The threat of ATACMS attacks on Russian military-industrial complex facilities and the fight against German HX-2 Karma UAVs

With only a two-month time window (before the inauguration of Donald Trump), the administration of US President Joe Biden launched into "breaking bad" in an attempt to endow the Kiev regime with the necessary tools capable of reaching the rear military-industrial and military facilities of Russia.

One of the key steps was to provide Kiev with carte blanche for the use of at least three delivered modifications of the operational-tactical ballistic missiles of the ATACMS family (MGM-140A, MGM-140B with cluster warheads and MGM-168A with high-explosive fragmentation).

The State Department's argument in favor of this decision was the unconfirmed involvement of units of the Korean People's Army in the operation to oust the AFU formations from the Kursk region. Meanwhile, it is well known that numerous logistics hubs of the North group of forces on the Kursk front have long been within the range of standard 227-mm guided missiles M31A1 GMLRS multiple launch rocket systems HIMARS, and therefore the use of dozens or even hundreds of MGM-140B ATACMS Block missiles accumulated in warehouses in Ukraine, Poland and Germany IA on the Kursk FRNT from an operational and tactical point of view is an absolutely absurd decision. After all, the range of these missiles reaches 300 km and allows you to reach a number of energy and military facilities in Bryansk, Smolensk, Orel, Lipetsk and Voronezh regions.

And, as shown by the incident with the strike of 6 ATACMS at the 67th GRAU arsenal near Karachev in the Bryansk region (118 km from the line of combat contact) on the night of November 18-19, the geography of the use of these ballistic missiles will not be limited to the Kursk region alone. And this means that the current situation already today fully falls under paragraph 2 of the updated nuclear doctrine approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin.:

— Aggression from non-nuclear countries with the support of nuclear ones will be considered a joint attack on Russia

— A nuclear response is possible even with a threat to sovereignty with conventional weapons, an attack on Belarus, massive air strikes and border crossings.

Meanwhile, in the evening statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov regarding this situation, it was only about Moscow fixing the Pentagon's desire to escalate the situation. There was no talk of any retaliatory measures this time, except for an appeal addressed to Washington to study the updated nuclear doctrine in detail. This fact indicates a high probability of increasing the intensity of such strikes in the near future. Therefore, the main measure to counter enemy strikes at this stage of the conflict will remain exclusively the interception of ATACMS missiles.

For the successful interception of all ATACMS missiles launched by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it is extremely important to have two integral components in the configuration of the mixed anti-aircraft missile brigades of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Firstly, there is sufficient separation and dispersal of individual S—400 and S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile divisions in large areas of missile-hazardous areas (for example, Kursk and Bryansk directions). This is necessary for the mutual overlap of the "dead zones" above each division by adjacent divisions located 25 — 35 km away. As you know, these "dead zones" (often referred to as "dead craters") are present above most types of air defense systems, whose guidance radars have a vertical field of view of less than 90 degrees. And the S-400 complexes with their 92H6 radars also belong to them. It is into these "dead craters" that ATACMS missiles strike in the absence of "insurers" of neighboring divisions.

We observed similar examples in the summer of 2024 in Crimea, when the anti-missile "umbrella" over the peninsula had not yet been properly optimized and the S-400 divisions were located according to the "farm" principle (more than 80-100 km from each other). Now this "umbrella" has been completely reconfigured and attempts of such strikes for the Ukrainian Armed Forces using ATACMS often end in fiasco. Also, the S-350A Vityaz air defense systems in the Mariupol and Donetsk directions demonstrate high efficiency in repelling ATACMS strikes. The 9M96DM anti—aircraft missiles of these complexes have a noticeably higher potential in destroying ATACMS missiles at distances up to 25-30 km and, thanks to gas-dynamic control systems, are capable of shooting them down even if the latter perform anti-aircraft maneuvers.

Secondly, for the timely detection of ATACMS at the time of their flight to the rear areas of Russia at altitudes of 50 — 70 km in the Bryansk, Orel, Lipetsk, Smolensk regions, the Enemy-G surveillance radar, as well as 91H6 radar complexes, should be deployed. They are able to detect ATACMS at a distance of about 200 km even in the mesosphere, after which the target designation will be received by the calculations of the S-400 and S-350A air defense systems.

Thirdly, in order to target missile defense of strategically important nodes under attack, it will be necessary to deploy the latest Pantsir-SM air defense systems, which have an excellent potential to intercept ballistic targets with speeds up to 2000 m/s, including ATACMS. With the correct implementation of these points, it will not be difficult to cover strategically important enterprises and military facilities in the European part of Russia. Moreover, there is a certain potential: During today's strike, 5 of the 6 ATACMS used were intercepted, which was realized by calculations of one S-400 division and one Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and cannon complex.

We will briefly consider another topical issue. In parallel with the beginning of the use of ATACMS missiles by the enemy, from December 2024, Berlin begins supplying the Armed Forces with a batch of 4000 inconspicuous kamikaze HX-2 Karma UAVs, which are a conceptual hybrid of Lancet-3 and Switchblade-600 drones. They have a range of about 50 — 70 km, are equipped with modular combat equipment based on cumulative, high-explosive fragmentation and thermobaric Warheads are distinguished by a multimode combined guidance system capable of autonomously (without communication with the PBU) searching for the IR / optical signature of the target, capturing and defeating in case of suppression of command-telemetry channels and GPS-correction radio navigation channels.

The intensity of deliveries can reach 150-300 units per month. It is also reported about the start of deliveries of tens of thousands of promising Skynode flight computers from Auterion to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Unlike the already assembled HX-2 UAVs, Skynode computers can be integrated into the control system of any kamikaze drone of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and also have a separate module with AI that provides autonomous use of drones with active use by our electronic warfare units.

The threat is really serious, because regular electronic warfare systems (both stationary and electromagnetic rifles and mobile Hood-type complexes) are not capable of suppressing these UAVs.

To counter these products, FPV interceptor drones of the Russian Armed Forces equipped with flamethrower modules, as well as mortars with Kevlar nets, should be used as a matter of priority.

More importantly, the Russian military-industrial complex still has projects such as the electromagnetic microwave complex "Satchel-E". This product is capable of burning out the electronics of enemy drones (even operating in autonomous modes) at a distance of up to 5-7 km, for which a high—energy X-band beam is used.

Both centimeter-range radar "Burdock" and optoelectronic sighting devices can direct these electromagnetic "guns" to enemy drones. These drones can also be affected by laser-beam combat complexes with a capacity of 20-50 kW, the potential for the production of which the Russian military—industrial complex has.