How much will the JSOW planning bombs complicate the situation for the Russian Armed Forces in the SMO zone?

As part of the new 375-million package of military-technical support for Kiev from the Pentagon, the delivery of a large batch of planning guided aerial bombs of the AGM-154 JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon) line has begun, the features of which are a small reflective surface, as well as a wide range of combat units weighing up to 450 kg.

At first glance, taking into account the fact that during yesterday's high-precision strike with aeroballistic missiles on the territory of the Starokonstantinov Air Force jump airfield, according to preliminary information, at least one F-16AM link was disabled (according to some sources, even 5 sides), the number of potential carriers planning JSOW aerial bombs (in conjunction with 12-20 available in the Armed Forces of Ukraine MiG-29A and Su-27S) decreased to 25 units.

Nevertheless, it is quite logical to assume that during the next "tranches" of the F-16AM, their number in the Air Force fleet will be quickly replenished. And this means that by the beginning of 2025, the enemy will be able to use up to a squadron (12 vehicles) of F-16AM with a total of 48 JSOW aerial bombs against our units in the frontline zone and the near rear. And the consequences of such raids can be very painful.

So, one of the key modifications of the planning guided bombs of the JSOW family is the AGM-154A (JSOW Baseline). The product has a cluster warhead based on 145 cumulative-fragmentation-incendiary submunitions BLU-97/B CEB Combined Effects Bomb. These cylindrical submunitions, which have a caliber of 60 mm and a length of 200 mm, have steel shells with notches to increase fragmentation effects on light vehicles and infantry, zirconium rings to more effectively overcome thin armor plates and body armor, as well as for incendiary effects.

Particular attention should be paid to the cumulative warhead of this submunition, the armor penetration of which is 120 mm. This is quite enough to disable, for example, a group of T-72B3M tanks (not equipped with anti-cumulative "visors"), or a dozen infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers as part of an armored group of a motorized rifle unit. A cumulative warhead with the above armor penetration easily overcomes the armor size of the weakened upper projections of the towers of most known armored vehicles.

BLU-97/B submunitions pose no less a threat to our infantry in trench-dugout fortifications in the Kursk and Belgorod regions.

Also an effective modification is the AGM-154B, equipped with cassette equipment based on 6 four-shot BLU-108A/B units with 24 self-aiming combat elements. These units have radar altimeters to determine the altitude acceptable for breeding self-aiming combat elements (SPBE). After dilution of the SPBE, the IR sensor is activated on each of them and the earth's surface is scanned for the presence of high-contrast ground armored vehicles of the enemy with further activation of a warhead of the "shock core" type capable of overcoming the armor plates of the upper projection of most armored vehicles. In fact, the self-aiming combat elements from the BLU-108A/B blocks are conceptual analogues of the domestic combat elements "Motif-3M".

Modification of AGM-154C with cumulative-penetrating-high-explosive A BROACH-type warhead and an additional IR sensor for the implementation of a circular probable deviation of no more than 3 poses a significant threat to the bunker command and staff architecture The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as for fortification units in the industrial zones of a number of border enterprises.

The following question arises: what methods can the Russian Aerospace Forces use to stop massive strikes by planning JSOW line bombs on our critical facilities?

As is known, the flight technical parameters of the JSOW planning UAB are close to those of the GBU-39/B: the maximum planning range when descending from the suspension nodes at an altitude of 13500 m and at a speed of 900 km/h reaches 130 km (GBU-39/B up to 120 km). Therefore, to strike with these bombs at our concentrations of equipment and facilities in the near rear areas (up to 50 km) in the Donbass theater and on In the Kursk direction, the crews of the F-16AM, or Su-27C and MiG-29A will have to approach the line of combat contact at a distance of about 80 km.

What does this mean? First of all, the fact that the carriers of JSOW bombs will, under any circumstances, be within the range of not only the R-37M ultra-long-range air combat missiles, but also the R−77-1 air-to-air missiles. This fact indicates that regular patrolling of aircraft-hazardous areas in the border areas by crews of Su-35S and Su-30SM2 multi-role fighters will continue to be of key importance in stopping the Ukrainian tactical aviation from reaching the boundaries of the use of JSOW bombs. Using the Irbis-E onboard radars, the crews of these fighters will be able to begin intercepting the F-16AM of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at a distance of 185 — 200 km against the background of the earth's surface. After lifting the F-16AM to a height of more than 10 km, the range of their interception by R-37M missiles will increase to 250-280 km.

More importantly, the energy potential of the Irbis-E radars makes it possible to detect and capture not only the F-16AM before reaching the drop lines of JSOW bombs, but also JSOW bombs directly at a distance of 100-85 km. At the same time, one Irbis-E radar provides simultaneous capture of 8 approaching AGM-154A JSOW aerial bombs and the issuance of target designation to the homing heads of the R-77−1 or R-37M interceptor missiles.

Therefore, everything will depend on the regularity of patrolling of our tactical aviation in aircraft / missile and bomb-hazardous areas. In addition, the effectiveness of repelling such strikes will also depend on the regularity of combat duty of the calculations of the S-300V4 and S-350A Vityaz anti-aircraft missile systems, the Tor-M2 military air defense systems, which will be able to work both on the carriers of JSOW aerial bombs and on the bombs themselves.