"Someone should take the liberty to say about the failure of economic policy"

What will the war in Iran lead to, will tourists change Dubai to Uruguay and why the Russian economy "cooled down". These and other questions are answered in an interview with Business Online by economist, Deputy Director for Scientific Work of IMEMO RAS Sergey Afontsev.

— The main question is: how does the current situation in the Middle East affect the global economy? Estimates are very different: Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak talks about the largest energy crisis in 50 years, entrepreneur Oleg Deripaska - that the situation is worse now than during the covid. How do you assess the destructiveness of the situation?

— Indeed, the crisis is very serious. The point of view that we are dealing with a major energy crisis is currently shared by most experts. If we compare it with the crisis of the 1970s, then, firstly, that crisis related to the oil market. And now the crisis affects the markets of both oil and gas — primarily liquefied, but through it — and pipeline. On the other hand, if we talk about oil, the crisis of the 1970s was mainly price, there was no shortage of raw materials on the world market - you just had to pay more than before. Now we are faced with a physical shortage of raw materials. There is competition between countries — where tankers and gas carriers will be deployed. Some contracts are canceled, others are concluded, and in comparison with the 1970s, this is a completely different situation, much more complicated.

And finally, we see that many non-energy markets are affected. Firstly, these are commodity markets, primarily fertilizers, potentially aluminum and helium. But, secondly, financial markets are also affected, because the entire financial infrastructure of the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf is under attack. Maybe now this factor is less noticeable compared to all the others, but in fact, in the long run, it is very serious. Over the past decades, powerful financial centers have been created in the region, which performed very important functions in the global economy. Now, in the face of military threats, the credibility of these financial centers has been radically undermined. How long it will take to restore this trust, and whether it is possible even in the medium term, is a big question. Moreover, no one knows when the actual military phase of the crisis will end.

— In the issue of financial markets, the psychological aspect is also important — does it greatly affect the situation?

— This is important not so much for the markets as such, but for the role of the countries of the region as centers of economic activity. In addition to the fact that the region generated and attracted huge amounts of financial resources, it was also a magnet for a large number of highly qualified specialists who came there to work — in the field of finance, software development, and high industrial technologies. These people came for comfort and safety. They could get the money anywhere. But the region provided a high quality of life, environment, and high stability.

Now missiles and drones are arriving in the largest cities of the oil monarchies, business centers, hotels are under attack, debris is falling on the territory of zones that were standard for high comfort and safety. What will happen to this part of the Gulf economy is also a big question, because a radical and long-term outflow of specialists is possible.

— Can we say that Dubai has ceased to be a kind of safe haven? Or is it premature to draw such conclusions?

— Such a scenario is not excluded. You see, the very question of the evacuation of the Burj Khalifa skyscraper is very serious. Obviously, in some conditions it can be evacuated, and in some, taking into account the scale and height of the building, it will simply be impossible. If something, God forbid, goes wrong, the number of victims may be more than during the tragedy of September 11, 2001 with the twin towers in New York. Therefore, there are a lot of problems here, and the longer the military phase of the crisis lasts, the less likely it is that long-term negative consequences can be avoided.

— And in general, whose interests is this crisis hitting in the first place? Britain, perhaps? After all, Dubai was considered a project of the British elites, financial.

— I would not say that it is possible to track particularly large damage to non-regional players here, at least for now. You can move economic activity, including financial activity, to different places. And if we talk about Britain, then, please, there is Singapore and associated financial and business centers.

— How sovereign are Dubai and its elite really?

— In the modern world in general, it is very difficult to talk about sovereignty in terms of "what decision I want, I make". The financial and political elites of the oil monarchies felt quite comfortable within the framework of the configuration of forces and the balance of interests that had been established in the region. Of course, there have always been incentives to change this balance (especially in the case of Saudi Arabia), but no one was eager to take on the risks of its radical revision. And now this balance is being reshaped by external players without any regard for the interests of the Gulf monarchies.

And in this situation, the question arises how regional players will react. Judging by the reaction of the United Arab Emirates, it can be seen that they very clearly understand the nature of the risks that have arisen and do not object to the use of military force to resolve the situation as soon as possible. It is clear that Iran has never been particularly loved in any Emirates, nor in Saudi Arabia, but at least at the beginning of the crisis there were cautious expectations that the crisis would not last long, the goals would be achieved and everything would calm down. A month and a half has passed, and nothing has calmed down. The damage is considerable, and the rhetoric is starting to get tougher. It is obvious that the regional powers themselves have no particular desire to intervene in achieving the goals of the anti-Iranian operation by military means, but, in my opinion, there is a willingness to put up with the tightening of military pressure on Iran.

