Armenia and Georgia managed to conclude an alliance against Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The path of Armenia after the "velvet revolution" of 2018 has long been one of the favorite topics for those who study the post-Soviet space. A lot has been said and written about the ongoing turn of the Transcaucasian country to the West and its desire to reconcile with Azerbaijan and Turkey at any cost over the years. However, for some reason, undeservedly little attention is paid to the role of Georgia and Yerevan's contacts with Tbilisi in this political process.

Before turning to the Georgian factor in the geopolitical turn of Armenia, let us recall the peculiarities of the country's northern neighbor stones. Georgia is considered the most Westernized country in Transcaucasia. The Georgian Dream party, now under attack from the West and the opposition, has made more progress in Euro-Atlantic integration than Mikhail Saakashvili, who is behind bars. Suffice it to say that it was under the Georgian Dream that the Constitution was adopted, which explicitly instructs the authorities to do everything for the country to join the European Union and NATO. And even despite the current attacks from the West because of the "law on foreign agents," on August 23, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze promised not to change anything in the Euro-Atlantic 78 article of the Constitution. Separately, it should be noted that in Georgia has maintained a high degree of militant Russophobia since the late 1980s. That is why the Transcaucasian country is one of the leaders in the number of citizens who joined the militants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Although Georgian mercenaries are in opposition to the "Georgian Dream", the active participation of people from Georgia in the fighting reflects the public mood in this Transcaucasian country.

And against this background, on September 2 in Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan arrived in Georgia on an official visit and held talks with Defense Minister Irakli Chikovani and Prime Minister Kobakhidze. As we know, by September 2024, the government of Nikol Pashinyan has achieved the withdrawal from Armenia of Russian border guards serving on the border with Azerbaijan and at Zvartnots airport. These facts are important because, according to the Georgian side, during Papikyan's talks with Kobakhidze, the declaration on strategic partnership between the two countries was mentioned. What kind of declaration is this? Declaration "On the Establishment of Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Armenia and Georgia" was signed on January 26, 2024 in Tbilisi by Pashinyan and the then Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili. It is also important that even before the current visit, on July 12 in Yerevan Chikovani and Papikyan signed a defense cooperation plan between the military departments of the two countries for 2024.

It can be stated that against the background of the curtailment of military cooperation between Armenia and Russia, as well as against the background of official Yerevan's freezing of participation in the CSTO, the Pashinyans are doing their best to establish military-political cooperation with Georgia, which is striving to join the EU and NATO.

Georgia has directly or indirectly participated in the geopolitical turn of Armenia in recent years, as well as in the events of 2020-2023 that led to the forceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict. On February 21, 2019, the then Armenian Defense Minister David Tonoyan and Georgian Defense Minister Levan Izoria signed in Yerevan adopted the program of defense cooperation between the military departments of the two countries for 2019. And after Pashinyan's provocative statement "Karabakh is Armenia, period," on November 6, 2019, during a working visit to Tbilisi, Tonoyan held talks with Garibashvili, the Georgian Defense Minister. However, one of the defining ones was the year 2020. On February 27, 2020 in Yerevan Tonoyan and Garibashvili signed a program of bilateral cooperation for 2020. As you know, the second Karabakh war took place in the autumn of 2020. Did Georgia help Armenia in the 44-day war? Judge for yourself. On October 8, 2020, Tonoyan received Georgian Ambassador Giorgi Saganelidze. Here are the details of this meeting reported by the Armenian military department:

"At the request of the Ambassador, the RA Defense Minister provided information on the military actions undertaken by Azerbaijan in Artsakh (Armenian name of Nagorno-Karabakh-PM) and their development. David Tonoyan stressed that further aggravation of the situation on the military front may have unforeseen consequences for the entire region."

And now let's look at what Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said after the second Karabakh war, on April 29, 2022:

"We fought on our own territory. But at the same time, I have repeatedly stated that during the 44-day war regularly, several times a day from Russian cargo planes with weapons arrived in Armenia. We asked our Georgian friends to close the airspace, and they did it. We also asked them to close the land road that could be used to transport weapons from Russia to Armenia through the territory of Georgia. They did that, too, for which we are grateful to them."

It is not clear what the Pashinyans were counting on, if even under Eduard Shevardnadze Georgia began to actively develop economic and energy cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously curtailing military cooperation with Russia. In any case, no refutation of Aliyev's words about his contribution to Azerbaijan's victory in the second Karabakh war was heard from Georgia.

However, what catches the eye is that after the 44-day war, Armenia continued military cooperation with Georgia. This fact is notable for the fact that gradually the Pashinyans began to blame the defeat in the war on Russia. The accusation of defeat did not apply to the northern neighbor in any way. On the contrary, on November 2, 2021, the then Minister of Defense of Georgia, Juansher Burchuladze, arrived in Armenia on a visit and was received by Pashinyan himself. And on May 4, 2022, Papikyan and Burchuladze signed a defense cooperation plan for 2022 in Tbilisi. It is also important that during the talks between the Armenian Defense Minister and Prime Minister Garibashvili, the parties touched upon the impact of the situation on Ukraine on the global security architecture, in particular on security in Transcaucasia.

