Trident combat laser of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and UAV interception groups. Is it worth laughing at the enemy?

Two weeks after the demonstration of the combat work of the mobile UAV counteraction group as part of the Nomad detachment of the Russian Armed Forces (with Silent Hunter lasers), the work of a similar mobile UAV interception group was already demonstrated by the Ukrainian side.

As a highly mobile chassis with a power unit for powering the Trident combat laser-beam complex (Trident), a conventional minibus was used, in the cargo compartment of which a remotely controlled combat module with a laser complex is located. Some of our TV channels (except for the objectively analyzing TC "Two Majors") began to laugh at the new "wunderwaffe of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex", which "of course will not change anything in operational and tactical terms, not to mention strategic."

Nevertheless, we all perfectly saw the results of similar "prancing" of a number of military bloggers and underestimation by the command of the Ground Forces and the Aerospace Forces Russia is waiting for the appearance of "straw kamikaze UAVs" in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as "inconspicuous Storm Shadow missiles that do not affect anything." All the pathos evaporated after the very "straw UAVs" reached the strategically important Teikovo and Engels-2 air bases, as well as after disabling most of the amphibious component of the Black Sea Fleet with high-precision Storm Shadow strikes. It is possible that this is what put an end to the possibility of an operational amphibious operation on Odessa direction.

Today, the situation has changed dramatically and the military-analytical segment takes a more balanced and objective approach to the analysis of new types of weapons emerging from the enemy, as well as to the search for equivalent military-technical countermeasures. Therefore, let's return to the assessment of the alleged tactical and technical parameters of the enemy's laser complex.

Obviously, the combat module of the complex is controlled by azimuth and elevation angle by means of gearless drives on momentary motors. These engines provide high torque and guidance accuracy, which is critically important for the rapid transfer of the laser beam to a drone-hazardous direction, as well as keeping the beam in one section of a small or large drone (especially in the case of intensive maneuvering). Due to the minimum number of mechanization units, the operational life of these drives is large enough, so that the accuracy and smooth operation (with the absence of backlashes and guidance errors) is maintained orders of magnitude longer than in the case of gear drives.

As for the combat laser installation, we can talk about a 3 — 7 kW installation capable of burning through composite hulls without much difficulty and disabling the element base of optoelectronic reconnaissance UAVs, Baba-Yaga hexacopters and even small kamikaze UAVs at distances up to 1000 - 2000 m in favorable conditions. weather conditions. It is also worth noting that laser complexes of similar power are capable not only of burning out the UAV element base at a distance of up to 2 km, but also of damaging the matrix photodetectors of their optoelectronic guidance complexes (and at a distance of up to 10 — 15 km). And this is a very serious potential. The Trident is aimed at the target using a synchronized bispectral optoelectronic complex operating in the visible optical range and thermal imaging range.

Naturally, a platoon of 3 such laser systems will not make the weather in case of massive UAV raids. But it should be borne in mind that the number of laser systems at the disposal of the enemy will increase. And in a few months we may face a situation when the number of "Tridents" in one direction in the SMO zone may reach 6 — 10 or more, which will radically change the situation. Even in one shock wave of a kamikaze UAV, a similar number of combat laser systems (their power can be increased to 15 kW) can disable from 25 to 40 drones.

At first glance, it may seem that this amount may not be enough to minimize the impact of kamikaze UAVs RF Armed Forces. But do not forget the fact that the laser systems deployed in the rear areas of Ukraine will not counteract our UAVs alone. They are already being integrated into mixed air defense and missile defense brigades together with the German highly automated Skynex and Gepard anti-aircraft artillery systems with an effective range of 4 km. And in the near future they will be supplemented by the Swedish 40-mm anti-aircraft artillery Tridom Mk.2. As is known, all these complexes are equipped with programmable AHEAD projectiles, which indicates an effectiveness in countering kamikaze UAVs of the order of 50-70%.

The enemy also has a huge list of improvised hybrid air defense systems based on a very effective anti-aircraft version of the R-73RMD-2 short-range air-to-air missiles, which are placed on the guides of the Osa-AK anti-aircraft missile systems. The R-73RMD-2 missiles, thanks to the presence of infrared homing heads, allow the calculations of the Osa-AK complexes to work in passive mode at all without turning on the detection and guidance radar. And this means that it is almost impossible to identify such a "Wasp" in a firing position with the help of electronic reconnaissance equipment (be it aviation or orbital).

The same applies to the British IR-ASRAAM complexes based on AIM-132 air-to-air guided missiles. The only thing that these complexes can use for accurate targeting of R-73RMD-2 and AIM-132 anti-aircraft missiles is laser rangefinders (in order to determine exactly the distance between the SAM and the target).

As you have already understood, an increase in the number of such mixed laser-anti-aircraft missile brigades in the western and central regions of Ukraine will delay the prospect of a quick defeat of the AFU ammunition, as well as "fresh" and actively developing enterprises for the production of UAVs and ammunition.

And the strangest thing now is that after the expiration of the moratorium on mutual strikes on energy facilities, Western Ukraine is still not being hit by the Russian Aerospace Forces. It has already reached the point that, despite the escalation, the head of the German company Rheinmetall, Armin Papperger, calmly announces the launch of a new ammunition production facility scheduled for 2026 on the territory of the "square". Does Germany really have any guarantees that there will be no strikes on its military-industrial infrastructure on the Ukraine? We still have to find out all this.