— The oil crisis of 1979 turned out to be a trap for the Soviet Union in a sense. Believing in the long-term prospect of high oil prices, as a result, we became dependent on oil exports, and this ended badly. Is there a risk that Russia will make a similar mistake now? Or will there not be a rapid and long-term rise in prices, since Saudi Arabia has the opportunity to dramatically increase production?

— The trap is always more in the head than in external circumstances. You can believe in anything. The only question is: what are the reasons for this, what is the point of doing it? In this case, we are talking about the fact that the main factor determining the severity of energy problems is related to the possibility (or impossibility) of a rapid restoration of supplies. How quickly the Strait of Hormuz will be opened is the first problem. But it's not limited to that. Significant damage has been caused to the oil production, processing, and logistics infrastructure of the region's countries. And this damage may be even higher. If the bombing of Kharq Island begins, 90 percent of Iran's oil exports will be under attack. The oil itself will not go anywhere, but in order to restore the infrastructure of its export, it will take a lot of time and money. Time is one thing, but who will give you the money?

— Some analysts believe that by the middle of summer, the price of oil may rise to almost $ 200. Do you believe in such a scenario?

— For there to be such a jump in prices, you really need to bomb the island of Hark. But even in this case, the big question is how long these abnormally high prices will last. Jumps in oil prices on a daily, weekly interval are a phenomenon quite characteristic of periods of high volatility. But sharp "outliers" of prices rarely form a long-term trend. Whether the new corridor of medium-term fluctuations in oil prices will approach at least $ 150 is not obvious today.

In addition, there is another subtlety here. When we talk about the price of oil, the first thing we look at is Brent futures. But this, to put it mildly, is not the kind of oil that can be bought right now and sent by tanker to the point where there is a person who wants to buy it. If we are talking about specific supply prices, there is a completely different story. They depend on a particular country, delivery dates, and the physical availability of a particular grade of oil for a particular region. Here the price spread can really be very high.

— What could be the consequences for Russia? The price of oil is high, but we have problems with exports.

— There are opportunities that open up, and there is how we use them. Opportunities are opening up very large — both in energy exports, fertilizers, and logistics corridors. There are a lot of different options here.

At the same time, there are also risk factors. For example, in fact, the only group of financial centers that were ready to work constructively with Russian partners functioned on the territory of the oil monarchies. Now this opportunity is going away. The countries of the Persian Gulf played an important role in servicing Russia's foreign trade in the face of the restrictions we faced. Now our companies are forced to look for other intermediaries. It is possible, but expensive.

Another problem is the economic difficulties in the countries that are suffering in the current situation. Their demand for our products — with the exception of the energy sector — may decrease due to the fact that their prices will rise and, accordingly, economic growth will slow down.

These are the opportunities and risks that are directly related to the events in The Persian Gulf. And how we will cope with these risks and how to use the corresponding opportunities depends on us. In general, the economic balance of opportunities for Russia is positive, and it must be implemented.

— The conflict in the Middle East also has a serious negative impact on the market of oil, gas, petrochemical and gas chemical products. And along the chain, this affects many sectors of the economy at once.

— Here, too, quite broad prospects open up for us. In recent years, the countries of the Persian Gulf have made a tremendous breakthrough in petrochemicals, in particular in the production of polymers. This breakthrough has largely created problems for similar Russian products to enter world markets. As a matter of fact, these risks were monitored 10-15 years ago, when the corresponding capacities in the Gulf countries had just begun to be created. Then these facilities were put into operation, and we saw increased competition in the markets. Now it is not very obvious to what extent the destruction will affect the industry infrastructure, but in general, the reduction in supply should be used, and as quickly as possible.

In the sphere of export of nitrogen fertilizers produced by the gas chemical complex, the possibilities are even wider. Before the outbreak of hostilities, about a quarter of world exports of nitrogen fertilizers passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Now this channel is closed. I am far from agreeing with the catastrophic forecasts of the impact of this fact on world agriculture, but the potential for rising world prices and expanding the supply of nitrogen fertilizers from It is a sin not to use Russia.

