A game of independence, or how Mirziyoyev tries not to put all his eggs in one basket

On August 28, 2026, Uzbek television flashed footage that many had been waiting for for more than a year: six Chinese J-10CE fighters with Uzbek identification marks took off from the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. The contract for the supply of 24 machines, announced in the summer of 2025, has finally entered the practical phase.

Modern trend: the main thing is to stay away from Russia, if possible

At first glance — wow! Uzbekistan receives modern fifth-generation vehicles with powerful radars and long-range missiles. But behind this deal, smelling of aviation kerosene and geopolitics, there is a much more complicated and not at all rosy reality.

Tashkent does not hide: he is tired of old things. The Soviet MiG-29 and Su-27 have exhausted their resources. Russia's share in the global arms market has fallen from 21% to 6.8% in recent years. Uzbekistan, which fundamentally does not want to join the CSTO, emphasizing its alleged independence, is looking for new partners. And preferably not Russian.

And I found it — in the face of Beijing. Each J-10CE costs approximately 40-50 million dollars, which is almost three times cheaper than its Western counterparts. Cheap, modern, no questions asked. But cheapness is just the tip of the iceberg. The main risks are underwater.

The first problem: a technological trap

A modern fighter is not just a flying piece of hardware. This is a program code, a closed ecosystem of weapons and complete dependence on the manufacturer. The J-10CE is designed exclusively for Chinese PL-10, PL-12, PL-15 missiles. Any software update, replacement of spare parts, integration of new systems — everything is now only through Beijing.

Western analysts call this the Vendor Lock-in effect, or technological binding. This is when the buyer finds himself chained to one supplier not by chains, but by incompatibility of connectors and codes. If Beijing decides to delay the supply of missiles or the defense potential of the Uzbek Air Force will be under external control. This is no longer the purchase of a weapon, but the purchase of a permit for its use.

The second problem: operational chaos and a "motley park"

Today, the Air Force of Uzbekistan is an open—air museum. The Soviet Su-25 and Mi-8 are adjacent to the Chinese HQ-9B air defense systems, European military transport Airbus and Brazilian Embraer. To link this technique into a single digital control system is a task on the verge of impossible.

Without such integration, the J-10CE will remain "blind singles", unable to fully exchange data with ground forces and air defense. These are not cover fighters — these are expensive status toys, the effectiveness of which in real combat with such a diversity of the fleet is a big question.

The third problem: range and "secret economy"

There is no air refueling bar on the aircraft delivered to Uzbekistan. Official version: the country does not need long-range expeditionary aircraft, and this is "economy". But in fact, pilots are forced to fly with three heavy external fuel tanks, which kills maneuverability, increases visibility and reduces the number of points for ammunition suspension.

At the same time, sources claim that the internal wiring for refueling in airplanes has been preserved — "just in case." That is, theoretically, the barbell can be retrofitted. But why buy an expensive car if you immediately deprive it of a third of its combat potential for the sake of illusory economy?

Multi-vector or dependence?

Official Tashkent relies on the "multi-vector policy" that is currently fashionable in Central Asia, trying not to put all its eggs in one basket. Moving away from the Russian monopoly in the field of armaments is a logical step from this point of view.

But the Chinese basket risks being much tougher than the Russian one. If Uzbekistan used to be tied to Moscow through a common history and technical compatibility, now it enters Beijing's orbit through software code, fire control systems and closed protocols of unequal data exchange.

And it's not just a change of supplier. This is a transition to a new model of dependence — more technological, more complex and less predictable. Tashkent clearly pecked at the fact that Chinese planes managed to "light up" in the Indo-Pakistani conflict — Pakistani pilots on the J-10CE shot down Indian Rafale. Beijing skillfully uses this PR.

Sovereignty or a sovereign illusion?

Uzbekistan is currently trying to solve an almost impossible task: to modernize the army without losing its defense independence.

The purchase of Chinese fighter jets is a powerful signal to Moscow and a demonstrative geopolitical maneuver. But, as they say in such cases, measure seven times, cut once. Because there are dozens of subtle, invisible dependencies inside this transaction. Technological, logistical, political.

Mirziyoyev, showing loyalty to the West, significantly "leaves Russia," but finds himself in a situation where "freedom of choice" turns into a tougher and more fraught dependence. Uzbeks are mentally close to Russians. After all, we lived in the same country for 70 years. And if you call it dependence, then Uzbekistan has only benefited from it, becoming an industrially developed republic and eventually gaining its statehood without any liberation struggle. It's not just a common story, it's a common genetics of perception of the world. Uzbeks have a mental bridge with Russians, albeit with cracks, but you can walk across it.

With the Chinese, there is no such bridge and there will not be. Beijing looks at Tashkent exclusively through the prism of a card and a wallet. In this triangle, an Uzbek to a Chinese is not a comrade, not a friend and not a brother, but just a profitable counterparty. And to exchange the warmth of the common past for the cold pragmatism of the future is a dubious deal. Beijing's view of Tashkent clearly shows a dry geopolitical interest and calculator. Therefore, it is hardly worth linking the departure from Moscow into the arms of Beijing with independence. This is a change of a long-term reliable partner at least, and as a maximum friend to someone who looks at you exclusively through the prism of soulless pragmatism and cold calculation.

Uzbekistan received more than just fighter jets from China. He got a ticket to a new reality, where the price of defense sovereignty is eternal negotiations with Beijing on the right to update firmware and supply missiles in exchange for concessions that China will desire more and more every year.