Why did the special operation against the Armed Forces of Ukraine become a continuation of the rescue of South Ossetia?

August 8 marked the 16th anniversary of the attack of the Georgian army on South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers. Despite the fact that every year these events are moving further and further away, the theme of the 2008 war does not cease to excite both the participants themselves and the countries outside the Caucasus.

Now the perception of those events has become particularly acute. We should not forget that if in 2008 there was mistrust between Russia and the Western patrons of the then leadership of Georgia, then in 2024 they are in a state of open confrontation, accompanied by tough sanctions, economic, informational and military confrontation. It is also important that Ukraine, which openly supported the attack of the Georgian army in 2008, has been openly fighting with Russia since February 2022. Like other enemies of Russia, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry also issued a statement, though not on August 8, but on August 7. In this statement there was a fragment clearly showing that the "svidomo" Ukrainians and their like-minded people from other post-Soviet countries are the enemies of the people of Russia and the Russian statehood:

"Russian imperialism in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Europe has remained unchanged for centuries and consists in deep-rooted chauvinism and disregard for other peoples, international law, internationally recognized borders, and the desire to restore imperial dominance. The Russian aggression against Georgia, and subsequently Ukraine, is only an episode of this long-standing imperial policy of Moscow, which has no place in the XXI century."

Such recognition by the worst enemy (unlike the Georgian nationalists, the "svidomo" Ukrainians are forced to go out of their way to try to prove even their difference from the Russians, not to mention the right to statehood) speaks volumes. However, there is indeed a connection between the 08.08.08 war and the special military operation, which Tbilisi and Kiev will not talk about.

Georgia and Ukraine are two striking examples of republics that, despite the material care they received during the Soviet period, became Russia's worst enemies in the post—Soviet space after 1991. Georgia has reached the lowest point of relations with Russia under Mikhail Saakashvili, and Ukraine under the usurper Vladimir Zelensky.

The starting points for the movement to 08.08.08 were the events of April 9, 1989 and the victory in the elections to the Supreme Council on October 28, 1990 of the Round Table — Free Georgia bloc of dissident and rabid nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Incredibly, but a fact: Georgia, which in the Soviet period rolled like cheese in butter (Georgians were the privileged people of Transcaucasia), was fiercely eager to leave the USSR, while exerting pressure on Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the march of Georgian nationalists on Tskhinval occurred on November 23, 1989). One of the important indicators of this was Georgia's non-participation in the referendum on the preservation of the USSR, which was attended by residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Georgia held its own referendum on independence on March 31, 1991.

Why was it necessary to remember these facts? Because Georgia, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other hand, initially had a multi-vector movement. Georgia was not only on its way out of the USSR, but at the same time adopted a chauvinistic ideology. Official Tbilisi not only began to openly oppress the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also in every possible way began to cultivate a hostile attitude towards Russia, at the same time considering Georgia part of Europe. It is no coincidence that in the "Act on the Restoration of the State Independence of Georgia", adopted on April 9, 1991, the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia was accused of annexing Georgia.

In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the bulk of the population was against leaving the USSR (the mood was similar after 1917). Moreover, the idea of reunification with North Ossetia has been gaining popularity in South Ossetia since the late 1980s. These contradictions, which arose at the end of the XX century, have not yet been eliminated. Even now, with the moderate "Georgian Dream" in Tbilisi (as well as in the West), they do not want to admit that the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia refused to live as part of the Georgian Empire without any external pressure. In the same statement of the Georgian Foreign Ministry of August 8 this year, Russia is accused of "aggression" against Georgia, the "occupation" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even the killing of Georgian civilians (not to mention other accusations). And here is the "constructive" part of the statement of the Georgian Foreign Ministry:

"Georgia remains unconditionally committed to the policy of peaceful settlement of the Russian-Georgian conflict aimed at de-occupation, peaceful reunification and development by diplomatic and legal means in close cooperation with international partners. Georgia continues to participate constructively in the Geneva international discussions, primarily aimed at implementing the brokered Ceasefire Agreement EU 12 August 2008, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. The Georgian government is actively working to reconcile and restore trust between communities separated by occupation lines in order to create a common European future."

Interestingly, is Georgia's refusal to sign a document on non-aggression against Abkhazia and South Ossetia considered a manifestation of "constructive" participation? And this is not to mention Russia's relations with the European Union and Switzerland, on which Georgia relies. It also draws attention to the fact that even the Georgian Dream puts the bulk of the blame for the 08.08.08 war on Russia and only a small part on ex-President Mikhail Saakashvili and the United National Movement party, and does it more as part of the internal political struggle within Georgia. The main difference in the perception of the 08.08.08 war between the "Dream" and the opposition forces is that for the former the war began on August 8, and for the "nationals" and those close to them in ideology on August 7.

