The contract is more expensive than money: will Russia fight for Venezuela?

Does the ratified Strategic Partnership treaty oblige Russia to fight for Venezuela? Viktor Kheifets, Professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Center for Ibero-American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, discusses this in the Profile magazine.

A few days ago, the Federation Council ratified the agreement on strategic partnership and cooperation between Russia and Venezuela, signed by the heads of state on May 7. The document envisages the expansion of cooperation in the fields of energy, transport, communications, security, culture and education. At the same time, some experts talk more about what is not in the published text of the treaty — about cooperation in the military sphere. Moscow and Caracas announced their intention to maintain regular political and diplomatic dialogue and to form new coordination mechanisms on issues of bilateral and international agenda. What can come of this is still unclear.

Content of the agreement

Among the provisions of the ratified document is the obligation of the parties to fight against unilateral sanctions, as well as the creation of an independent financial and transport and logistics infrastructure "resistant to external restrictions" (here the interests of Russia and Venezuela clearly coincides), the intention to jointly oppose the falsification of the history of colonialism and attempts to glorify Nazism (a topic that is increasingly heard in the discourse of Moscow and Caracas).

With the rest of the postulates of the document, the situation is more complicated. Thus, the plans for cooperation in the energy sector, including in the exploration and development of new oil and gas fields, are a "repetition of the past." In the current century, a number of Russian companies have already "entered" the Venezuelan energy sector. Many of them failed to work there, after which most of the assets were transferred to Rosneft (40% in the Petromonagas, Petrovictoria and Petroperija projects, 32% in Petromiranda and 26.7% in Boqueron). After the sharp expansion of sanctions against Caracas, this company chose to sell its Venezuelan property to the state-owned company Roszarubezhneft.

The Venezuelan oil industry is experiencing a large-scale crisis caused by inefficient management and sanctions. Oil production has fallen sharply for a long time (from 3 million barrels to about 800 thousand), and only multibillion-dollar investments over a number of years can bring it back to previous levels. Neither Moscow (nor, we note, Beijing and Washington) are ready for this, and even the strategic cooperation agreement will not change this.

On the other hand, Russia still has the technical capabilities to assist Venezuela in modernizing electric power facilities, expanding power generation capacities and infrastructure. Caracas, which has faced blackouts more than once, is interested in such cooperation.

The unattainable horizon of the military alliance

Will Russia provide military assistance to Venezuela in the face of the escalated confrontation between Washington and the government of Nicolas Maduro? Loud statements by the White House about the intention to forcibly put an end to the activities of drug cartels allegedly linked to the top leadership of Venezuela, and, more importantly, the concentration of forces of the US navy in the Caribbean region have generated a lot of speculation about the inevitable Pentagon action against the Maduro government.

This aggravation is a direct continuation of the long—standing American policy of pressure on the "Bolivarian" Venezuela, within the framework of which there have been threats of the use of force before. Increasingly, the administration of Donald Trump does not even hint, but almost openly talks about strikes on targets in Venezuela and the overthrow of its government. The flirtations with Caracas that took place under Joseph Biden (informal talks at the beginning of 2023 and some easing of sanctions) stopped after the Republicans returned to power in the United States.

Venezuela has significant reserves of modern Russian-made weapons, but one technique in the event of a head-on collision with the American army and navy will not be enough. Therefore, Caracas would not mind expanding cooperation with Moscow in the defense sector. But there are obstacles to the implementation of such plans. Firstly, the legislation does not provide for the possibility of deploying foreign military bases in the country. And secondly, the newly ratified treaty speaks about military interaction in an extremely streamlined manner (unlike, for example, the treaty between Russia and the DPRK, which stipulates that if there is a direct threat of armed intervention, the parties will immediately begin negotiations on joint actions). Vague wording is used in article 14 of the treaty: the parties undertake to "improve ties in the field of defense", "carry out military-technical cooperation in the interests of strengthening the defense capability and ensuring the security of the two countries."

