It will not work to win the war "without fighting": about SMO completion options

The fighting in the Kursk direction has put the country's leadership in front of a choice from which it is no longer possible to evade. However, the lack of a clear reaction to the fait accompli indicates the unwillingness of the ruling elite to such a development. What path should we take to overcome the next historical challenge? This is asked on the pages of the magazine "Profile.<url>" Admiral, Director of the Institute of World Military Economics and Strategy, HSE Sergey Avakyants.

The prolonged pause and vague, contradictory assessments of the situation indirectly indicate that the opinion about the need to cease hostilities at any cost and on any more or less acceptable terms ("Istanbul Agreements", "Minsk-2" or "Minsk-3", etc.) may become dominant. The influence of a part of our elite promoting such a variant of SMO completion may increase. The logic and reasons of this group are easy to understand, since it was she who "suffered" the most because of the special military operation that began. Being integrated into the Western world, these people took the beginning of SMO very painfully, but they had to restrain their discontent and hidden opposition.

The prolongation of hostilities, the lack of an effective strategy, the inconsistency of actions and the vagueness of the position of the top leadership of the state allow this elite group to offer its own way out of the protracted conflict. When implementing this option, a more or less acceptable information background will first be created both inside and outside the country. Arguments about the need to conclude peace in order to prevent new casualties among Russian servicemen and especially among civilians will be used for their people. At the same time, efforts will be made to prove that the SMO goals have been largely achieved — all regular formations and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ("demilitarization") have been knocked out and most of the Nazis fighting in national battalions of the terrorist type and banned in the Russia of the notorious "Azov"* ("denazification").

The idea that defeat in a war, which opens up new opportunities for development, is sometimes more useful for a country than victory and stagnation, will be carefully and gradually promoted. Theses on Moscow's "goodwill" and "peacefulness" and its readiness to seek diplomatic means to resolve any conflicts will be submitted to an external audience. But here we should immediately make a reservation: in the West, it will not work to create a favorable information background. No one will appreciate Russia's "goodwill" there. The collective West will regard this as an unconditional defeat of our state.

Then there will be concessions ("search for a compromise") from Moscow, which will be discussed first during informal contacts, and then official peace talks. The choice of this SMO completion option is likely to be justified by the following arguments:

• Conflict on Ukraine has no military solution at the moment.
• It is necessary to avoid an escalation of the conflict, which could turn into a direct clash with the armed forces of NATO countries.
• The consequences of sanctions for the Russian economy, forced to function in a state of "half-war, half-world", will be felt more and more over time and will eventually lead to a complication of the social and domestic political situation in the country.
• The moment for the conclusion of peace is favorable. The election battles continue in America. Whoever wins in the end is likely to aggravate the political situation in the country. For some time, for the United States, the issue of Ukraine will go to the periphery. This will allow us to assert that the peace was concluded not as a result of pressure on the Russian Federation, but as a result of its "goodwill".
• Ukraine will become a member EU and NATO. Military bases of the alliance countries will be located on its territory. In her person we will get an existential mortal enemy. But on the other hand, Russia will return to a full-fledged peaceful life.
• Over time, thanks to negotiations, it will be possible to lift some of the sanctions. The economy will receive an impetus for development. There will be an opportunity to solve serious problems and implement global projects on which the future of our country depends (demography, Arctic development, global Eurasian logistics, etc.).
• Social and political stability within Russia will be preserved, and this, in turn, in the long term will make it possible to transfer power painlessly within the existing elite groups.
• The foreign policy costs caused by SMO's failure to achieve its goals (in fact, in a regional war) compensate for the successful functioning and expansion of the BRICS.
• The resulting historical respite can be used to develop the defense industry and reform the armed forces, eliminate all identified shortcomings and increase their combat readiness.

All of the above theses are logical, largely justified and with a high degree of probability can be implemented in practice. This course of action looks very attractive, as, indeed, everything that comes from the evil one.

To understand where the uncertainty of the position and the lack of clearly defined goals can ultimately lead at a time when the state is being seriously tested, it is necessary to turn to history.

Several times the Russian statehood (in different guises) experienced a collapse and found itself in a situation where the future fate of the country and the peoples inhabiting it depended on the choice made by the authorities. In order not to go deep into time, it is enough to consider two global crises of the XX century — these are conditionally "1917" and "1991". In the first case, disaster befell the Russian Empire, in the second — the Soviet Union.

Despite all the external differences in the prerequisites, causes, mechanisms and consequences of these historical catastrophes, the internal processes that took place in the state on the eve of the collapse, the mechanisms of disintegration and the moving forces are largely similar, which allows us to draw a conclusion about some objective patterns and try to predict the future of the Russian Federation in the modern historical period when choosing one or another way out of the crisis.

