The reasons for missing Storm Shadow on Marino, and what else will surprise the "Hazel Tree" — review

A couple of days ago, the Ukrainian media diligently dispersed information about the impending strike of the RS-26 Rubezh ICBM. The "pattern break" occurred on the afternoon of November 21, when two external surveillance cameras in Dnepropetrovsk captured at least 6 outfits of 24 hypersonic missiles diving into the industrial zone of Yuzhmash, which is strategically important for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Since the maximum speed of the Patriot PAC-3 targets accompanied by AN/APG-65A radars does not exceed 2.2 km/s, it is quite obvious that warheads with speeds of 3.7 — 5 km/s turned out to be too banal for them. Already in the evening, during an emergency speech by the head of state Vladimir Putin, it turned out that the enemy was not even dealing with the RS-26 Rubezh, but with a promising medium-range solid-fuel ballistic missile Oreshnik, equipped with 6 combat units capable of developing speeds from 3.3 to 4 km/h on the terminal (approach) section of the trajectory.c (from mach 10.3 to 12.5).

Note that this speed is achieved in the lower layers of the stratosphere and troposphere, while the thermosphere and mesosphere (at altitudes of 100 — 70 km) it can even reach 15 M. At the same time, the most important detail is the minimum range of action, which is only 500 km, and the maximum is 5500 km, which, unlike the "Frontier", allows you to hit any objects both on the territory of the "square" and in Europe.

According to Yuzhmash, kinetic combat units were used, which at a speed of 3.5 km/ s (with the destruction of the crystal structure and evaporation) made it possible to achieve the release of energy significantly exceeding that of a hexogen aerial bomb of similar mass. Thus, several large workshops of the key rocket-building enterprise of Ukraine were destroyed, where various stages of assembling the first prototypes of operational-tactical ballistic missiles "Thunder-2" were carried out, about the future use of which The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine stated a few weeks earlier.

Nevertheless, in the case of the use of nuclear warheads with a capacity of "only" 150-200 kilotons, almost the entire Yuzhmash industrial zone would have been completely destroyed. It can be argued that thanks to the modern inertial navigation system based on digital accelerometers and gyroscopes, as well as astrogation sensors on the marching sections of the trajectories, the circular probable deviation of the warheads does not exceed 100 m, which is an excellent indicator for this class of systems. It is most likely that the Oreshnik missile is equipped with two high-pulse solid-fuel stages and a module for breeding warheads.

Given the currently known information (and it is extremely scarce), it can be assumed that only the AN/TPY—2 TMD—GBR anti-missile radar can detect the Oreshnik missile at a distance of about 700-1300 km on the marching sections of the flat trajectories (at altitudes of 85-110 km) until the separation of the warheads. the THAAD complex. After the alignment of the route, target designation can be issued to the guidance systems of the KV interceptors. Nevertheless, one should not expect a successful interception, since there are also infrared traps and aerosols in the breeding stage of the Hazel combat units that can counteract the steady capture of the Hazel by the infrared seeker of the KV THAAD anti-missiles. Moreover, after a descent to an altitude of less than 80-70 km, THAAD exoatmospheric interceptors will no longer be able to function effectively due to high aerodynamic drag.

In addition, the Pentagon does not plan to provide THAAD anti-missile systems to the Ukrainian side. And this means only one thing: in the event of a continuation of such strikes (as has already been announced by presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov), even the logistics hubs covered by several Patriot PAC-3 and French SAMP-T divisions will not even be 5-10% protected from strikes by 15-17—mach non-nuclear Milestones combat units and other intercontinental ballistic missiles, or medium-range ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian sources claim that Israeli Arrow-2/3 anti-missile systems with combined dual-band active radar and infrared seeker can intercept the Hazel. But even the presence of an active radar sensor does not guarantee interception at altitudes of 50-60 km, since the Oreshnik missile defense system and combat units have dipole reflectors and electronic warfare modules. At the same time, if we are talking about kinetic combat units (hypersonic "cast iron"), then even a missile hit will not be able to disable the combat unit, but only partially shift its flight path. Therefore, there can be no question of any effective anti-missile barrier against the "Hazel".

