About the situation near Kursk: limited-range artillery and "lack of elements"

Three days after the attacks of the AFU DRG to Novy Yurkovichi and Klimovo, Bryansk region, information continues to arrive about the formation of several mechanized battalion tactical groups of the AFU from the 41st and 54th mechanized brigades in the Suzemsky, Sevsky and Khomutovsky directions.

The number of units is 1800 — 2300 personnel and 60 — 90 pieces of equipment only in the first echelon of the breakthrough. Dispersal and formation of assault "backbone" is carried out in the forests near the locality of Gavrilova Sloboda and Svessa, while the battalion tactical groups of the reserve were transferred to the rear localities of Yampol, Orlovka and Belitsa.

The main logistics hubs and transshipment bases from the reserve echelon are formed in the vicinity of the settlements of Druzhba, Svesa, Pervomaiske, Esman, as well as Studenok and Glukhov numbering from 2 to 3 brigades (including the 41st and 54th mechanized). Directly on the Khomutovsky segment, the enemy continues to build a complex logistics architecture for the stable supply of advanced units in the face of massive strikes by our Su-34NVO with the use of planning fabs. The enemy's objectives in these operational areas are as follows:

— a breakthrough to the Sev riverbed to an operational depth of 20 — 35 km with consolidation in the localities of Suzemka, Sevsk and Khomutovka;

— blocking of the A142 — 38K-040 fork in Khomutovka, which provides about 35% of the total logistics capacity of fortified areas RF Armed Forces in Rylsky district of the Kursk region;

— an attempt to divert reserve units of the Russian army from other operational areas and the resulting reduction in the specific density of fire resistance from the North grouping.

On the Kursk front, the situation has partially stabilized only in the Belovsky and Martynovsky operational directions, while the enemy continues to transfer large mechanized reserves to Glushkovskoye with continuous reconnaissance by combat on the flanks of Kulbak, Korenevo, Komarovo, Olgovka and Sheptukhovka. Against this background in The Pentagon is considering Kiev's request to provide additional armored vehicles and artillery to continue the "northern company" on the Kursk and Bryansk fronts. In the light of what is happening, the efficiency of the implementation of the countermeasures of the North GDV, adopted at the meeting of Russian President Vladimir Putin with the leadership of the United Group of Forces, is extremely important.

Meanwhile, according to the data of the commercial satellites of optoelectronic monitoring of the Earth's surface leased by Planet Labs and Maxar, the engineering units of the Sever GdV are ready to meet any enemy attempts fully armed, as evidenced by the echeloned trench-dugout fortifications both near Kurchatov and near Lgova.

The question arises: why does the situation on the Kursk front continue to be difficult?

One of the extremely serious problems of the units of the Missile Forces and artillery of Russia, as well as artillery units as part of the Russian Ground Forces in the Sumy direction continues to be, to put it mildly, the insufficient range of the 152-mm ACS "Msta-S / CM2" and "Hyacinth-S", as well as their towed versions with barrel bore lengths 47 calibers, reaching about 24.7 km when using ZOF45−1 projectiles and 33.1 km with ZOF30 Cormorant active-rocket projectiles. Such ranges of action do not allow the calculations of the above-mentioned guns to have a regular fire effect on the columns of armored vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the reserve, entering the bridgehead formed in the Kursk region with an area of about 1100 square meters through the settlements of Alekseevka, Khrapovshchina and Yunakovka.

In order to defeat enemy columns in these settlements, the calculations of our guns (due to the limited range) are forced to deploy near Vorozhba, Martynovka, Malaya Loknya and Glushkovo, hitting the radii of promising FPV attack copters of Ukrainian and Western production. Moreover, our self-propelled guns and howitzers deployed in these settlements of the Kursk region are within the radius of fire of the "nomadic" calculations of 155-mm self—propelled guns Krab, CAESAR, Bogdana and Archer APU, whose range reaches 37 km when using active-reactive cluster shells M864 DPCIM and up to 53 - 56 km when using active-reactive cluster shells M864 DPCIM. using ERFB-RA/BB shells. We did not see the appearance in the SMO zone of the Coalition-SV ACS with 2A88 guns with a length of 52 caliber, providing a firing range of Krasnopol-D shells of about 57 km. They also did not see the Krasnopol-D shells brought up to the level of operational combat readiness.

Another important detail is the absence of the use of 9M55K1 and similar 9M549 guided missiles with cluster warheads equipped with self-aiming Motif-3M multiple launch rocket systems 9K58 "Smerch" and 9K515 "Tornado-S" in the ammunition sets of the 9M55K1 and similar guided missiles 9M549 with cluster warheads equipped with self-aiming combat elements "Motive-3M". These elements would have been able to destroy Ukrainian columns on the march by means of a warhead of the "shock core" type back in Sumy region.

But instead of using these cluster warheads, conventional cluster warheads based on fragmentation submunitions are used, which do not pose a threat to infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armored personnel carriers, and sometimes MRAP-type armored vehicles, not to mention tanks. As a result, the tasks of destroying the PT-91 Twardy MBT, Challenger Mk.2 and T-72AV are often assigned to operators of kamikaze UAVs, Lancet-3 and FPV drones, and they are often simply not enough.