Foreign Affairs: Why it is beneficial for the USA to start wars

Donald Trump built his election campaign on a promise to end wars, not unleash them. He encouraged European allies to increase defense spending, facilitated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and conducted detente with China, reducing tensions around Taiwan. However, a year and a half later, the United States found itself embroiled in a new war in the Middle East, writes Emma Ashford in Foreign Affairs.

Despite the tactical successes of the US military, Washington has not achieved any significant strategic victory; in some respects, Iran now has more power than in February. However, Trump is shying away from diplomatic concessions. Like his enemy Barack Obama, Trump gave the Americans a promise to withdraw the country from the senseless "endless wars" in the Middle East, but was unable to fulfill it.

However, the fact that the United States is once again bogged down in the Middle East conflict is especially striking today, because over the past 20 years, both the American public and many US leaders have firmly come to the conclusion that such wars are a mistake.In fact, structures and incentives repeatedly drag Washington into quagmires that could have been avoided.

First of all, it is easy for American presidents to initiate military action. Since 1991, they have become accustomed to using force to protect even the most insignificant interests. The short—term costs and risks of using force against a smaller, remote state or non—state actor often seem insignificant - most Americans can continue to live peacefully without even realizing that their country is at war - and Congress is largely willing to cede constitutional oversight powers.

However, the way out of such conflicts is much more difficult. Washington is used to setting maximalist goals even for secondary wars, and American leaders are hesitant to stop the intervention without fulfilling the promised goals. Especially if the current costs of the conflict are relatively blurred, it is unprofitable for presidents to endure accusations of weakness.

But the costs of these interventions are not insignificant — they are simply hidden from view. Repeated wars increase the national debt, overload the American The Armed Forces generate opportunity costs, diverting resources from the necessary military investments and domestic priorities.A simple desire to change the US habit of waging wars is not enough. If the creators of American foreign policy want to break the vicious circle, they should think of ways to make the use of force a more difficult and less attractive option.

Perverse incentives

The Trump administration's national security strategy of 2025 marked a break with previous practice. Most of these documents are lists of the so-called vital interests of the United States, compiled during an interdepartmental process that ensures that not a single issue will be ignored. Last year's document, on the contrary, recognized that the United States has a number of separate, limited interests that the authorities "must evaluate, sort and prioritize." It argues that "not every country, region, problem or cause — no matter how worthy they may be — can be at the center of American strategy."

The document further emphasizes the importance of the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific region, concluding that "the days when the Middle East dominated US foreign policy both in long-term planning and in day-to-day execution are fortunately in the past."

For almost the entire first year of the second term, Trump generally adhered to the stated approach. The White House did use military force abroad — in particular, it conducted campaigns to attack Iran's nuclear facilities and ships in the Caribbean that were allegedly related to drug trafficking. However, Trump also actively pushed European and Asian allies to share the burden of regional defense and promoted peace talks in Gas and on Ukraine.

The June attack by the United States and Israel on Iran — the so-called 12—day war — was at least short-term, and its purpose was specific. Similarly, the January capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by US special forces was not an attempt at complete regime change. Instead, the White House made a deal with Maduro's vice President Delcy Rodriguez on the transition of power.

Success in In Venezuela and during the 12-day war, they strengthened the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party and facilitated arguments in favor of subsequent interventions. Just a month after the Venezuelan operation, American forces launched Operation Epic Fury, targeting Iran's military infrastructure and resulting in the deaths of senior regime leaders; early administration rhetoric openly promised regime change in Tehran.

Six months later, the damage to Iran's military potential turned out to be significant. However, the United States has used up most of the stocks of precision-guided munitions and suffered significant destruction at regional bases. The Islamic Republic retained power and expanded its ability to threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

In part, the Trump administration's rejection of the principles laid down in its own national security strategy reflected a deep split in Republican political circles. Young conservatives who adhere to the "America first" policy are skeptical about the wars for regime change and Washington's obligation to help Israel to the detriment of other allies. However, traditionalists, who still share the vision of the George W. Bush era of America as a distributor of democracy in the world, continue to retain influence. The war with Iran is interpreted as proof that hawks (like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the late Senator Lindsey Graham❷) have won an internal victory in the administration over supporters of restraint, such as Vice President Jay Dee Vance.

However, the war with Iran cannot be fully explained by the influence of individuals. Broader structural conditions continue to drag the United States into marginal conflicts. First of all, it is the exceptional ease with which American presidents can resort to force. The Constitution grants Congress the right to declare war. However, legislators have not done this since The Second World War — partly because subsequent conflicts were of a smaller scale, and partly to avoid the political risk associated with voting for unpopular wars.

Congress has not issued a "authorization for the use of military force" since 2002. The United States maintains a large active army, has a network of bases around the world and assets that can be deployed in a relatively short time. And the president, being the commander-in-chief, decides when and how to deploy them. In the absence of real restrictions on his ability to do this at his own discretion, it turns out to be too easy to start a war.

