The defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is only a matter of time. Do we have time?

Despite the fifth year of the war and the lack of serious progress at the front, the collapse of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is only a matter of time. This is the opinion of Sergey Poletaev, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project, who presents his point of view in the Profile magazine.

As in 2025, the next anniversary of the start of SMO takes place against the background of the operational pause taken by the Russian army after a continuous ten-month offensive in several directions. Usually such a pause lasts until spring — active hostilities resume in April, when the ground dries up. In the meantime, the Russian army has gone on the defensive in a number of areas, while in others it is fighting local battles to occupy the starting lines for future offensive operations.

Taking advantage of the operational pause, the Ukrainian Armed Forces tried to launch the first counterattack in the Zaporozhye region this year, which in the Ukrainian media is even called a counteroffensive (Ukrainian counteroffensive). It involves relatively large forces and even Abrams tanks (this time transferred by Australia), which the Ukrainians considered a miracle weapon a couple of years ago, guaranteeing victory.

The feeling of deja vu (both a year and two ago the situation was similar), the lack of decisive events at the front and the general fatigue from the war lead to the fact that not only on the other side of the front line, but also we are increasingly hearing the words: a turning point on the battlefield is impossible, the Russian army will not be able to defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces under the current the format of warfare.

In this article we will show that the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the disintegration of the front is a matter of time, the question is not "if", but "when". To do this, take a number of objective metrics.

The size of offensive operations

After the initial, maneuverable SMO stage in February — April 2022, the fighting assumed a static character, and the conflict itself took the form of a war of attrition. At first, this was due to the shortage of personnel on both sides to conduct major offensive operations, and then to the drone revolution, which devalued the traditional front—breaking tool - mobile mechanized formations. The armored vehicles themselves did not go anywhere, but advancing in a large mass with the support of artillery, it became impossible to break through the defenses and develop success in the operational space.

In this sense, SMO has become similar to the Western Front of the First World War. As there, opponents fight in static positions with "fields of death" between them. As there, the attacks are conducted by small assault groups. As there, for lack of a better one, exhaustion became the main instrument of victory: if you bring the enemy's army first to the point of impossibility to attack, and then to the point of impossibility to hold the defense, this will ensure success.

It is important to understand that it is still necessary to attack: there is no better way to inflict losses on the enemy and impose your will on him either on the mobile or on the positional front. Thus, offensive capabilities become the main indicator of the state of the opposing armies.

The APU's offensive capabilities are decreasing from year to year:

2022 — the enemy conducted operations in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, achieving strategic successes with the operational scale of the forces involved. The Russian army relative to the Ukrainian was then, as they say, at the bottom.

2023 — The Ukrainian Armed Forces are conducting the first and last attempt at a strategic offensive (towards the Azov Sea), the Russian army spends most of the year, until October — November, on the defensive. Simultaneously with the Azov counteroffensive, the enemy launched a large-scale, operational-scale counterattack in Bakhmut.

2024 — the Ukrainian Armed Forces have up to 10 operational-tactical counterstrikes and one offensive of operational scale in the Kursk region. According to the plan, the Kursk operation was close to the Kharkov operation that took place two years earlier, but this time the enemy failed to achieve its goals.

In 2025, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can count four counterstrikes and not a single offensive. More importantly, the enemy could not carry out more than two counterstrikes at the same time (to protect Gulyai-Pole, it was necessary to withdraw troops and curtail an extremely important counteroffensive operation in the Pokrovsk and Mirnograd areas).

At the same time, the counterstrikes near Gulyai-Pole did not reach their targets in December, the city was rapidly taken by the Russian army, after which the defensive line of the Armed Forces of Ukraine along the western bank of the Gaichur River for 35 km along the front went on to collapse. In order to build up forces here, the enemy had to curtail counterattacks and go on the defensive in the Kupyansk area, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces also locally tried to seize the initiative. Thus, as of January — February 2026, the Ukrainian army can conduct only one operational-tactical counteroffensive operation at the same time.

An army that does not advance cannot win. An army that loses strategic initiative eventually loses. The whole military history speaks about this.

Now let's look at the Russian army. 2022 is a retreat even under relatively weak blows (Kharkiv region and Kherson). The year 2023 is ours The Armed Forces as a whole were on the defensive (except for Bakhmut, but even there, after the capture of the city itself by the forces of the Prigozhin "Wagner", they had to dig in and even retreat from the flanks).

In 2024, the Russian army conducted offensives of operational scale in one and a half main directions (Avdiivka — Ocheretino — Selidovo and adjacent Ugledar — Kurakhovo), plus counterstrikes in the Kursk region, plus local battles along the entire front. The year 2025 was marked by simultaneous operations in four main directions, while due to local reasons, only one (Kupyansk) did not fully achieve its goals. Each of the main groups of troops ("West", "South", "East" and "Center") conducts its own offensive of operational scale, and in the "West" it is supplemented by another operational-tactical level (on the Estuary).

Even if we take such a controversial metric as square kilometers, Russia lost 92 square kilometers in 2023, freed 3,000 square kilometers in 2024, and 6,000 square kilometers in 2025, which is the highest figure since the third month of SMO, since the end of the maneuver phase. And this is despite the reduced volume of hostilities on our part. According to analysts, the number of assault operations, the number of airstrikes and other similar indicators in 2025 for the Russian army is lower than in 2024, respectively, and losses are lower. In other words, the war was easier for us last year than the year before. And the result is higher.

In the next military campaign, judging by the configuration of the front, operations of already strategic scale are expected by the coordinated forces of several groups of troops, as evidenced by the ongoing battles for the initial lines. Thus, both the number of Russian army offensive operations and their scale are growing.