SCALP-EG strikes at the rear command post and communications hub in Maryino

Nevertheless, it is also not worth writing off the enemy's strike capabilities. In particular, the Hazel strike was preceded by the first use by the crews of the tactical aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of 12 inconspicuous tactical cruise missiles Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG in the Kursk region, which is included in the list of "old" regions of Russia. Recall that the blow was struck literally 3 to 4 hours after Kiev was given the appropriate carte blanche by the administration of US President Joe Biden.

Starting from the video of objective control captured by the optoelectronic module of the enemy reconnaissance UAV southwest of Maryino, it can be seen that out of 12 Storm Shadow missiles launched by the enemy, at least 10 missiles hit the target object. This is also confirmed by the characteristic sounds of explosions in the video of a local resident published on the Pozdnyakov 3.0 channel. The video from the UAV shows that the missiles struck not the historical estate of the Baryatinsky princes, but the administrative buildings 250 m west of the estate, where, according to the Defense Express publication, a tactical communications center was deployed or underground KP of the North group. In principle, we are dealing with a regular strike from the enemy.

But a logical question arises: what is the reason for such a low percentage of intercepted Storm Shadow missiles? For more than six months of regular launches of R-360M Neptune-MD missiles in the Kursk region, the mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade of the Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces, had to optimize the radar contour, in addition, the effective reflective surface of Storm Shadow is an order of magnitude smaller than that of Neptune (0.03 versus 0.3 square meters. m).

It is obvious that on the proposed flight routes of 12 Storm Shadow to Maryino there were no more than 2-3 camouflaged combat vehicles of the Tor—M2 air defense system, or the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system in a collapsed position with the detection radar turned off. In the folded — for the reason that the classic combat duty near Maryino (50 km from the line of combat contact) is fraught with the detection of radiation from the switched-on radar by means of electronic reconnaissance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with a further strike from several MLRS HIMARS. Only 2 Tor-M2 complexes will not be able to intercept such a number of GMLRS guided missiles.

But in this case, the Russian Aerospace Forces have the technical capabilities for combat duty "Tor-M2" with the radar turned off in anticipation of target designation. What is it about? About the deployment of a full-fledged battery of 6 camouflaged air defense systems "Tor-M2", coupled with a unified battery command post "Rangir-M", also camouflaged in the forests of the Kursk region. For the operational release of all Tor-M2 combat vehicles to firing positions and the timely tying of Storm Shadow missile routes, the Rangir-M should initially receive target designation from A-50U long-range radar detection aircraft, whose operators then perform target distribution between the Tor-M2 complexes. But this, unfortunately, did not happen. Why not? Yes, because the number of A-50U boards is extremely limited today, which is simply unacceptable for a state with a huge length of borders and a huge number of opponents.

But do not forget about the presence in the Russian Aerospace Forces of a sufficient number of Su-35S transitional generation fighters, whose Irbis-E radars are also capable of performing the AWACS function, detecting "Storms" at a distance of up to 110 km. With the help of the C-108 communications complex, the pilots of the Su-35S on duty could issue target designation on Rangir-M, as well as independently intercept most of the Storms with R-77−1 missiles. Even one Su-35S is capable of simultaneously operating 8 Storm Shadow missiles with R-77−1 air-to-air missiles.

Meanwhile, it is obvious that the Su-35S in the Sumy direction are used mainly during the escort of multi-purpose fighter-bombers Su-34NVO during strike operations. Consequently, the enemy's missiles feel like a "fish in the water" in the border areas of our airspace.

A similar situation is developing with the operation of optoelectronic reconnaissance UAVs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the border areas of the Kursk region, which carry out the opening of our logistics hubs, communication points, columns of equipment, and then issue the control center to the HIMARS MLRS calculations and perform objective control, as during the recent strike. To prevent such a situation, these drones with a working height of 3,500 m can be intercepted by the Strela-10M3/MN air defense systems, as well as the Mi-28NM and Ka-52M crews, who have confirmed the ability to work on drones with Igla-V and Vortex-1 missiles. However, for unknown reasons, this does not always happen.

A much more layered and effective anti-missile barrier has been formed by the Russian Aerospace Forces on The Azov operational direction. During the day before yesterday's attempt to strike Storm Shadow, all British missiles were intercepted by the Tor-M2 air defense system and the Panir-S1 air defense missile system over the Taganrog Bay, while the far frontier on the Priazovsky It is covered by Buk-M3 military air defense systems, as well as S-400 and S-350A air defense systems.