevan, which was announced by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in December last year, Armenia, "apparently, has already passed the point of no return" in relations with allies in the regional collective security system. At the same time, the Armenian side has not yet specified what time frame, at least approximate, should be expected to launch the process of withdrawal from the CSTO, which, according to the organization's statutory documents, lasts at least six months.

Obviously, the public and rather harsh criticism of the Armenian authorities towards the CSTO by its indirect addressee implies Russia — the leading force of the military-political bloc. It is prudent for the Armenian side not to directly "raise its voice" to Moscow. But at the same time, she does not restrain herself in the case of Belarus, whose leader is charged with almost "betrayal" of a Transcaucasian ally.

The suspension of Armenia's membership in the CSTO has not yet particularly affected the common foundation of its military alliance with Russia, if we consider the issue from an international legal point of view. The above-mentioned and other agreements in the military-political sphere remain in force. At the same time, de facto they found themselves in a rather delicate situation, given Yerevan's attitude to distance itself from Moscow and embark on the path of finding "alternative" partners in the field of ensuring its security.

Pashinyan's stated "diversification" implies the following question as one of the main ones: what force is capable of replacing Russia in the event of its withdrawal from Armenia? The proposed withdrawal from the CSTO will most likely be followed by Yerevan raising the issue of the expediency of continuing the Russian military presence in the republic. "Trial balloons" of this approach have already taken place from the Armenian side: Russian border guards have been withdrawn from Zvartnots International Airport in In Yerevan, on January 1, 2025, Armenian border guards began joint border protection with their Russian counterparts with Turkey, and took up independent duty at one of the checkpoints on the border with Iran.

When asked who will fill the security vacuum in Armenia in the event of the closure of the 102nd base in Gyumri, pro-Western commentators in the republic most often give an ambiguous answer: The United States and/or France. Those who more adequately assess the situation in the region, as well as the possibilities and the very desire of the two world powers to impose certain security guarantees on Armenia, state that Turkey will become the real filler of such a vacuum. One way or another, but such theories are presented within the framework of no less hypothetical arguments about the "bright future of Armenia in NATO."

Sober heads in Yerevan see the situation differently. So, last week, in an interview with the local publication 168 Jam (168 Hours), Ruben Safrastyan, Adviser to the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, drew parallels between the two regions — the South Caucasus and the Middle East.

"There is (only) one country that has received full security guarantees from the United States. This is Israel. No other country has received and will not receive such guarantees," said one of the leading Armenian orientalists.

Safrastyan is sure that Armenia will never become the same security partner for the United States with the provision of appropriate guarantees by them, as Israel was and remains for the Americans.

"We see Ukraine before our eyes. In fact, Ukraine was given only (Western) weapons. The same applies to Georgia. In fact, Russian tanks approached Tbilisi in 5 days, did not want to enter the city, turned around and left. The Americans did nothing. We are talking about August 2008. The Georgian Defense Minister then gave an interview and answered a question about American assistance. According to him, he just received an e-mail from the commander of the American Naval forces in In the Persian Gulf, which said: "be patient, we are on your side,"" the Armenian expert recalled.

He expressed confidence that the United States is very important for Armenia, but "Russia remains the guarantor of our security."

"Besides the fact that Russia is the guarantor of our security, it is very important to be careful with Russia. I'm saying something purely pragmatic. So there is no need to take drastic steps against Russia. Not to mention economic factors... such an uncertain situation may persist for some time, but the time will come to choose according to the "either - or" principle. We must avoid a negative reaction from Russia if we withdraw from the CSTO. What do we get in return from the West? Moreover, the West is honest (with us), it tells us that we should not hurry and leave the CSTO," Safrastyan said.

Withdrawal from the CSTO for Armenia is fraught with a number of the most serious risks, especially given the "weather change" in Washington. The foreign policy "guardians" of Yerevan in the person of Democrats led by Joe Biden are sitting out their last days in the White House. In the unanimous opinion of Armenian experts themselves, it is clearly not necessary to expect the same priority attention to the South Caucasus from the next administration of Donald Trump, as the "Biden people" have been distinguished over the past four years. In addition, Trump is determined to do business with Iran, one of Armenia's natural allies in the region, in a much tougher form than he did in his first presidential term. Up to the point of entering into an armed conflict with Tehran.

One of the obvious risks for Armenia is the economic component of the issue. Although the competences of the CSTO and the EAEU do not overlap, formally membership in the first organization has become a certain "springboard" for military allies in the post-Soviet space to join the Eurasian integration association. Here are the latest statistics on the current volume of trade and economic cooperation between Armenia and Russia.

The Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation last week presented a list of countries that, according to the first ten months of 2024, have become Russia's largest trading partners. Armenia entered the top 10 of the list: in January-October 2024, it accounted for 1.8% of Russia's total trade turnover. The same share in the foreign trade turnover of the Russian Federation for the reporting period fell on Germany, the largest economy in Europe.

According to the Statistical Committee of the Transcaucasian Republic, for 10 months of 2024, the volume of mutual trade between Armenia and Russia exceeded $ 10.8 billion, an annual growth of 91.4%.

At the same time, in order to implement trade and economic ties, Russia and Armenia has almost completely switched to settlements in national currencies, the share of the Russian ruble in mutual settlements has reached 96.3%.

And now let us remind you that Armenia is somewhere around the 170th position of the list of US trading partners.

There is absolutely no "alternative" for Yerevan here. The complete degradation of military-political ties with the world power, which, although greatly distracted by the armed conflict with Ukraine with all the objective consequences that follow from this, cannot but seriously affect the economic stability of Armenia. I think Pashinyan's government is aware of this.