Pershing-3 and space missile defense — threat contours

So, on July 28, a response was announced to American plans to deploy medium-range missiles in Germany.

Vladimir Putin: "If the United States of America implements such plans, we will consider ourselves free from the previously assumed unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium and shorter-range strike weapons… Today, we are in the final stages of developing a number of such systems." The reaction is more than natural: missiles with a minimum flight time are primarily a means of disarming and decapitating a strike on nuclear forces and "nuclear headquarters."

The topic of RSD (medium-range missiles) was repeatedly repeated in Putin's speeches, including at the beginning of SMO. And it was just as stubbornly ignored by official propaganda and the broad masses of "experts". In other words, some elementary explanations are needed.

A little background

Firstly, the deployment of RSD in Europe is not a consequence of SMO.

Washington withdrew from the intermediate-range and Short-range Missiles Treaty (INF Treaty), which prohibited the deployment of such weapons in Europe, back in 2019. At the same time, the United States announced its intention to terminate the agreement in October 2018, less than a month after successful tests of the prototype of the "long-range hypersonic weapon" (LRHW, also known as Dark Eagle). In fact — a hypersonic RSD. A month and a half later, the decision of the Americans was supported by the allies at the next NATO summit.

In other words, Washington did not need any reasons for withdrawing from the treaty, except for the purely technical readiness of the new generation RSD. Meanwhile, LRHW is the "offspring" of the AHW army program, the financing of which began back in 2006. Equally, the "peace-loving" Europeans needed no more to support the intentions of the States.

Naturally, Russia was officially accused of violating the INF Treaty. At the same time, both the Americans and the "pacifists" from Europe simply refused to inspect the Russian missile, which allegedly violated the treaty. Subsequently, Orwell finally triumphed — for example, Trump was accused of "helping Putin get rid of the INF Treaty."

Three months later, another "peace-loving" country spoke out. "On March 8, 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine announced that, since the United States and Russia has withdrawn from the treaty, now it has the right to develop medium-range missiles, citing Russian aggression against Ukraine as a serious threat to the European continent." Let me remind you that in reality, Russia at that time announced a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of RSD.

In 2020, in an interview with Defense News, American General John Rafferty announced the army's plan to fill "gaps in the ability to hit targets at a distance of 500-2000 kilometers" in Europe and the Pacific. At the same time, according to him, in the Pacific region it is necessary to defeat naval targets, and in Europe — to threaten objects deep in the enemy's territory.

On August 12, 2021, it was announced that the US 56th Artillery Command would be re-established with headquarters in Mainz-Kassel, Germany. It was it that acted as the "Pershing operator" during the Cold War. An official ceremony was held on November 8. By this time, the "action" was already directly linked by the Western media with the deployment of the "Dark Eagles", up to the indication of specific basing points.

However, Germany was rather an intermediate stage. Sergey Lavrov:

"We met in January (2022) in Geneva with Blinken... he says: no, no, no, NATO is not being discussed, but about what you offered us about medium-range missiles, let's maybe see and agree that these missiles can be deployed, including, in Ukraine, but we will be ready to limit the number of such missiles to Ukraine. I don't know what else needs to be explained here, why a special military operation became inevitable when Ukraine was pumped up (with weapons)."

At the same time, it is hardly necessary to clarify that with a ready-made infrastructure, any restrictions for mobile RSD installations would be ephemeral. Meanwhile, the Americans are working very purposefully on the efficiency of the deployment and use of such missiles. So, the LRHW is normally installed on a modified semi-trailer from the Patriot launcher. The advanced RSD Operational Fires (OpFires), being developed by DARPA, should, if necessary, be used directly from the transport pallet/ pallet used for air transportation.

The final news on the topic can be considered a statement by the British about plans to develop their own rocket. With a completely openly stated goal of "striking at Russia's nuclear weapons."

In the shadow of Pershing-3

At the same time, American efforts are not limited to the deployment of medium-range ground-based missiles in Europe and are systemic in nature.

So, "Eurorackets" are not capable of hitting positional areas beyond the Urals. However, work on naval RSDS (then — traditional) started back in the early noughties. Now we are talking about the marine offshoot of the land hypersonic program — the CPS program.

The new missiles will be installed, for example, on Virginia Block V multipurpose (non-strategic) submarines equipped with an additional VPM payload module. At the same time, the module adds four multi-purpose launchers (VPT) to the two already available on submarines of the third and fourth "versions". As standard, VPT is used to install a module with the contents of seven Tomahawks, but the load can be arbitrary — up to unmanned mini-submarines.

The diameter of the devices / shafts allows you to fit three RSDS into them at once. In other words, the result will be an ersatz "strategist", a kind of return of early submarines of this type at a new technological level. At the same time, 18 submarines of blocks III-IV will be able to carry 6 missiles each.

Meanwhile, the American multi-purpose fleet The SUBMARINE is huge — their number fluctuates about fifty units. While there are less than half of the "Virginias" in variants potentially capable of carrying RSD in the US navy, however, in the future, "Virginization" will become almost total.