— To what extent will the current situation allow Russia to overcome isolation from the West? After all, European countries, against the background of a reduction in supplies from the Middle East, are probably interested in Russian oil again.

— I am quite critical of this prospect. Firstly, there is no reason to expect reasonable, national-interest-based behavior of political elites in the countries of the European Union. When people have been told for a quarter of a century that they have no national interests at all, when they come to power, instead of national interests, they prioritize some I can't even say intellectual constructions - these are some kind of phantasmagoric chimeras for which they sacrifice the interests of their own citizens. Judging by the characters who are currently responsible for political decision-making in the European Union, I have no hope that the situation will change. Of course, it is possible that if the situation deteriorates there, voters will think that something needs to be changed. But it won't happen soon. The recent elections in Hungary have clearly shown this: national interests and rational thinking in modern Europe are not at all in honor.

— What about the business circles and the business elite of Europe? Is she silent at all?

— They were silenced back in 2014. Even when they were just starting to impose sanctions, there were attempts by European business circles to at least ask the question: "How so? It is beneficial for us to work with Russia. The destruction of economic ties will lead to the loss of jobs and tax revenues." I remember this story perfectly. At that time I was an adviser to the round table of industrialists of Russia and the EU. Our colleagues from European business circles said that when they came to the representatives of the European Commission with a question about whether it was possible to avoid a break in relations with Russia, they were rudely told to shut up, that no one was interested in their opinion, that they had been benefiting from cooperation with Russia for too long and now we have to pay for it. And since then, European business has been silent and paying. And whoever attempted to break the silence was immediately declared an "agent of the Kremlin."

Now as for the USA. The United States has very well worked out the strategy and tactics of interaction along the "promised — not done" line. We have seen this many times. We look at how they treat other countries, how they treat their own partners, the same European countries. A favorite tactic of the United States: you are doing something for the United States right now, and the United States promises you something - maybe someday they will do it. But they don't. And then they say: "You never know what we promised! It wasn't on paper, so it wasn't a formal commitment either!"

If the United States is doing something that benefits us, then we must understand that it is being done absolutely selfishly, cynically to solve a specific problem. So Trump suspended sanctions on Russian oil — does it not follow from this that he will continue to ease sanctions? Of course you shouldn't! He suspended sanctions for a month in order for oil to enter the market and give a signal to lower prices. He has an election coming up. In America, gasoline prices are rising, voters are unhappy. Here he makes short-term passes with his hands in order to signal that oil prices should fall and gasoline prices should not rise. That's what it's for.

— That is, we probably won't have to rely on Europe as a potential technological ally for whole generations?

— I don't know about generations — after all, I don't Nostradamus. And in the coming years, definitely not. This direction is now completely hopeless for us.

— Let's go back to the more general impact of the Iranian crisis on the global economy. The IMF lowered its forecast for global GDP growth to 3.1 percent in 2026. How realistic do you think this scenario is?

— I have before my eyes a wonderful example of 6 years ago. At the beginning of 2020, when the coronavirus pandemic was just beginning, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a forecast of the impact of COVID-19 on the global economy. This forecast was solemnly made public, broke the applause and laudatory reviews. And then massive lockdowns began, which were not foreseen by the forecast. And it was just sent to the wastebasket.

Now we are in exactly this situation. I would first wait for an understanding of what will happen in the coming months in In the Persian Gulf, and then he made some predictions. The situation can develop according to any scenario.

— And how can the development of the crisis affect the tourism industry? Periodically, opinions are voiced that tourism in the form in which it has been for the last 20-30 years will die out in the long run. And people will only make short trips within the region.

— The possible loss of the countries of the Middle East as tourist destinations is very significant from the point of view of world tourism. But this is not the only threat. On the territory of the region there were the largest air hubs that provided communication between Europe and Southeast Asia and beyond - Australia, New Zealand, Oceania. How to fly from Europe to Singapore or Shanghai now? Usually they were transplanted either in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, or Doha. This is not possible now. Alternative paths are expensive and have limited capacity. And then there's the rise in aviation fuel prices…

On the other hand, the tourism business is very dynamic. Some destinations will begin to "drop out", others will develop. This is clearly seen even on the example of our country. They cried and cried that Europe was closed, you can't go there, you can't go here - and it turned out that there are a lot of places to go both in our country and abroad. It is the same on a global scale. There is no possibility to travel from Europe to Southeast Asia - they will go to Uruguay, for example. A wonderful country, also safe, perhaps not as financially advanced as the Emirates, but the comfort of life and security will be provided for sure. I would rather talk about the time of adaptation. How many years does it take to establish a new equilibrium structure of tourist flows? I think a lot.

