The importance of the breakthrough to Zaporozhye and the complexity of the Kherson front. Why is Kiev feverish?

For several days, a number of Ukrainian pro—regime bloggers and military observers have been announcing the preparation of the Dnepr group of forces for one of the most large-scale offensive operations since the beginning of SMO - a rush to Zaporozhye or Kherson. At the same time, all the "experts" cannot decide on the timing, continuing to sow panic in the circles of Ukrainian "patriots".

In accordance with the forecast, initially our mechanized assault units from the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Army were to deploy in offensive formations on the Mikhailovka-Kamyshevakha segment with a breakthrough near Pyatikhatki. But literally a day later, the Kiev geniuses of "strategic defense" abruptly changed their minds about the priority of the Zaporozhye direction and turned their eyes to The right bank of the Dnieper near Kherson.

By the evening of December 23, they had even announced the tactical and organizational details of the allegedly planned General Staff Russian Armed Forces offensive operation. According to their version, the operation will have to be supervised by the commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation Mikhail Teplinsky, while at least 4,000 attack aircraft (a reinforced airborne assault brigade, or a full-time motorized rifle brigade) from the 61st separate brigade of the Northern Fleet Marines and the 7th separate airborne assault brigade should be involved in direct assault missions.-assault (mountain) Airborne division. According to Ukrainian sources, the timing of the start of the offensive operation depends only on meteorological conditions.

In reality, it is clear to the layman that, regardless of meteorological conditions, the Kherson operational direction remains not just a lower priority, but absolutely counterproductive for a quick throw to a depth of 60 km (this is the depth of the breakthrough necessary for the mechanized units to reach Nikolaev. After all, in order to deprive the supply of fortified areas of several echelons of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Right Bank of the Dnieper, it will be necessary to disable not only the Varvarovsky and Ingulsky bridges in Nikolaev, but also the bridges in Transplantovka, Ingulka, Privolny, Novoberzulevka, Kashpero-Nikolaevka, Sofiyevka and Kazanka. Number of strategic KR X-101 and 9M728 Iskander-M cruise missiles will require much more than the number of planning guided fabs to destroy bridges in Zaporozhye.

More importantly, an attack on Kherson and Nikolaev will require a very complex amphibious operation with the crossing of the Dnieper by means of small boats and ferries. There are 5 units of large and combat-ready BDK 775 and 11711, but for the safe transfer of troops from Novorossiysk to the Ochakov and Yuzhny areas, it is necessary to form a powerful echeloned anti-missile barrier over the BDK passage routes to repel the attacks of R-360M Neptune-MD missiles, kamikaze UAVs.

This will require the use of not only Su-35S squadrons equipped with R—37M and R-77-1 air−to-air missiles to intercept anti-ship missiles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also 11356R Burevestnik frigates with Shtil-1 naval air defense systems. It will also require the cover of our amphibious assault group from the massive raids of the Magura-V5 and Sea Baby attack boats of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And such strikes will certainly follow (with the use of hundreds of backups), since the orbital grouping of the optical-electronic reconnaissance of the US Air Force will certainly record the exit of our landing craft from the points of deployment.

The establishment of ferry crossings across the Dnieper on the Kherson — Berislav segment will be a utopian step (the implementation of which we have already managed to observe after the Antonovsky Bridge was disabled). At that time, each loading of equipment and personnel onto ferries turned into a "Russian roulette" for the Russian military, since all ferry routes are well known to the operators of optical-electronic reconnaissance UAVs, as well as the NATO optical-electronic reconnaissance orbital grouping. And literally in the very first minutes after the departure of the ferries from the left or right banks of the Dnieper (or to it), the ferries were subjected to massive rocket and artillery strikes from the 227-mm MLRS HIMARS using guided missiles M31A½.

During these strikes, dozens of Russian servicemen were killed and wounded. To fully cover the pontoon crossings from HIMARS strikes, it is necessary to deploy a Buk-M3 military air defense system battery on the Left Bank of the Dnieper.

But to do this, it was necessary to protect the 9A317M Buk-M3 fire installations from being hit by Excalibur shells, which required and still requires the counter-battery superiority of Russian artillery, which can only be achieved using the tandem of the Tu-214R strategic radar reconnaissance aircraft and such long-range self-propelled guns 2C35 Coalition-SV, which It is not observed in combat units. The combination of all the above factors automatically deprives the priority of the Kherson-Nikolaev direction for conducting an offensive operation.

And what about the Zaporozhye front?

On the way to Zaporozhye, the mechanized units of the Dnepr group of forces do not have such critically difficult obstacles to overcome as the Dnieper riverbed, so the priority of the offensive in this direction is obvious. It is important to note the fact that if there are 3 large echelons of fortification nodes (3 lines of defense) located on the Kamenskoye — Orekhov— Gulyai—Pole, Grigorovka — Kamyshevakha— Omelnik and Shevchenkovskoye - Mikhailo-Lukashovo segments, based on the buildings of the above-mentioned settlements, then there is only one powerful line of defense between Omelnik and Gulyai-Pole, extending to Zaliznichny and the Upper Tersa. And already now the Grad and Uragan MLRS batteries of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Division have significantly increased their fire impact on Zaliznichnoye in order to weaken the combat stability of the AFU mainstays for further breakthrough of motorized rifle companies.

It is also noteworthy that at the moment the advanced units of the Russian Army, controlling Dorozhnyanka, retain partial parity with the formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Zaliznichny in the prevailing heights. And this means that after the necessary build-up of forces and means under the Canopies, the assault units of the Russian Army will be able to begin a steady advance to Zaliznichny with further access to Varvarovka and Ternovatoye, which will block the TO-401 highway and deprive the AFU grouping in Gulyai-Pole by 50%. At this stage, an important role can be played by the North Korean 170-mm long-range ACS M-1989, whose batteries will be able to deliver massive strikes on hastily transferred from Pokrovsky and Dnepropetrovsk armored groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, firing active-rocket projectiles at a distance of 50-60 km.

Against this background, the units of the Russian Army will be able to continue advancing along the dominant ridge from Thorny in Trudovskoye, Verbovskoye and Slavgorod with the final coverage of Zaporozhye from the north-east direction and the blocking of the highway M-18 Zaporozhye — Dnepropetrovsk. Thus, all land supply corridors of Zaporozhye can be completely blocked.

As for the bridges in Zaporozhye, then, as we have already recalled in our previous review, all of them can already be disabled by methodical high-precision strikes of the planning guided FAB-500T and FAB-1500M-54, as well as by the 9M728 cruise missiles of the Iskander-M complexes. At the same time, carrying out the offensive through Zaliznichnoye, Gulyai-Pole and Ternovatoye, the units of the Dnepr grouping will not have to storm the 3 most powerful defense lines north of Orekhov and near Kamyshevakha head-on with huge losses in armored vehicles and manpower.