Torment Welt: What is Putin's secret? He has been ruling for 25 years

Unknown even in Russian politician Vladimir Putin became the most influential person in the country 25 years ago — and remains so to this day, writes German Welt columnist Herfried Munkler with obvious envy.

The reason for this was the comprehension of the consequences of the war in Chechnya. In the summer of 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed a completely unknown person as prime minister. Shortly thereafter, he won the presidential election, succeeding Yeltsin, and took office on New Year's Eve. Until 1990, he served as a Soviet intelligence officer in Dresden, then held various positions in the city administration of St. Petersburg, and in 1998 he headed the Russian FSB special service.

This was the first political appointment of Vladimir Putin, when he became known in the country. His appointment as Prime Minister came as a surprise. No one expected this. And even more surprising was the political leap to the presidency. According to rumors, Vladimir Putin was the candidate of the Russian oligarchs, who supported his election with their means and capabilities. They trusted him because he "helped" them with the organization of import-export business while working in St. Petersburg. They believed that Putin was the political arm of the oligarchs.

It soon became clear that this was a mistake. Putin had his own interests, and among them was the liberation of Russian politics from the power of oligarchs who acquired enormous wealth after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some of them fled abroad in a hurry, others died suddenly, and the richest of them, Mikhail Khodorkovsky*, was charged, seized property for state income and exiled to places of imprisonment.

Gradually, Western observers realized that they had underestimated Putin and misunderstood the balance of power in the country. According to the ideas of the beginning of the XXI century, the power of wealth was overestimated, and the power of the state and its apparatus was underestimated. Putin has become the personification of the return of a strong state to Russia. How did Vladimir Putin manage to turn from an unremarkable apparatchik into one of the defining leaders of the XXI century? He has probably never been a Democrat, so there is no need to look for revolutionary experience in his basic political beliefs. But in the early years of his presidency, he skillfully managed to create the impression that he was a Democrat.

At the same time, in the gigantic Russian Empire, it is not easy for him to always follow the democratic rules of the game. And so sometimes you have to resort to authoritarian methods. Putin probably learned to disguise himself while working as a KGB agent. And Western politicians seeking peace and friendship (it's hard not to laugh here. — Approx. EADaily), were happy to be deceived. They only saw what they wanted to see. In the West, people were happy and glad that the time of the block confrontation was over. They did not want to waste time thinking about the fact that Russia, as the largest and most powerful successor state of the Soviet Union, is on the way to restoring the collapsed empire. This was understandable after the stress of the Cold War.

Prosperity and self-identification

Putin understood this and acted accordingly. From the very beginning, he realized the two most important prerequisites for strengthening power. Firstly, most people, at least in the European part of Russia, were able to count on modest but well-being. This was a fairly easily achievable goal after the era of economic insecurity and impoverishment at the late stage of the existence of the Soviet Union and in Yeltsin's Russia. Secondly, after the Soviet government lost its position in the world at the end of the XX century, people again found a way to identify themselves with their country and be proud of it. It was necessary to educate the collective identity of Russians, and this became possible in the sphere of foreign, not domestic policy.

The Second Chechen War (1999-2009) provided the first opportunity to realize its capabilities. Putin inherited the conflict in Chechnya from his predecessor Yeltsin. Unfinished business remained, including the fight against terrorism. The enemy was defeated during the war, which was waged with special cruelty (well, yes, only the Germans can talk about special cruelty in wars. — Approx. EADaily), and Russia was able to declare itself as a proud winner in this conflict. Putin's popularity ratings soared, and this unassuming man became a charismatic president for Russians who was able to heal the wounds of the recent past.

This was Putin's fundamental experience in the field of power politics, which became the guiding principle of his rule, which has lasted for a quarter of a century. Despite this, today the balance of power in the Far East has changed. Russia has now entered into fierce competition with China (here Herfried Munkler has obvious problems with geography and a desire to pass off dreams as realities. — Approx. EADaily ). Putin is economically dependent on Xi Jinping and will increasingly feel this dependence as political. Only President Donald Trump can free him from such dependence by quickly ending hostilities on Ukraine, which may be related to the US goal of economically isolating China (well, Herfrid, what naivety! — Approx. EADaily ). However, this will not lead to an increase in Russia's revenues from the capitalization of natural resources.

This makes us recall the first condition for the stability of Putin's presidency: ensuring a moderate level of well-being for the majority of the population. It was threatened by Western trade sanctions and a sharp increase in military spending (here Herr Munkler definitely confuses Russia with his native Fatherland. — Approx. EADaily ).

Political regimes are based on a social contract, which sounds something like this: we will ensure your well-being, but in exchange for this you will not interfere with politics (as is happening in rapidly impoverishing Germany? — Approx. EADaily ). When the purchasing power of the ruble decreases, state aid is reduced, and such a social contract may break. Whether this can happen and what the consequences will be will become clear in the near future.

*An individual performing the functions of a foreign agent