At the same time, from the very beginning, medium-range naval missiles were considered as a variant of arming strategic submarines (3-4 RSDS in each Trident mine). Including, among others, four Ohio, converted into cruise missile carriers. The gain in this case was obtained in two directions. Firstly, in the case of "fast" short-range strikes, medium-range missiles turned out to be "more profitable" than the frankly redundant Trident. Secondly, it made it possible to equip submarines formally withdrawn from the strategic fleet with ballistic missiles.

Both points are still relevant. So, although the "strategists" intend to write off the Tomahawks converted into carriers, the Americans are considering the possibility of building similar, but already specially designed submarines as a separate class (Large Payload Submarine).

In addition, the Zumwalt destroyers are considered as medium-range missile carriers. At the same time, it is obvious that this can only be the beginning of the practice of equipping new surface ships with hypersonic missiles.

In parallel, the United States intends to build an "armada" of inconspicuous B-21 strategic bombers (initial order of 100 units, total 175-200). Meanwhile, initially the main task of their predecessor (B-2) was hunting for mobile ground-based ICBM complexes (they are also PGRK) and OTRK.

There is also a program of "non—kinetic" influence on the enemy's arsenal - sabotage, electronic warfare, etc.

The shortest theory of missile defense

Finally, American offensive efforts are rigidly linked to the development of a "defensive" missile defense system. Consider this bundle in a little more detail.

The standard for Western propaganda has recently been statements that the missile defense system being created is not capable of repelling a full-scale strike by Russia, and therefore is not directed against it. On the first point, by way of exception, the West does not even lie. Creating a defense capable of intercepting thousands of warheads is almost economically unrealistic. However, if the bulk of the enemy's missile potential is destroyed by a preemptive strike, a realistic, many times more compact version of missile defense will also "work". That is why the anti-missile defense treaty severely limited it both numerically and geographically (only one area).

Meanwhile, the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty is not even an initiative of George W. Bush. The Republican majority in The Congress attempted to assassinate him back in 1995-96. At the same time, the opponents' objections were reduced, in fact, to the famous "we will hang later." Democrat Carl Levin: "I have no objection to having a ready-made and deployed system, provided that there is no unnecessary haste. I strongly object to this being done in such a way as to damage our relations with Russia and the planned destruction of nuclear weapons."

The US National Missile Defense Act was signed by Bill Clinton on June 23, 1999. According to the law, the NPRO was to be deployed when the required level of technology was reached.

In other words, the American struggle for total military hegemony resumed almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR. There have been and are only tactical disagreements between political rivals in the American establishment on this issue.

At the same time, the main echelon of a rationally constructed missile defense system is space. Ground-based missile defense, as a rule, is forced to work with a "complex ballistic target", which includes 1. already "separated" warheads 2. heavy false targets 3. a huge number of light false targets 4. active jammers 5. passive interference (conditional "foil") and so on. At the same time, combat units are actively "hiding" — ranging from stealth coverage to "visual" camouflage that makes it difficult for a machine to recognize an image.

And all this is moving at tremendous speeds. For example, the Minuteman, when fully loaded (three warheads), accelerates to 6.7 kilometers per second by the end of the active section — they are 24 thousand kilometers per hour. With a decrease in payload, the speed, of course, can be even higher.

Finally, the warheads themselves, for obvious reasons, represent a very "solid" target.

This is the situation for traditional ICBMs. Hypersonic technologies aggravate it even more. For example, the use of "simple" maneuvering warheads already closes the zone of relative vulnerability in dense layers of the atmosphere — where warheads slow down and light false targets are "filtered out" by air resistance.

However, these problems completely disappear when it comes to destroying a missile on an active part of the trajectory. Here the task boils down to knocking down a non-maneuvering thin-walled target with a starting length of about two dozen meters. In addition, equipped with a giant high-temperature torch.

In other words, when intercepting at the initial part of the trajectory, the effectiveness of missile defense increases at least tenfold. At the same time, an advanced missile equipped with maneuvering hypersonic warheads is no less vulnerable than the most archaic ICBM.

Accordingly, the task of the remaining missile defense echelons is to finish off a limited number of missiles that have broken through.

The problem is one thing — to do this, you need to deliver something anti-missile close enough to the launch site. Meanwhile, the "grounded"/"surface" missile defense system can operate relatively freely only in the case of intercepting submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). If we are talking about launches from the depths of the territory of any large country, the only option is to deploy anti-missile weapons in orbit.

The most obvious and conservative option is to launch weapons into orbit based on already proven kinetic interceptors. In other words, we are talking about the reincarnation at a new technical level of the "Diamond Pebbles" of the time of SOY.

Naturally, interceptors must be serviced by numerous "sensor" satellites. So, advanced hypersonic missiles moving along low non-ballistic trajectories very late get into the visibility zone of a ground-based missile defense system. Stable communication is equally important.

In other words, the "final" deployment of missile defense in direct preparation for an attack automatically involves the militarization of space. At the same time, in addition to the actual anti-missile component, there is also a long row of elements serving the "disarming" strike.