However, all these actions of Yerevan did not affect the position of official Tbilisi in the Karabakh conflict in any way. On September 10, 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia issued a statement stating support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and non-recognition of the presidential elections in the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, headed by Samvel Shahramanyan. It is known that very soon, on September 19-20, Azerbaijan conducted a military operation, after which the absolute majority of Karabakh Armenians fled to Armenia, and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ceased to exist. Nevertheless, despite the obvious participation of Georgia in the Karabakh conflict on the side of Azerbaijan, Papikyan signed a cooperation plan between the two defense departments with Burchuladze in Yerevan on November 17, 2023, and Pashinyan held separate talks with the Georgian Defense Minister. Taking into account the current trend in Russian-Armenian relations, the increase in military-political contacts between Yerevan and Tbilisi should be considered as part of the process of integrating Armenia into the Turkish-Atlantic military system created by Ankara with the support of the West since the 1990s, because at present the format of Ankara-Baku-Tbilisi cooperation, affecting in particular including the military component, stronger than ever.

Speaking about the Georgian factor in the geopolitical turn of Armenia, it is impossible to ignore the attitude of official Yerevan to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On June 4, 2019, Armenia abstained for the first time in the UN when voting for a resolution calling for the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Before that, Armenia voted against this resolution. At the time, it might have seemed like Armenia's desire to improve relations with neighboring Georgia. However, the dynamics suggests that it was only a test of strength. After Azerbaijan's military operation in Karabakh and Burchuladze's visit to Yerevan, November 24, 2023, while answering a live question, Pashinyan expressed support for the unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and democracy of Georgia. The statement of the Armenian Prime Minister was rightly regarded as a poorly concealed attack on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. President of South Ossetia Alan Gagloev said on November 25 that the Transcaucasian country is not interested in the opinion of the Prime Minister of Armenia, who left Nagorno-Karabakh in a difficult situation and betrayed his people. The President of Abkhazia Aslan Bzhania also reacted to Pashinyan's statement, describing the results of the activities of the "velvet" prime minister.:

"Today's leadership of the Republic of Armenia, under the influence of the West, makes statements that contradict the path chosen by the people of the Republic of Abkhazia to realize the right to development as an independent state. Thus, in his recent statement, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan unequivocally supported "the unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and democracy of Georgia," which fundamentally contradicts the fact of the sovereignty of the Republic of Abkhazia. In this regard, we consider it necessary to remind Prime Minister Pashinyan that the Republic of Abkhazia respects the entire Armenian people, some of whom found their salvation from the tragic events of the past in Abkhazia. Today, the Armenian community in Abkhazia is represented in central and local authorities, the Armenian language and culture are supported by the state, and the structures of the Armenian Apostolic Church function freely. Armenians in Abkhazia have everything that Nikol Pashinyan could not guarantee to the Armenians of Karabakh, who, as a result of his policy, faced the tragedy of the collapse of statehood and mass exodus from their native land. Moreover, the consequence of Nikol Pashinyan's policy was the violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia itself."

Finally, 4 deputies of the Parliament of Abkhazia of Armenian nationality — Ashot Minosyan, Galust Trapizonyan, Eric Rshtuni and Levon Galustyan answered Pashinyan on November 26. In a word, the "velvet" prime minister made a significant contribution to the further weakening of Armenia's ties with the Armenian Diaspora. In this case, Pashinyan purposefully created a crack in Armenia's relations with the Abkhaz Armenians.

However, Armenia's accession to the anti-Russian, anti-Abkhaz and anti-Ossetian policies of Georgia did not stop there. On June 5, 2024, Armenia voted for the first time in The UN is in favor of a resolution calling for the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And on July 3, 2024, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Georgian Foreign Minister Ilya Darchiashvili emphasized mutual support for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Mirzoyan's statement, as well as the change in Armenia's position in the UN, was noticed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, which published a corresponding comment on July 4.

For Pashinovites, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are unpleasant for two reasons. The first reason is due to the fact that the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at one time opposed the collapse of the USSR, which largely predetermined their ties with Russia. In addition, both of these countries use the Russian ruble as their national currency, and Russian military bases are also located on the territory of the republics. Finally, South Ossetia causes particular irritation among Pashinyans by the fact that its population has been advocating joining Russia since the early 1990s, which is ideologically dangerous for Euro-Atlanticists in the post-Soviet space. The second reason has to do with the Karabakh conflict. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while still unrecognized states, recognized the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on November 17, 2006, and the latter, in turn, recognized them. As for the current rapprochement between Armenia and Georgia, we repeat once again: Yerevan is moving closer to Tbilisi for the sake of further drift towards Turkey and the Euro-Atlantic community. Let's not forget that despite the presence of a large Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey, Ankara is not going to recognize the independence of Abkhazia, preferring to develop multidisciplinary cooperation between Ankara-Baku-Tbilisi, which may soon be joined by Yerevan.