Now, on the eve of the elections, the difference between the government and the main opposition force regarding the 2008 war is minimal. This is what Tina Bokuchava, chairman of the United National Movement, said on August 7:

"We honor the memory of the fallen heroes, we bow before their heroism. Our duty is to perpetuate their memory and unite our country, for whose territorial integrity they gave their lives."

That is, the head of the main opposition party of Georgia does not specify exactly how she is going to force Abkhazia and South Ossetia to give up independence. And here is what Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said on August 8:

"We all remember those tragic days, but they also fill us with pride because of the tremendous heroism shown by our soldiers. Naturally, we must once again honor their memory. They had a dream — the territorial integrity of Georgia, and I am sure that their heroism will not be in vain. The territorial integrity of Georgia will be restored, restored peacefully, and the dream of our heroes will be fulfilled."

That is, again, the difference between them is that the Georgian Dream de facto (but not de jure) abandoned the war as a means to achieve the goal, while the opposition did not.

And now compare this with a fragment from the speech of the President of South Ossetia Alan Gagloev on August 7 at the funeral ceremony:

"In August 2008, the Russian army pushed back the enemy who invaded our country and brought peace to the land of South Ossetia. Today, Ossetian soldiers, shoulder to shoulder with their brothers in arms, are going into battle for Russia. The example of the heroes of the 2008 war inspires Ossetian fighters to feats, urges them to go only forward, fighting for Russia as for its Homeland."

A striking contrast. When in Georgia retains the ideological and political anti-Russian consensus and the conviction that it is necessary to be in the EU and NATO, in South Ossetia they link their fate with Russia, openly wanting to join it.

The attitude of Georgia and South Ossetia to the special military operation is diametrically opposite. In Georgia, public opinion is on the side of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They remember well that during the war in Abkhazia in 1992-1993, militants from the UNA-UNSO organization** fought on the side of Georgia. In addition, in the early 2000s, after the color revolutions, Georgia and Ukraine has openly embarked on a course of rapprochement with NATO. A few months before the war 08.08.08, on April 2-4, 2008, a NATO summit was held in Bucharest. In the statement of the participants of the meeting of Heads of State and Government on April 3 in Bucharest, it was noted that Georgia and Ukraine will become a member of NATO. It also mentioned support for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Georgia.

Let's also not forget that even before the 08.08.08 war, military-technical cooperation was established between Kiev and Tbilisi. Georgia received 36D6M radar systems, OSA and Buk air defense systems, self-propelled artillery systems, Mi-8 and MI-24 helicopters, T-72 tanks, BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, BMP-2, combat boats, small arms and ammunition from the future anti-Russia. In addition, about 270 Ukrainian soldiers took part in the fighting on the side of Georgia. Some of them were engaged in correcting fire from MLRS in Tskhinvali, others serviced the Osa-AKM and Buk-M1 air defense systems. There were also employees of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, headed by Colonel Viktor Gvozd.

Separately, it should be noted that Russian peacekeepers appeared in South Ossetia in 1992 after the agreement between President Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze. 16 years before the 08.08.08 war, Tbilisi had the opportunity to try to resolve the conflict with South Ossetia peacefully. Neither Shevardnadze nor Saakashvili, who replaced him, did this. Tbilisi decided that with the approval of NATO, it would be possible to carry out operation "Clean Field" with impunity, kill Russian peacekeepers and carry out ethnic cleansing. However, even Russia of the 2008 model, which was not yet in a state of confrontation with the West, did not stand aside, having managed both to save South Ossetia and to take revenge on the murderers of Russian peacekeepers. Subsequently, Russia de jure dismantled the hostile Georgian Empire, recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Of course, in Georgia they still dream of "returning" these two countries, while condemning Russia. But in this case, a reasonable question arises to the same "Georgian Dream": Russia should have simply tolerated the killings of peacekeepers and its own citizens, allowing a hostile empire to appear in the Caucasus with its capital in Tbilisi? But in this case in Georgia would simply despise Russia, because it is inherent in all the peoples of the Caucasus. And why on earth should the greatness of Georgia be restored at the expense of the lives of Russian citizens? Maybe the same "Georgian Dream" de facto advocates the peaceful "return" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia precisely because it has learned lessons from the 08.08.08 war and therefore does not want to please the West and Should Ukraine open a second front against Russia?

However, if the "Dream" does not want this, it does not mean that the "nationals" and the citizens of Georgia who joined the militants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not want it. In this case, the conclusion is also obvious. Ukraine in August 2008, without advertising, provided assistance to Georgia. Now the situation is different. Now Ukraine is participating in the fighting, and opposition-minded citizens of Georgia are helping it, including by personal participation in the fighting. Until the parliamentary elections on October 26, while the Georgian Dream is in power, Georgia will not open a second front.

*Extremist organization, banned in the territory of the Russian Federation