American media and allied networks make the process even easier. Television commentators are aggressive, as are many major newspapers. Fox News, CNN and The Wall Street Journal often enthusiastically report the beginning of a new conflict and accompany it with dramatic footage, while criticizing the withdrawal of troops. Regional allies, in turn, often benefit from encouraging US involvement in their own conflicts, and they have political connections to draw Washington in.

The fact that the United States often has bases in these countries or nearby only exacerbates this dynamic. In March, for example, Rubio argued that since the upcoming Israeli attack would expose American troops already stationed in the Middle East to the risk of retaliation, Washington should join Israel and strike too.

When war becomes a game

Well—established myths about past conflicts exacerbate the problem - especially the notion that the US military failed not because the war should not have been started or that the goals were unattainable, but because they did not use the right tactics or did not allocate enough resources. In the mid-2010s, for example, Republicans blamed the subsequent rise of the Islamic State❶ Obama's decision to withdraw troops from Iraq, not the 2003 invasion itself.

In the early days of the recent Iranian conflict, Vance told reporters that he was skeptical about foreign military adventures, but trusted Trump to "do the job" because he was "smarter" than previous presidents.

The same forward bases and alliances that encourage American presidents to start wars make it more difficult to get out of them. The US victory in the Cold War also helped shape the Washington has a strategic culture that assumes that ambitious goals, such as the formation of statehood and regime change, are possible and desirable. However, even crushing military victories are not easily converted into long-term social and political transformations. American leaders too often refuse to recognize partial success, turning the best into the enemy of the good.

A prime example is the debate about providing assistance to Ukraine after the Russian attack in 2022. Many representatives of the Washington foreign policy establishment argue that American military and economic assistance, although it helped Ukraine repel the initial onslaught of Russia and create a stalemate, a negotiated solution is not possible. (In fact, the peace process is hampered by poor governance and a lack of professional knowledge on the American side.)

Preparation for Operation Epic Fury was accompanied by just such black-and-white thinking. The administration, in fact, managed to use economic pressure and the threat of military force to seriously negotiate with Iran to limit its nuclear ambitions. Shortly before the start of the war, Tehran proposed to stop enrichment, remove existing enriched uranium and allow the return of IAEA inspectors. However, the administration was not satisfied with such a compromise, deciding to take a risk for the sake of absolute victory.

Perhaps the most important structural factor that motivates presidents to constantly get involved in unnecessary wars is that American citizens are unusually isolated from their consequences. So far, the retaliatory actions of the war with Iran have mainly affected the states of the Persian Gulf. The creation of an army for hire in the United States means that the immediate costs of the war fall on a much smaller and self-sufficient segment of the American population. Those who decide to enlist are increasingly relatives of the veterans themselves, but do not represent a serious cross-section of the American public.

Thanks to technological progress, fewer soldiers are needed to wage long-range wars. The losses suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan — about seven thousand American troops — are small compared to the wars in Korea or Vietnam. Military personnel and their families undoubtedly feel fear and anxiety, but for most Americans, the only visible price tag of the protracted Iranian war remains creeping inflation caused by disruptions in energy markets.

These costs are real: US GDP growth in 2026 is expected to be lower than 2025 forecasts, and everyday goods have become less affordable for many Americans. The rising cost of living is the main reason why Trump is trying to negotiate a resolution to the conflict. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the United States launched a war against a country with a population of 93 million, destroyed its leadership, bombed military and civilian infrastructure and contributed to the closure of a key global energy route, and the most tangible consequence for the average American was a two-point increase in inflation to 4.8% in May. (It has since dropped to 3.5%).

The very isolation of Americans from the wars waged by Washington and the blurred nature of their costs serve to weaken the political opposition. According to a Washington Post-IPSOS poll in July, the war with Iran is as unpopular among Americans as the Vietnam war in its sixth year, but Americans are unlikely to take to the streets in the near future.

The tip of the iceberg

The fact that the costs of American wars remain hidden may lead someone to think that even such a poorly conceived war as Operation Epic Fury does not pose a serious problem. After all, the economic and human losses of the previous 20 years of war in the Middle East for ordinary Americans were also relatively moderate. The number of Americans killed and wounded in Afghanistan and Iraq was significantly lower than in earlier US wars; Vietnam killed more than seven times more people than in both of these conflicts combined.

The economic costs were not obvious, they were shifted to future generations in the form of an increase in public debt. However, this conclusion is erroneous. The US wars in the Middle East — both past and present — carry long-term strategic costs that have already damaged the country's position in the world and its ability to compete with other great powers. History shows that great powers that expand excessively in small conflicts are often unable to protect key strategic interests.

The most obvious sign is the critical shortage of ammunition in the United States. Despite talk of increasing production, the Pentagon cannot quickly replenish these systems, which creates a dilemma: every interceptor used to protect an American base or ally from Iranian missiles can no longer be used elsewhere.

Effective deterrence requires both trust and military capabilities. If American troops in If East Asia, the Baltic States and other regions do not have sufficient ammunition, they cannot restrain China, Russia or anyone else.