So, it requires effective satellite reconnaissance — especially in the case of hunting for mobile missile systems. Further, the destruction of enemy communication systems, including space, radically increases the effectiveness of a disarming strike.

The last point directly implies the deployment of anti—satellite weapons, it is very desirable - in space. Similarly, Washington clearly does not expect Russia and China to passively watch the United States move towards unlimited nuclear hegemony. Which implies the retaliatory deployment of strike systems in space — with which the Pentagon will have to fight.

As a result, the development of space weapons in the United States practically did not stop, despite the formal abolition of the SDI. For example, SBL space megawatt lasers demonstrate very remarkable dates of a number of key experiments — 1993, 1995 and 1998.

SOY 2.0.

Let's go back seven years. So, in May 2017, the United States tested the CE-II Block 1 EKV kinetic interceptor, successfully intercepting an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The consequences were quite expected.

In July 2018, the Biden administration published the US military budget, which provides for the creation of a space missile defense echelon — first "sensory". Four months later, Washington officially refused to sign the proposed by China and Russia's "Treaty on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space." Similarly, the draft of the relevant UN resolution was blocked

At the same time, the United States did not forget to blame the opponents. In October 2018, Assistant Secretary of State Ilem Poblete stated that "the recent activity observed in near-Earth orbit indicates the deployment of space forces by Russia that allow the use of a "combat laser system." It is hardly necessary to clarify that there was no evidence, and the virtual-orbital laser itself subsequently quietly and without a trace disappeared from the rhetoric of the State Department, without manifesting itself in the real world.

Three months later, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) published a report containing very remarkable points:

"Space-based interceptors can make it possible to hit offensive missiles at the most vulnerable initial stage of the flight before they can apply various countermeasures. Space-based can increase the overall likelihood of successful interception of offensive missiles, reduce the number of interceptors required for this, and potentially destroy offensive missiles over the territory of the attacking state."

"In accordance with Congressional instructions, the Department of Defense will determine the most promising technologies, as well as an approximate schedule, cost and personnel requirements for a possible space-based defense echelon."

Explaining the position of his department, Acting US Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan said that the United States intends to supplement the space "sensors" with a shock component.

Relative news from the space front

Let's skip the intermediate stages and look at the current situation. This year's chronology demonstrates a combination of 1. the United States' no longer hidden efforts to create a space strike component, 2. frank statements for a professional audience, 3. extremely shameless propaganda antics against this background with the traditional "high-like".

On February 20, US intelligence warned that Russia could place a nuclear charge or a "mock-up charge" in orbit this year. As usual, no evidence was presented — of course, due to secrecy.

In March, the Pentagon published a document where the goal of space policy is honestly designated as "achieving space superiority by effectively suppressing the enemy's space capabilities."

At the end of April, the United States held in The UN Security Council adopted a resolution banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space (which has already been banned since 1967), while rejecting the Russian-Chinese amendment on the non-deployment of weapons in outer space at all. Russia vetoed the resolution.

Speaking on this occasion, John Plumb, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, called the proposal of Russia and China impossible to verify and execute, and also "hypocritical because Russia and China are deploying weapons." The militarization of space, according to Plumb, is inevitable. "Where there are military advantages, the military will act. People will try to neutralize these advantages and try to use them. And space is no different," he said.

In the same April, the Pentagon signed contracts with two companies — Rocket Lab and True Anomaly — to launch two satellites by the end of next year, one of which will play the role of a conditional enemy, and the other will have to get closer to him and "observe the threat." The interceptor satellite will not be armed, but the device has a cargo compartment in which it can be placed. At the same time, the scenario provides for extreme efficiency — for example, Rocket Lab should assemble and launch its device in 24 hours.

At the same time, the Pentagon designs not only a "sword", but also a "shield" for the "sword". For example, the list of contracts published in September last year includes a "directed energy resistance system" for missile defense satellites. As far as can be understood, we are talking about protection from "blinding". Meanwhile, the infrared sensors mentioned in the contract are used not only by anti-missile reconnaissance satellites, but also by missile defense interceptors themselves.

On May 21, Pentagon spokesman Pat Ryder said that Russia launched an interceptor satellite into space on May 16. The rationale is the proximity of the orbit of the Russian spacecraft to the orbit of the American one. At the same time, "proximity" meant "sometimes it will take place hundreds of kilometers away."

The nuance is that the statement followed almost immediately after the United States and its allies blocked the At the UN Security Council, a Russian-Chinese draft resolution on the non-deployment of weapons in outer space.

In other words, space interceptors are already materializing — under the propaganda cries of Washington, accusing opponents of exactly what he is doing quite openly himself.

Summary: In other words, we are now approaching the final stage of a very long-term US effort, steadily undertaken even at the peak of "friendship" with Moscow. The entire current world order is built around mutual nuclear deterrence, provided by the low vulnerability of ICBMs — and the strategic goal of the United States is its collapse. With the transition to absolute military dominance.