There are, however, nuances. In the conditions of a real, not contractual policy, it is important not only what is formally spelled out in the contract, but what the parties really mean. Or what third parties think about the content of such documents. In 2019, during the next round of the political crisis in In Venezuela, when the first Trump administration was considering the possibility of intervention to remove the "usurper" Maduro, unexpected visits by high-ranking Russian military (allegedly for routine inspections of the state of military equipment) noticeably cooled the ardor of the Pentagon's "hawks". Since it was unclear whether Moscow was really ready to provide military assistance to Venezuela, Washington decided not to take risks.

It is possible that now we are dealing with the intention to repeat the experience of previous years. There are enough hints about this not only in the Russian, but also in the American media (which in this case is much more important). True, the rates have increased significantly over the past five years, and assumptions alone may not be enough to force the Americans to abandon the military action against Maduro.

Qui prodest?

Immediately after the ratification of the treaty, the Venezuelan authorities enthusiastically began to trumpet a long-term comprehensive alliance. For Caracas, the agreement can become an additional tool in correcting the economic situation and a new impetus for restoring the shaken geopolitical positions. Maduro's cabinet considers the military issue to be no less important. It is no coincidence that the government declarations were supported by the publication on instagram of photographs of Russian Su-30 aircraft on the runways and equipped with anti-ship missiles. Thus, Caracas hinted that Russia would support him with equipment and people. It is impossible to check whether these hints are justified, which is what the calculation was made for.

It is more interesting to understand what Russia is really ready to do, which in the XXI century has significantly expanded its presence in Latin and Caribbean America, but few in the region maintain such close ties as with Venezuela. After a long decline in trade caused by the financial difficulties of Caracas, the trade turnover between the countries has slowly (so far it does not exceed $ 200 million per year), but confidently began to gain momentum. Moscow supplies to Venezuela sells industrial equipment, automobiles, pulp, fertilizers and other chemical industry products, buying, in turn, food (rum, fruit, cocoa), as well as marble and granite.

Russia resumed in Venezuela has five energy projects. The state concern PdVSA signed contracts with Rosgeologiya and UEC "Engineering", involving the supply, repair and maintenance of gas equipment. At the same time, PdVSA and Pequiven are developing cooperation with Russian oil companies in the field of personnel training on the basis of Gubkin Russian State University. For Russian tourists at the Margarita Island resort, the opportunity to pay with Mir cards has been earned.

The firm position of both Russia and China, with which Venezuela has repeatedly expressed solidarity, could become a deterrent for the Americans. But so far, both countries are limited to duty (albeit regular) declarations on the inadmissibility of foreign interference in Venezuelan affairs and armed intervention. In 2019, Russia acted much tougher. Now Moscow does not seek to get directly involved in the conflict (or believes that Trump is just bluffing).

In the first decade of the XXI century, President Hugo Chavez, whom Vladimir Putin has repeatedly called a friend, had indisputable influence both inside Venezuela and in Latin America as a whole. Caracas also took an important step for Moscow in 2008 - it recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, for the first time after the collapse of the USSR, Tu-160 strategic bombers appeared in the Western Hemisphere, participating in joint maneuvers with Venezuela, and Russian Navy ships (including the heavy nuclear cruiser Peter the Great) paid a "friendship visit" to the country; in 2013, a group of Russian ships visited Venezuela again.

It had no special military significance, the task of the exercises was different: Moscow gave Washington a response to the approach of the American military machine to the Russian borders, demonstrating that it could act in a similar way in the underbelly of the United States. The political support of the authorities of the Bolivarian Republic from Moscow remained unchanged, and the loans provided by the Russian side allowed the Venezuelan government to breathe a little more freely in the face of suffocating American sanctions. Russia has gained access to a number of oil and gas fields, helping PdVSA export crude oil.