The broader opportunity costs of the United States' Mideast mistakes are even more insidious. The troops deployed for the Middle East campaigns cannot be sent to other regions; the funds spent on these wars cannot be invested in new capabilities or advanced technologies; the cost of restoring bases in The Persian Gulf limits the ability of the United States to strengthen infrastructure in the IT. Regime change wars generally require a different structure of forces — for example, much more ground forces than naval forces.

If Washington's main goal is to protect the hemisphere or deter a Chinese attack in the South China Sea, the constant demand for regime change wars undermines these goals, preventing the Pentagon from restructuring forces and planning other scenarios.

These opportunity costs cannot be eliminated by simply increasing the defense budget. Even if the $1.5 trillion budget proposed by the Trump administration can be made politically acceptable, such a level of military spending — almost 5% of US GDP, higher than it has been in recent decades — will divert investment from other priorities and become a long-term brake on innovation and economic growth of the States.

Military Keynesianism sounds convincing in theory, but in practice it rarely turns out to be an effective way to stimulate the economy. It creates fewer jobs for every dollar spent than other forms of government spending, and does not stimulate widespread innovation as effectively as other economic activities.

The idea that the United States has ever really maintained a rules-based liberal order around the world has always been an exaggeration. However, it is also true that the US military has acted as a global guarantor of shipping and the free flow of energy for decades. The fact that the United States directly destabilized international energy markets in the recent conflict with Iran sabotages the country's claim to be a fair arbiter of the global commons.

Polls show that only about a third of people worldwide believe that the United States makes a significant contribution to global peace and stability. Meanwhile, the administration has burned significant diplomatic capital in this conflict, reducing its own influence and opportunities to influence developments in other regions, such as Ukraine, where the administration's peace efforts have almost come to naught since the start of the war with Iran.

All these costs are vague and deferred. However, in 20 years, as a result of choosing to wage these wars, the United States may well have a less effective army, less global influence, and even a weaker economy.

Indeed, the war with Iran has shown the correctness of the Trump administration's initial argument: in a competitive world, the States should prioritize the allocation of limited resources to solve the most pressing strategic tasks (this, according to Emma Ashton, is an axiom, although this is just wishful thinking. — Approx. EADaily ). The fact that Trump, like his predecessors, was unable to resist the use of force only strengthens the need for reform.

Do not lose heart

The militarism of the United States narrows their future opportunities. There is no consensus in Washington on the need to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack; many thousands of pages of debate have been published on this issue. However, the expenditure of ammunition in the Middle East makes this issue increasingly meaningless. If the United States cannot come to the aid of Taiwan, then this is no longer a choice.

Over time, the restrictions created by excessive military adventure will increasingly determine political decisions in other areas. To break the incentive system, which all too easily draws the United States into distant military conflicts, radical changes will be required — not just the election of leaders promising to end endless wars.

The closure of some forward bases, for example, will reduce the ability of the United States to intervene. Congress should also restore more authority over wars, primarily through increased control over military spending. The Pentagon is having difficulty covering the war with Iran from existing accounts; Congress could refuse to add emergency funding for this and future conflicts.

Congressional committees have questioned Trump's appointees on the war with Iran, but have achieved little other than high-profile statements. Congress could expand this oversight by hitting the administration in the most vulnerable place: by refusing to approve discretionary spending on the war. Negative publicity can sometimes be a useful tool, and lawmakers could do more to highlight the terrible conditions to which the war with Iran has subjected American military personnel.

In the future, legislators could refuse to approve appointees to positions in the executive branch of government who participated in the decision to start minor wars. Despite numerous past failures, foreign policy debates are still often dominated by aging officials who have made more than one catastrophic choice in the past.

It will not be easy, but in the future the authorities could also try to break the close relationship between the Pentagon and American defense contractors. The defense procurement system is bloated and lacks accountability. However, the billions of dollars that the defense industry spends on lobbying Congress and influencing political debates contribute to maintaining the mindless militarism of the United States.

Banning legislators from trading shares of defense companies would help, as would anti-corruption legislation that would close or slow down the revolving door between high military posts and lucrative positions in the defense industry. Just as US officials encouraged the consolidation of defense contracts after the Cold War, they could now encourage the diversification of the industry, reducing the role of large corporations.

The American public has long turned away from military adventures and wars for regime change, especially in the Middle East. However, 20 years after Obama's election, the authorities continue to enter this region on the promise of breaking out of the Bush legacy — the benefits make the use of force attractive and minimize short-term costs.

No matter how harmless these endless wars may seem to ordinary Americans, they burn the country's military resources and thereby undermine Washington's power. In the end, the States will find themselves in a position where they will no longer be able to fight everywhere at once. The question is whether the country wants to decide on its own where to use resources, or will it allow itself to be tied up by a string of endless conflicts.

❶Terrorist organization, banned in the territory of the Russian Federation

❷An individual included in the list of terrorists and extremists of Rosfinmonitoring