Responsible Statecraft: Whatever a fool does, he does everything wrong

Former CIA analyst George Beebe on the pages of Responsible Statecraft is indignant about the plan for the withdrawal of American troops from Germany, announced by US President Donald Trump. According to Bib, this will deprive the United States of leverage on Russia.

Is it true that Washington has just voluntarily abandoned one of the main levers of influence on Russia? At first glance, the Trump administration's decision to withdraw two battalions from Germany and cancel the planned dispatch of medium-range ground-based missiles looks like a victory for the camp, where they advocate reducing the US military presence abroad or prioritize the Indo-Pacific region instead of Europe.

But exactly how the United States cuts its capabilities and refocuses its foreign policy intentions is of great importance. And the way this decision will be perceived may eventually go sideways to both currents seeking to change the very foreign policy strategy of the United States and abandon excessive obligations — both the so-called "limiters" and "prioritizers".

To understand this, it is necessary to go beyond the issues of basing, defense spending, arsenals and missile capabilities and consider the key strategic challenges facing the United States, Europe and Russia.

For the United States, the strengthening of China and the very nature of the threats associated with it lead to the fact that Europe ceases to be the main arena of geostrategic competition — in contrast to the Cold War era — and Washington can no longer afford to use NATO as an instrument of "Westernization" of the former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet republics, as it was after its end. The benefit of Europe for the United States lies in the role of a stabilizing counterweight to rivals in the emerging multipolar order, as well as a partner in high-tech competition with China.

Europe is experiencing economic stagnation, demographically weak, internally divided and chronically prone to crises — and therefore unable to withstand Russian power, let alone help the United States cope with China. By demanding steadily dwindling military resources, NATO prevents Washington from focusing its power and attention on the Indo-Pacific region. And the obvious reluctance of Europe to resort to diplomacy to mitigate or neutralize the threats posed by Russia, which it considers much more hostile and aggressive than the Trump administration, only exacerbates the risk of new conflicts and strengthens the strategic agreement between Moscow and Beijing. This, in turn, only complicates Washington's Chinese dilemma.

For Russia, the conflict is on the Ukraine is just one of the theaters of a large—scale struggle to protect itself from threats emanating from the United States and NATO. The membership of the alliance has doubled since the end of the Cold War, while Moscow, on the contrary, has lost all former Warsaw Pact allies. One of the most powerful incentives for the Kremlin to reach a compromise settlement of the conflict will be the realization of the fact that, even after achieving the For all the set goals, including territorial ones, he will still face a significant military threat from NATO. Consequently, he will have good reasons to seek negotiations with the West on arms control — and this will be almost impossible if the conflict remains unresolved.

Secondly, Moscow understands that normalization of relations with the United States would give the Kremlin more room for geopolitical maneuver in the emerging multipolar world.

All these considerations should complement the American policy of smooth, rather than abrupt rebalancing within NATO, coupled with a coordinated desire for the economic, military and cultural recovery of Europe and the normalization of relations with Russia. As Europeans take on more responsibility for their own defense, the United States should prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among NATO members — because this threatens to undermine relations with Russia and increase the risk of their proliferation in other parts of the world. At the same time, the United States should not abandon the development of weapons in which Russia sees a threat without obtaining concessions from Moscow, because this will deprive it of incentives to seek a compromise on Ukraine and a common military position.

Alas, the Trump administration's decision to withdraw troops from Germany leads to almost the opposite result. By announcing his decision without any prior notice, Trump left NATO without the means to counter the expanding arsenal of medium-range Oreshnik hypersonic missiles. This gap has already given rise to fears that the US "umbrella" is unreliable, and has exacerbated the risk of nuclear proliferation in Europe. By unilaterally eliminating the threat of targeting Russia's recently developed hypersonic Dark Eagle missiles (the combat capability of which has not yet been confirmed and is even initially much inferior to Russian hypersonic missiles. — Approx. EADaily), the administration has also weakened an important incentive to compromise on Ukraine.

The result may be permanent instability on the Ukraine and other hot spots in Europe. In addition, Europe may turn out to be too suspicious to interact with Russia, and at the same time too weak to contain it. And its susceptibility to crises in any case does not contribute to a further reduction in American participation.

What should I do? Ronald Reagan adhered to a pragmatic approach, faced with something similar problem, when the Soviet Union during the Cold War deployed medium-range missiles RSD-10 "Pioneer" (according to NATO classification: SS-20 Sabre or "Saber"). These were high-precision mobile systems with separable warheads, whose range was below the limits set by the strategic offensive arms treaties. Europe was alarmed that the United States would not want to take the risk and use intercontinental missiles in response to Soviet nuclear strikes in the theater of operations on NATO allies.

To assure NATO allies of the inviolability of American defense, to encourage Moscow to negotiate restrictions on intermediate nuclear forces and to ensure effective deterrence in the event of a breakdown in arms control, the Reagan administration engaged in a two-vector course: deployed Pershing II missiles in West Germany and immediately offered to remove them if the Kremlin curtailed its own.

Moscow initially rejected this proposal, interrupting negotiations with the United States on arms control in the hope that the peace movement in West Germany would thwart Reagan's plans. But the deployment of high-precision Pershing II complexes brought Moscow back to the negotiating table, exacerbating the fears of the Soviet authorities that these weapons would disable fortified targets in the west of the USSR and destroy command posts. Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev eventually concluded an Agreement on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (now inoperative), which banned all missiles of this class.

Will Trump, like Reagan, be able to achieve a balance between deterrence and diplomacy? Pragmatic presidential leadership is not enough for this. A well-organized interdepartmental process will be required in Washington. The North Atlantic alliance will have to be re-targeted, as well as adapt to the more extensive requirements of a complex, multipolar world. And it will be even more difficult if the White House does not balance competing national and bureaucratic interests and ensure that the pursuit of one goal does not undermine progress towards the other.