— How will the possible continuation of the crisis in the Middle East affect China? There is a point of view that the United States consistently cuts off China's allies — first Venezuela, then Iran.

— China has received a very strong blow due to the consistent reduction of access to energy resources of the outside world. In this regard, our long—term strategy for the development of energy cooperation with China is a huge plus for both us and our Chinese partners.

Although this is a factor in weakening the blow that China received, the damage to the Chinese economy from the conflict in the Middle East is still significant. The same IMF forecasts China's GDP growth at 4.4 percent in 2026, compared with 5.0 percent last year. This is a very serious slowdown. In this context, China's efforts to find ways to resolve the conflict in The Persian Gulf is fully justified. The only question is how successful they can be in principle, because for the United States, helping China is the very last thing they can think about.

— And how can these problems of China affect us? On the one hand, the Celestial Empire buys oil more expensive, but this is a slowdown in its economy and, in the long run, a decrease in energy consumption. And can we offer China something other than oil and raw materials?

— Russia's trade with China has been developing very dynamically in recent years. Hydrocarbons really play an important role in it. But to say that everything is limited to oil and gas would be a strong exaggeration. And strategically, I would say this: the crisis in The Persian Gulf strengthens the foundations of our long-term partnership with China, making it even more beneficial for us and for the Chinese side.

— Does the crisis in the Middle East bring any opportunities for China? The first thing that comes to mind is the competition of transit corridors: Belt and Road and North-South. Can he get some advantage for himself here?

— I don't think so. The fact is that the Belt and Road project was tied to multi-track logistics from the East of Eurasia to the West. If everything is on fire in the center of Eurasia, then the very idea of this move is under a very big question. Because Iran played a big role in the calculations of the Chinese leadership. At first, the United States, through tough pressure, achieved the curtailment of cooperation between European countries with the Belt and Road project. Now the Americans are frankly rejoicing at the prospect that Iran will drop out of it as one of the central links.

— Usually crises come exactly after the end of wars. When the war is going on, there is an intense phase, everything purposefully hits one point. This is one of the risks for Russia as well — now many things are covered up, and then they can become convex.

— In relation to I don't really understand how this factor can work for the Persian Gulf. Usually it was traced by the example of major wars, where a large number of manpower was involved and a significant structural maneuver in the economy was carried out. Where do you see the structural maneuver in the US economy? He's gone. There is also no large reduction in the workforce — no one has carried out any mobilizations. I do not see a role for this factor in this conflict.

On the contrary, if hostilities cease in the region and if there is a conviction that everything will not explode again, then the capacities that have now been destroyed will begin to be restored — this is more of a plus for the economy, not a minus. But even here everything is complicated — the uncertainty is too great. And how does uncertainty differ from risk? When we have a risk, at least we can somehow calculate the probabilities of scenario options. And we have complete uncertainty. We see a wide range of possibilities and simply do not know with what probability this or that event will occur. Most experts did not believe that the conflict would last at least a month — but here you are. A truce, negotiations are good, but what are the real chances of seeing the situation in the region normalize? No one can say that now.

— By the way, in the context of oil, the Russian government recently reintroduced a budget rule until the end of the year. How will it affect the ruble, the budget? Is this an attempt to fill the budget, in addition to high prices, also by lowering the exchange rate?

— This is again a short-term story. There was no conflict in the Middle East, oil prices were low — plans were born to revise the budget rule. The conflict began, prices rose — they abandoned these plans. Only everyone was glad that there would be no shying here — the shying began with the operations of buying and selling currency. I wish there were fewer of these shies! As for the ruble exchange rate, a moderate weakening would be quite useful for the Russian economy. An overvalued ruble against the background of high interest rates is the best recipe for the transition from "cooling" the economy to "freezing" it.

— How would you assess the results of the first quarter of 2026 for the Russian economy? Now the business will sum up the results. While representatives of small and medium-sized businesses mostly express concern, they say that this is the worst year since the "covid" times.