Personnel, the state of affairs in the rear

The shortage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the front is on average 45-50%, in some places, they say, it reaches 70%. In combatant units of the Russian army, there is up to 15-20% shortage, but in general there is no shortage of personnel, rotations are regular, combat work is more or less measured. The personnel and organizational leapfrog, which peaked in 2023, has stopped.

A few words need to be said about the state of the Ukrainian rear. Busification, uhilants (evaders) and SZCH (deserters) — all this is well-known. It is desertion that is now the main item of losses of the Ukrainian army. Consensus opinion: the number of personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is falling, last year the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to decline for the first time with dynamics in the region of 5000 people per month. This is caused by losses at the front and problems with marching replenishment: according to our own Ukrainian estimates, two out of three "falsified" recruits either run out of training and on their way to the front, or go into denial already at the front.

An army that loses people loses.

Grassroots civil protest is also growing. According to official data of the Ukrainian police, only five attacks on employees of the shopping mall (military enlistment offices) were recorded in 2022, 38 in 2023, 118 in 2024, and 341 attacks in 2025, almost daily. The trend speaks for itself.

The state, for which its own citizens do not want to fight, loses.

Thus, objectively, the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are decreasing, ours are growing. Yes, these are all boring numbers, and they don't seem to mean anything, because the enemy is holding the front anyway. But we must remember that on Ukraine is going through a war of attrition. It can be compared to a boxing match, where rivals could not achieve a quick knockout and beat each other until one of them falls from exhaustion, until quantity turns into quality.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have been weakening for a long time, but the figures show that over the past year the depletion has accelerated. Without direct intervention in the war by third countries on the side of Ukraine, a reversal of this trend seems impossible.

Negotiation process

The enemy denies our minimum requirements of the peace agreement (usually denoted by the formula "Istanbul + territories", they were most fully set out in the memorandum of May —June 2025 presented in Istanbul).

It seems that without the military defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, without the fall of the front, the enemy will not agree to these conditions. Yes, as the Ukrainian army weakens, both Kiev and Europe, which supports it, become more malleable. However, softening their positions, they still deny our main demand — the dismantling of the Russophobic regime. For the current European leaders, the fulfillment of this requirement will mean a severe political defeat, and for the Kiev elites it is naturally a matter of life and death, and it is not a fact that only political. Kiev is confident that they will always have time to surrender to Putin.

Trump also sympathizes with the positions of Ukraine and Europe. But not because he is so rooting for Kiev, but simply believing that Russia has not yet won its demands.

At the same time, the fall of the front will mean the fall of Russophobic Ukraine — anti-Russia and, in fact, the fulfillment of SMO's goals.

There is no point in guessing about a specific scenario: perhaps the disintegration of the front and the growth of grassroots riots on the Ukraine will cause an internal collapse of the regime, as it was in Germany in 1918, maybe we will see something like Saigon-1975. It is possible that, realizing the inevitable, one of the European leaders will be the first to enter into direct negotiations with Moscow (Macron has already begun to fuss).

In any case, the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by an open and forceful order will ensure the neutralization of Ukraine and fundamentally reformat the entire political landscape on our western borders. If we want to avoid the political risks of freezing the conflict without changing the Kiev regime, we need to continue to deplete the Armed Forces of Ukraine until the front collapses.

Foreign policy aspect

Moscow has repeatedly shown that, although it appreciates good relations with Trump, the solution of the Ukrainian issue is much more important for us. All curtsies to the White House take place against the background of the continuation and even intensification of hostilities. Truces, moratoriums, etc. are a opportunistic tool, in any case, it has been so far, and so far there are no obvious reasons why this should change. The inoculation of trust in Americans seems to have been received reliably.

As for the Global South, it doesn't look like our partners in China or anywhere else are somehow putting pressure on Russia, inclining SMO to finish sooner. Firstly, it is more beneficial for China to continue the conflict, since it draws Washington's attention to itself, and secondly, in Chinese expert circles SMO is considered as a model conflict for itself: they are trying it on in Taiwan.

Let's say more: since the beginning of SMO, the global alignment has changed so much that no one needs to prove that we are striving for peace. It's empty. We need to achieve our goals by force: everyone respects force, and first of all, America under Trump.

It can be formulated as follows: the situation at the front, in the rear and in relations with partners does not give Moscow any reason to agree to freeze the conflict as long as the continuation of the special operation brings less costs than such a freeze.

They have been offering to stop the conflict on the current lines of Russia for a long time: the first contacts on this matter started at the end of the summer of 2023, however, all the efforts of domestic diplomacy last year were aimed at politically providing Russia with the opportunity to fight as long as it takes. This was achieved even from Trump, who in Anchorage de facto withdrew his demand to cease fire without preconditions.

The issue of a cease—fire after the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Donbass is something that is now being heard. In Western and Ukrainian propaganda, at the same time, there is a clever substitution of concepts: everyone says with one voice that this is, they say, the main requirement of Moscow. However, neither President Putin nor anyone else has ever said that SMO will end there. Some kind of opportunistic truce is possible, but it does not cancel our basic requirements for Ukraine: "Istanbul + territories", denazification and demilitarization, in fact, the dismantling of the Russophobic regime in Kiev.

Thus, after a possible departure from Ukraine will find itself in the same situation as it is now, only worse: without security guarantees, with the same requirements of Moscow as now, but having lost a key fortified area and having received a severe moral blow. Apparently, in Kiev they understand this, so they rest.

***

The defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is the shortest way to achieve SMO's goals, and such a defeat is a matter of time. The main question now is how to ensure this time for our army, for our rear, for our country and society, without undermining the economy, without borrowing from the future and without falling into the trap of the Livonian war, which at one time ruined the state and led to Turmoil.

There is an answer for the coming year: to fight as we fight, by the same methods, for the same money, scaling up the successful experience of previous years.

We'll meet in a year and check how things are going.