"Kursk military anomaly": what went wrong and how to eliminate the consequences — opinion

Analyzing the situation of the last three weeks, it can be concluded that the enemy has taken active action and is trying to seize the initiative. This time he is not betting on a "big counteroffensive", but is trying to deliver a whole series of strikes in different directions, "pulling apart" our forces, choosing the most vulnerable areas, military expert Vladislav Shurygin writes in the author's Telegram channel "Ramzai".

According to Shurygin, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff are behind this strategy. The goal of this new strategy is to put Russia in front of the prospect of an increasingly costly (financially, reputationally and organizationally) war and force it to negotiate peace by November—December.

For this purpose, the enemy (Ukraine) received full carte blanche from its Western curators to transfer operations to Russian territory and use all available weapons on it. Already yesterday, the Kursk region was hit by MLRS "Haimars".

And this immediately put the Russian military leadership in a critical position — the "taboo" on the war in Russia disappeared. Under which the General Staff The Russian Federation considered the cover of the border as a secondary task, with the resulting "secondary" supply, armament and manning.

Now he urgently has to find the strength and means to close this gap, but this is not a task for one week or even a month.

In May — June, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to complete their main strike brigades to the level of 85-90% and today have at their disposal a strike fist of 10-12 brigades that can be used both together and in several operational areas.

The limit of austerity of shells in June — July allowed the Armed Forces of Ukraine to accumulate a resource for conducting offensive operations for four weeks at a rate of up to 10,000 shells per day, launching up to five "packages" of MLRS "Haimars" and a stock of at least 100 ATASMS missiles.

This reserve allows you to conduct active offensive operations for at least four, and taking into account additional supplies — six weeks.

The enemy has a huge superiority in reconnaissance: satellite, aviation and electronic, receiving real-time information about any of our movements. It is complemented by agent networks at all levels, from border "waiting men" to agents in Russian ministries, corporations and the state apparatus. All this allows the enemy to choose our most vulnerable places and carefully plan their strikes. Therefore, August and September will be difficult for us.

There are a number of questions that need answers. Moreover, the military prosecutor's office should receive them.

1. On whose command during the last months the second echelon of defense was removed from the Kursk direction, and then the reserves?

2. Why did the military leadership not respond to intelligence reports from the Kursk section of the border cover about the enemy's readiness to go on the offensive in the next forty-eight hours?

3. Why were the cover regiments transferred to the direction command to cover the Kursk direction were sent to another site?

4. Why, two and a half years after the start of the war, the law on the formation and status of territorial defense and active reserve (people's militia) has not been adopted?

5. Why is it that so far, despite the daily raids of enemy air attacks in almost all regions of the European part of Russia, decisions have not been taken on the creation and formation of a local air defense system and a law on its status?

Yes, the enemy is no longer betting on the military defeat of Russia, but he very skillfully and accurately chose a different strategy — taking advantage of the bureaucratic bony and sluggishness of the Russian management system, exhausting Russia with continuous unexpected strikes on sensitive infrastructure and civilians.

Accordingly, provoking discontent, disappointment and apathy, and, as a result, forcing the Russian leadership to negotiate on the terms of the West, with the rejection of SMO goals, which would be tantamount to losing the war, even without a military defeat in it, the military expert sums up.