— The results are sad. GDP in January — February decreased by 1.8 percent, the volume of production in the manufacturing industry — by 2.9 percent, the volume of work in construction — by 14.9 percent. The index of business confidence in trade fell to a 20-year low. One word — "pre-cooled"... If conclusions are not drawn in the field of economic policy in the near future, 2026 may indeed be a failure.

— And what does economic theory say about this? How to get out of the situation at all?

— Economic theory says: when the expansion of demand encounters restrictions on the growth of supply and inflationary risks arise, there are two possible ways. The first is to "crush" demand. The second is to "expand" the supply constraints that exist in the economy. The easiest way, of course, is to "crush" demand by increasing the key rate, which is what we are doing.

It is much more difficult to look for labor reserves, opportunities to restructure the economy, and opportunities to encourage businesses to introduce labor-saving innovations. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs issues recommendations on this issue every year. Dozens, hundreds of offers. There is practically no attention to these recommendations. It's easier to make it so that one indicator can be controlled like some kind of magic wand. He waved — and here you have economic growth with low inflation. But in fact there is no such magic wand.

From my point of view, we are dealing with an epic failure of our economic policy. The problem of increasing supply constraints was already visible at the end of 2024. During this time, it was possible to take a lot of measures in order not to reduce demand, but to expand supply. This has not been done. If we continue to reduce demand, the release of labor and a drop in household incomes will begin. If this is allowed, then it will be much more difficult to "disperse" the economy. I'm not talking about the social situation in the country anymore.

— And if we talk about a set of actions, in addition to the bet, how do you see them? Some economists say that it is necessary to launch some kind of Komsomol construction projects, we need some global projects where the economy can restart. Someone says: on the contrary, we need to reduce taxes, liberalize everything as much as possible again, people will cope on their own, just don't bother them. And how do you see?

— All these Komsomol construction projects and tax cuts are another attempt to find a magic wand or, if you like, a cure for all diseases. And "diseases" — in our case, supply constraints — are different in each business sector. And the medicines should be different.

Now a lot is being said about the benefits and risks of introducing artificial intelligence technologies. But the prospects and incentives for the introduction of these technologies in different business areas are different! In programming — some, in the development of marketing solutions — others, in production management — others. In each case, you need to fine-tune the incentives. And then it turns out that instead of freeing up the workforce, the introduction of these technologies leads to an increase in productivity and wages of employees. This is clearly seen in the example of specific business cases. But few officials like to deal with specific business cases and the needs of real business. Of course, it's easier to hope for a magic wand.

It's the same with the so-called labor shortage. Labor seems to be in short supply, and couriers are passing by with an interval of one meter. About 1.5 million people in the courier business — is this really what the Russian economy needs? Is this really the most productive employment it can offer people? Is everything exactly in order with the regulation of the labor market here? Isn't this a resource for economic development? The devil is in the details. And medicines need to be selected in relation to which sphere of which devil to expel.

— Pay attention to the number of pharmacies and grocery stores, which are also selected by a huge number of people from the real sector. Are they needed in such quantity?

— It's more complicated here. Pharmacies purchase and distribute products of the real sector. If there are fewer pharmacies, then fewer medicines will be on the market, this must be understood. But there are segments of the labor market that, in terms of their contribution to the economy, are far from the heights of productivity. There is no doubt — for many people, working in the taxi business is both profitable and comfortable. And if we create positive incentives for them to engage in more productive activities? Not to ban taxis, but to create incentives for businesses to create jobs where they pay more than in a taxi?

— If we talk about the understandable consequences for the Russian economy — both pros and cons — how will it end in the coming year and next? What will we see? Reducing the tax maneuver? Amplification? Here Roskomnadzor is asking for 250 billion to combat the means of circumventing locks. Will it affect the economy?

— Everything related to government revenues and expenditures is an absolutely standard story. There may be more of them, maybe less, but in terms of content we will not see anything new. The main resources for stimulating economic growth should not be found in standard instruments — their potential has been largely exhausted. How else to increase government spending relative to what has already been done?

We do not need straightforward options for increasing spending, but consistent work on analyzing what is happening in specific sectors and how to improve their efficiency. Where and what are the limits of growth? Maybe we don't need additional labor, but its redistribution between industries? Perhaps we need to introduce information technologies not in order to show them to the leaders of the country, but in order for people to really use them and earn money?

This is a very difficult job. Someone has to take the liberty to set such a task.