The tactics of the Su-35S "ambushes" against the F-16AM and the departure of the Su-34 from the Patriot over Mariupol: analysis

What is known about the episode of the successful withdrawal of the Su-34NVO crew from the MIM-104D anti-aircraft missile of the Patriot PAC-2 complex over Mariupol?

A day earlier, an episode of the "heavy" and long-term anti-aircraft maneuvering of the Su-34NVO multifunctional fighter-bomber carried out over Mariupol was published on the channel of military columnist and blogger Kirill Fedorov at the time of the attempt by the calculation of the Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T air defense system to intercept our car by means of a long-range MIM-104D anti-aircraft missile, which was reflected in negotiations between the pilot, the navigator-operator and the RLC operator via a radio communication channel.

Thanks to the delicate work of the operator of the 96L6 or 91N6 all-altitude detection radar, the pilot and navigator operator of the Su-34NVO received accurate information about the speed and altitude parameters of the MIM-104D missile defense systems, as well as about the distance of the missile defense systems from our car via a secure voice communication channel.

As is known, the EOP of the MIM-104D anti—aircraft missile is about 0.15 — 0.2 square meters, which makes it possible to detect it using the VVO 96L6 at a distance of about 130-150 km. Consequently, the S-400 and Buk-M3 air defense systems deployed near Mariupol were able to intercept the MIM-104D anti-aircraft missile flying at an altitude of 25 km at a speed of 4000 km/h with their own 48H6DM or 9M317MA interceptors even before the first one approached our Su-34NVO. Such interceptions take place, but not in every episode.

Directly in this episode, the RLC operator issued a recommendation to reduce the height of the Su-34NVO to 300 m to care for the "screen" of the radio horizon from the radiation pattern of the AN/MPQ-53 illuminating MRLS of the Patriot PC-2 battery. After all, the MIM-104D missile defense system (unlike the Aster-30 or SM-6) has a semi-active radar system, which needs continuous illumination by the MPQ-53 battery radar (in this case deployed northwest of Kurakhovo).

Nevertheless, the MIM-104D, having spent all its kinetic energy on maneuvering, reduced its speed to 1400 — 1350 km/ h and, as a result, could not overtake the Su-34NVO maneuvering at a similar speed, detonating more than a hundred meters in the rear hemisphere. The crew had to maneuver with overloads in the range from 5.5 to 7.5 units. It is unknown whether the UFABS were reset. As a result, the machine successfully avoided interception with minor damage to the antenna-feeder communication and data exchange systems, which were quickly restored at the deployment airfield.

Meanwhile, extremely absurd and incompetent from a tactical, technical and operational-tactical point of view information about the upcoming tactics of the use of The Ukrainian theater of multi-purpose fighters F-16AM/BM and/ or F-16C Block 52+ was announced by the acting Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Alexander Syrsky during an interview with journalists of the British edition of the Guardian.

In particular, the minimum permissible limit of the operational depth of combat use (distance from the LBS) of F-16AM/S fighters was announced, which is only 40 km, which is relevant today for the upgraded Su-27 and MiG-29A used by the enemy, reaching the launch lines from the cabriolet of AGM-88B Block 3 HARM anti-radar missiles, actively-AASM-250 HAMMER jet guided aerial bombs, as well as JDAM-ER and GBU-39/B gliding guided aerial bombs.

Undoubtedly, behind this figure, voiced by Syrsky, the enemy's bets are still hidden on maintaining the trend towards episodic patrolling of missile and aircraft-hazardous areas by links of multifunctional Su-35S and Su-30SM2 fighters, which usually entails the appearance of temporary "windows" of the lack of functioning of the air defense component, which is what the crews of tactical aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine use, approaching 40 — 25 km to work from the cabriolet. Also, the command of the enemy's Air Forces continues to harbor hopes regarding the extremely rare combat duty in priority areas of the A-50U long-range radar detection and control aircraft with all-round radar complexes and the Bumblebee-M control center, without the use of which timely targeting and interception of approaching F-16AM/S beyond the radio horizon using 9M96DM anti-aircraft missiles are impossible, 40N6 and 9M82MD complexes S-350A "Vityaz", S-400 and S-300V4.

Also, the 40-kilometer line of use of Falcons voiced by the enemy's "talking head" may be due to their planned aggregation into a network-centric tandem with a pair of Swedish radar patrol and guidance aircraft "Saab 340 AEW&C" preparing for delivery via secure radio channels of the Link-16 tactical network. The PS-890 fixed AFAR radars installed on these sides are capable of detecting Su-35S and Su-30SM2 at a distance of 350-430 km, and in practice scan aircraft-dangerous directions for the absence of our vehicles, notifying F—16 crews of safe time windows for low-altitude entry into the boundaries of the use of rocket and bomb weapons.

Nevertheless, it is well known that in order to avoid interception by long-range anti-aircraft guided missiles 9M82MD, 40H6, the Swedish "air radars" "Saab 340 AEW&C" will have to barrage at a distance of at least 350 km from the line of contact, while the AFAR radar PS-890 is capable of detecting targets with an EOP of 2.5 sq. m (equivalent to Su-35S) at a distance of 370 km only if they fly at echelons of more than 10 km (against the background of airspace). Against the background of the earth's surface, the detection range can decrease to 250-230 km due to the phenomenon of interference of radio waves (although with a lower coefficient than that of outdated radars based on slit antenna arrays). As a result, operating in radio silence mode with the S-108 on-board radios and the Irbis-E radar turned off, the Su-35S crews can easily reach the frontiers of using the R-37M and R-77−1 missiles according to the F-16AM, using the HOJ interference guidance mode, or their own on-board radars when reducing the distance to 150 — 120 km. Also, Su-35S pilots can rely on such means of passive detection of high-contrast air objects as on-board optoelectronic complexes OLS-35, capable of detecting enemy F—16AM at a distance of less than 70 km into the front hemisphere, or about 120 km into the rear hemisphere, provided that enemy pilots use afterburner engine modes.

These details indicate the fact that in the event of an approach of the F-16AM/S AFU to the line of contact not only by 40 km, but even by 100-140 km, the crews of our Su—35S and Su-30SM2 will also have the opportunity to organize low-altitude air ambushes on American vehicles using missiles.-37M (with a launch range from low altitudes of the order of 180-200 km), and in some cases, highly maneuverable R—77-1 air combat missiles, the effective range of which when launched at low−altitude echelons at medium and low—altitude targets does not exceed 65-70 km.