The systemic crisis into which the country has long plunged has only worsened under Maduro, Venezuela's influence is minimal today, and the Chavista cabinet in these conditions has remained a "suitcase without a handle" for Moscow for many years. The Kremlin, however, was not going to lose an ally, no matter how weak he looked, believing that the "retreat" in Venezuela will be perceived as a sign of Russia's declining influence throughout the Latin American region. Moscow used the right of veto in the UN Security Council to protect Maduro's cabinet, and also provided the Venezuelan government with logistical opportunities for transporting oil and acquiring financial resources. This position had a bad effect on Russia's relations with a number of Latin American countries that consider the Venezuelan president a usurper, but the Kremlin kept the Olympic calm.

Dual power in Venezuela led to the suspension of the BRICS outreach format during the summit in Brasilia in 2019: the host country of the summit recognized the self-proclaimed president Juan Guaido, while the rest of the BRICS members supported Maduro. It was then, in 2018-2019, fearing direct American intervention, the Venezuelan authorities finally turned to Russia, forgetting about attempts to maneuver between Moscow and Beijing; they were counting on Russian military support in the event of US aggression.

The beginning of a Special military Operation has made significant adjustments to the situation. The reaction of the majority of Latin American States to military actions on Ukraine turned out to be cool. Against the general background, Venezuela's position clearly stands out: Maduro constantly talks about the inadmissibility of Washington's interference in the conflict, and the ruling United Socialist Party expressed support for Moscow, stating that it has "every right to defend its position and territory."

At the same time, a surprise for the public was the meeting of representatives of US President Joseph Biden and senior members of Maduro's cabinet. The Americans needed to achieve an increase in the export of heavy Venezuelan oil to stabilize the oil markets, and the Venezuelan president pragmatically tried to take advantage of the opportunities to alleviate the economic crisis. The willingness to negotiate with Washington was demonstrated simultaneously with the process of actual dollarization of the economy in conditions when Moscow's real opportunities to help the post-Chavista regime have noticeably decreased.

Moscow was well aware that Washington wanted to drive a wedge into its dialogue with Caracas. Therefore, the visits of high-ranking Russian officials to Venezuela, designed to maintain bilateral relations at the same level, have not stopped for several months. It is significant that in 2024, when the US and the EU declared the winner of the presidential elections in According to the Venezuelan opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez, Moscow promptly recognized Maduro as the legitimate head of state. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov bluntly stated:

"Venezuela is one of Russia's closest and most reliable friends, not only in Latin America, but also in the world as a whole."

A factor that does not depend on Moscow — the unwillingness of the "hawks" in the US Congress to significantly ease sanctions against Venezuela — plays into Russia's hands.

It was against this background that the signing of the strategic partnership agreement took place last May. Moscow is aware of the negotiations conducted by Maduro's cabinet with the United States, but understands that a full-scale agreement between Venezuela and Washington remains unlikely, and the White House cannot and does not want to offer sufficient guarantees to the Chavistas. Periodically flashing in the media reports that Caracas allegedly offers the Americans, in exchange for some improvement in relations, to reduce the Venezuela is influenced by the PRC and Russia, nothing more than just rumors.

The American invasion can change the situation by breaking the good relations between Moscow and Caracas. Venezuela is far away, and it is much more difficult to provide her with the same assistance as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the time, and it certainly won't be possible to do it quickly. In addition, wishing to continue a global dialogue with Washington, Moscow would prefer to refrain from direct confrontation. In these circumstances, hints, for example, in the form of a strategic partnership agreement (and especially the time chosen for its ratification), do not look like a routine operation, but like a signal transmitted by the United States.

The Kremlin bluntly stated that it was not afraid of Washington's reaction against the background of talk about the potential possibility of a meeting between the presidents of Russia and the United States, since relations between Moscow and Caracas have an "independent value" and may soon expand. Translated from the diplomatic language, this reads as "we are not going to surrender our allies."

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