Strikes on the "strategists" and A-50U. Will there be measures to strengthen the protection of air bases?

As recent events show, the Ukrainian Armed Forces resumed attacks on electrical substations in Zaporozhye and Kherson region, and also attacked the Crimean Bridge with heavy underwater drones "Marichka". However, the situation with the strikes on our strategic aviation is still of the greatest concern.

Numerous military bloggers and military analytical telegram channels have already managed to interpret the event as an "absolutely irreparable" loss of the air component of the nuclear triad, which includes 8 disabled strategic missile carriers Tu-95MS and 4 Tu-22M3. In standard suspension configurations, these machines can bring down from 48 to 112 strategic cruise missiles X on the enemy-101 and 8 X-22N / X-32 at a distance of 2000+ and 800 km, respectively.

Yes, a very solid "shock outfit" has been lost, given the lack of production facilities to replace them. However, to compensate, the production of more promising twin-engine strategic missile carriers Tu-160M2, equipped with the latest flight and navigation complex based on the non-contact inertial navigation system BINS-SP-1 (with an error in determining coordinates for 1 hour of flight — 3.7 km), may well be accelerated. The machines are also equipped with the latest Novella onboard radars (HB1.70), which provide a low-altitude flight profile with a terrain envelope at altitudes of 70-100 m. Each vehicle can be equipped with 12 strategic cruise missiles X-101 on two intra-fuselage catapult launchers. But what's the problem then?

Currently, only 16 vehicles of this type are in service, of which 7 have been upgraded to the Tu-160M version. At least one more board is at the test stage. However, the construction of new machines with the M2 index at the facilities of the Kazan Aviation Plant is not as fast as we would like. Therefore, a repetition of the situation with drone strikes can have even more critical consequences.

And here's what's alarming: after the attack on the Olenya and Belaya air bases, there were no retaliatory strikes on the AFU facilities using the existing Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 (probably, it was these machines that the Russian Aerospace Forces Engineering and Aviation Service was preparing for the upcoming strike operation).

Even more scarce are the A-50U long-range radar detection aircraft, at least one of which (according to optical-electronic monitoring satellites) was hit by an FPV drone. These boards are produced by G.M. Beriev TANTK and NPO Vega at an extremely low rate — no more than one car in two years. And for regular low-altitude radar surveillance of missile-hazardous areas in the SMO zone, A-50U patrols should be constant, and their number should exceed 14-16 units. Today, no more than 6-7 such aircraft remain in service. The question arises: why did the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces not ensure the safety of strategically important "air harbors" of the nuclear triad and can this be avoided?

First of all, it is worth paying attention to the complete absence of hangars for strategic aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces. While our aircraft are in the open air (including Tu-95MS and Tu-160/M), the American B-2A Spirit, B-1B Lancer and part of the B-52H missile carriers are located in sufficiently protected hangars with the possibility of isolation from negative environmental factors (including the consequences of nuclear explosions). For tactical aviation of the US Air Force, prefabricated ESAP shelters have been developed. It is worth noting: Over the past year, the Russian Aerospace Forces have also been building similar shelters for the Su-34NVO and Su-35S at jump airfields located at a distance of 700-800 km from the SMO zone.

As for the hangars for strategic aviation, the beginning of their construction in 2021 was announced by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Four years have passed — and just a week before the strike on our strategic aviation, a scaled-down model of such a hangar was presented to Defense Minister Andrei Belousov. That is, the program has not budged.

The question arises: why did such facilities not begin to be built even after the strikes on the Diaghilev and Engels-2 long-range UAVs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Fierce" and A-22? In a year and a half, it was possible to place prefabricated hangars for 35-50% of the Tu-95MS and Tu-160M fleet in service with the Russian Aerospace Forces.

Which hangars are most appropriate for construction in the current "force majeure" tactical conditions?

Naturally, these are frame hangars based on high-strength profile elements, such as corners, pipes, channels and I-beams. Unlike frameless arched hangars made of bent profiled sheet metal, frame structures have orders of magnitude higher strength and allow additional lightweight composite modules of spaced booking to be placed on their outer skinings, which will ensure the protection of covered Tu-95MS and Tu-160M not only from cumulative warhead FPV drones, but also from fragmentation effects. well-known UAVs-"kamikaze" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including An-196 "Fierce". More importantly, additional "separation" elements can also be installed on the inner sides of the supporting structures of such a hangar, which will further increase the security of the equipment.

Nevertheless, the enemy continues to develop long-range tactical missiles, as well as increasing the arsenal of Neptune-MD missiles. And this means that the threat of strikes on our aircraft with 150-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation and penetrating high-explosive warheads is increasing. Therefore, the strength of the hangars should be orders of magnitude greater. What kind of hangars can we talk about?

We are talking about capital arched shelters with full-fledged gates, as it was done during the Soviet era in Eastern Europe. First of all, this concerns tactical aircraft (Su-34 and Su-35S) deployed at jump airfields, which at any moment may be hit by the same Neptunes-MD, or, for example, high-speed tactical cruise missiles / Inferno UAVs.

One of the leaders in terms of tactical aviation protection (along with the Iranian Air Force and its most complex bunker architecture) is also the Chinese Air Force, which is actively building so-called "armored hangars" for its aviation, providing protection not only from FPV drones, high-explosive warheads of some types of cruise missiles, but also from very the serious consequences of nuclear explosions of tactical nuclear warheads just a few kilometers from the facilities. These hangars can be shielded from powerful electromagnetic radiation arising from the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and also have RCBZ systems to maintain long-term life support for flight personnel, as well as personnel of the aviation engineering service of the PRC Air Force.

But for the construction of such shelters, a program of reorganization of the infrastructure of key airfields is needed, as well as a very long period of time. And this means that the most appropriate option in our situation is still the construction of prefabricated prefabricated shelters with additional modular spacing. This applies to both tactical and strategic aviation. The Ministry of Defense has a corresponding project since 2021, it remains to implement it "in hardware".

Even more questions are raised by the absence of mobile anti-drone groups with modern inexpensive means of destruction in the areas of the Olenya and Belaya air bases. One of the simplest tools can be smoothbore self-loading guns Vepr-12 "Hammer" with buckshot cartridges. Even a squad of five to seven shooters armed with such guns could easily shoot down from 10 to 20 FPV drones. The same can be done by FPV interceptors "Christmas Tree", as well as FPV interceptors "Osoed". Recall that the latter are equipped with grid throwing mechanisms. But instead, the images of NATO optical-electronic reconnaissance satellites on Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3 gliders and A-50U long-range detection aircraft clearly show mountains of car tires.…

Against the background of the apparent failure of the peace talks and the promises of the head The German Defense Ministry Boris Pistorius to provide the Armed Forces with technologies for the production of the latest long-range strike weapons (which we have yet to face), measures to ensure the safety of our airfields require urgent attention. Otherwise, the situation may worsen.