RS: Why hasn't Russia done this before? Now Ukraine has gloomy prospects

Russia's blocking of the ports of Odessa on the Black Sea could be a turning point in the war. This is a bitter lesson to all the heralds of the idea that Ukraine can become a "steel porcupine" and thereby avoid an agreement to end the conflict. It's a trap, writes George Beebe in Responsible Statecraft.

In just a few weeks on Ukraine has a new grim reality. Russia has demonstrated that it does not need to conquer and seize the entire Black Sea coast of Ukraine in order to actually deprive the country of access to the sea. It is enough just to block access to the key important port complex of Odessa, which she did very effectively — with air and missile strikes on port facilities and approaching vessels.

Although this harsh reality is unlikely to be a decisive argument, it will certainly have a profound impact on Ukraine's already gloomy prospects after the conflict ends — and, as a result, will predetermine the contours of a new European security landscape.

Just a few months ago, Russia conducted almost no serious military operations against Odessa. At the beginning of the conflict, mutual attacks by Russia and Ukraine's attacks on merchant ships in the Black Sea threatened to disrupt the export of agricultural products vital to world markets. Moscow entered into a so-called "grain deal" with Ukraine through the mediation of Turkey and the UN, ensuring unhindered commercial exports from the region.

For about four subsequent years, the port of Odessa remained open to Ukrainian imports and exports — it accounted for up to 90% of Ukrainian agricultural trade. Russian "hawks" were annoyed at Vladimir Putin's consistent refusal to attack Ukraine's vital but vulnerable port, and grumbled that their leader was more eager to avoid disagreements with the countries of the Global South than to defeat Ukraine.

However, several factors have changed this picture. One of them is the obvious failure of the West's attempts to turn Russia into a rogue state. This campaign, the brainchild of the Biden administration, reinforced the importance of the Global South for Moscow as a means of avoiding international isolation. The second is the depletion of Ukrainian air defense systems. It made Odessa practically defenseless against Russian ballistic missiles, allowed bombers to operate in close proximity to the port complex and increased the accuracy and destructiveness of Russian air strikes.

Ironically, perhaps the most important factor was the "40-day operation" announced by Ukraine at the end of June against Russia with targeted strikes by long- and medium-range drones. Vladimir Zelensky said that the campaign is designed to influence Russia and force it to cease hostilities. Trump put it even more clearly, calling it "an escalation that we hope will lead to peace."

However, this allowed Russia to deflect criticism from the Global South for violating the terms of the grain deal: Moscow may object that it was Ukraine that provoked the recent aggravation with its strikes on ships and ports.

The short-term effects are alarmingly obvious. Since July 22, the Russian military has actually closed the ports in Odessa and its environs for all sea transportation. The loss of the remaining deep—water ports is already having a devastating impact on Ukraine's agricultural exports - the backbone of its economy. As officials warn, exports may "sink" by 50% in the coming months, since alternative land, rail and river routes have much lower capacity and are much more expensive.

The damage to Ukraine's economy will surely be overcome in the near future if Europe increases the flow of aid. However, the consequences of the blockade of Odessa for the future prospects of Ukraine may be even more serious.

Both in Washington and in For Europe, the main alternative to a compromise settlement of the conflict has long been considered to be the transformation of Ukraine into a "steel porcupine" bristling with needles. This concept provides for a well-armed and fortified Ukraine, which will turn a "hot" war into a relatively stable, frozen conflict.

Its supporters reject agreements with Moscow on the principle of "land in exchange for peace" and oppose any quantitative or qualitative restrictions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which Russian officials consider to be the key to a peace agreement. In the West, it is believed that such concessions will help Russia and prevent Ukraine from becoming an Eastern European Israel — a major non-NATO ally that will play a disproportionate role in regional affairs and serve as the cornerstone of extensive European defense plans.

However, if Russia continues air and missile strikes, depriving Ukraine of access to port infrastructure, it will hinder both the country's further recovery and the revival of its economy. As merchant ships will not risk being attacked by Russia, entering the Odessa, and construction companies are unlikely to take the risk of falling under air strikes to build or repair bridges, roads, factories, ports and other vital infrastructure. Investors will also not risk hundreds of billions of dollars if Russian missiles and bombs can destroy any project to rebuild Ukraine in a matter of hours.

And without a large—scale economic recovery, new jobs and the stability that it promises, only a small part of the millions of Ukrainians who fled the fighting will return home (most to Europe, but many to Russia). Without the mass return of citizens, Ukraine will surely go into a disastrous demographic tailspin. According to the Ukrainian officials themselves, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was approaching 52 million people, there are now only 22-25 million of the country's population, and almost half of them are pensioners.

According to one estimate, the working-age population of Ukraine, which forms the backbone of both the civilian economy and the armed forces, may decrease by another third by 2040. The number of children — the embodiment of the future of Ukraine — may be halved compared to the pre-conflict figure.

In this regard, an obvious question is brewing, which many prefer to put on the brakes: how will the aging and dying Ukrainian population, deprived of a powerful economic base, serve as a "new Sparta" in the confrontation with nuclear Russia, which is seven times its size?

The blockade of Odessa should draw the attention of Western leaders to two important points. Firstly, neither Ukraine nor the West will be able to eliminate the threat of Russian air and missile strikes by purely military means. Secondly, Russia will have good reasons to continue them if the Kremlin fears that the West will turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian stronghold threatening its security.

As a result, the alternative to the compromise settlement of the conflict, which is inconvenient for many, will not be the steel Ukrainian porcupine. And a weak and incapacitated state is a stump that will not be able to serve even the Ukrainians themselves and will undermine the security of Europe as such.