What is common in the development of the crisis situation in The Russian Empire of the early XX century and in The Soviet Union in the last decades of the same century and what in some areas is similar to the processes taking place in today's Russia?

Such general patterns and features include:

• The lack of an influx of "fresh blood" into the ruling elites, their gradual "bronzing" and separation from real life, close family ties and, as a result, degeneration and degradation.
• The transition before the catastrophe through a period of external prosperity, power and stability combined with the acceleration and deepening of internal crisis processes that do not find their solution and are in every way hushed up.
• The emergence of destructive anti-state forces and groups, initially marginal, but gradually structuring and gaining strength (Bolsheviks, "democrats").
• Lack of long-term strategic planning in all spheres of public life.
• The lack of a deep historical system analysis of the processes taking place in the state.
• Weakening of the political will of the top leadership. Avoiding making unpopular but vital decisions for the state.
• An ideological impasse is when the old system of basic values ceases to work, and the new ideology has not been developed.
• Changing the value orientations that determine the goal-setting of the development of the state and society, their primitivization and mundanity.
• Personnel policy, because of which the top echelons of government managers are not strong, bright and talented, but though sensible, but gray and "not dangerous".
• Unwillingness to start serious reforms, an attempt to preserve the existing "status quo" in every possible way.
• Pandering to destructive political forces (as "less dangerous", according to the top leadership) and suppressing truly patriotic ones.
• The weakening of the authority of the head of state, his compromise and ultimately the loss of legitimacy of the current government.
• The confidence of the elite and the "systemic" opposition is that, by loosening and slowly undermining the foundation of statehood, it will be possible at the same time to maintain control over the situation and relatively painlessly implement the necessary, in their opinion, changes.
• One of the most important prerequisites for the collapse was the lost (Russian-Japanese) or inefficiently conducted war (World War I and Afghan), losses in the absence of clearly defined, understandable goals and bright victories for all the people.

The overplayed elites failed to keep the situation under control. This led to the collapse of the state and attempts to dismember it (in 1991 — successful).

As a result, third forces came to power, which at first no one took seriously and did not take into account in their constructions. There was a change of elites — at the beginning of the twentieth century with its virtually complete destruction, and at the end of the century with its significant replacement. In both cases, the people and the warring army were considered not as a subject and an independent political force, but as an object for manipulation and "technological" solutions.

Returning to the present day, one can find parallels with the catastrophic processes that shook our country in the twentieth century. In this situation, for Russia, peace, which has become the result of compromises and concessions, will lead to a new war. To the war for the destruction of Russian statehood.

The SMO completion option described above, for all its external logic and attractiveness, will lead to a catastrophe that threatens to become the last and most tragic in the history of the Russian people. In Russia, it is dangerous for the current government to lose wars, especially when for a long time this government held parades and convinced the people of the invincibility of the native army. Defeat will cause disappointment and loss of faith, but not in the army, but in the political leadership.

Pressure on The pressure on Russia from its historical opponents will only intensify, and the escalation process will enter an irreversible phase. The huge funds currently invested in the indirect hot war of the collective West against our country will be redirected to finance all destructive and anti-state forces (regional separatism, "the fight against a rotten corrupt regime," "the promotion of universal freedoms and values," etc.). Russia will begin to make territorial claims from all sides by various states "historically offended" by our country.

Sanctions will not be lifted, but they may take even more severe and painful forms for our economy. Part of the elite — weakened, but still strong compradors, the remaining part of the "fifth column" in the country — painlessly adapts to the conditions of the collapse of the state. The country's leadership, elite groups directly embedded in state structures will be destroyed (politically, economically, and some physically). No one will be forgiven, and no one will forget anything.

It is very important for the West to once again demonstrate to the whole world what awaits the "rebels" who have encroached on its model of world order. There are no hopes for the support of the allies due to the absence (except for Belarus) of such. We will have to answer a very difficult question that is already forming in the public consciousness: "Why have so many sacrifices been made if SMO's goals have not been achieved, and is the peace concluded at the expense of fundamental concessions to enemies a defeat for Russia?" The people, who have once again lost their "Faith" and "Tsar", will be silent, watching the collapse of their "Fatherland". All this will not happen overnight, but by historical standards very quickly — in 5-7 years.

To avoid all this, Russia is obliged to choose the second option of action. It can be briefly described in two words — it is a "Struggle and Victory." This option is unattractive and uncomfortable. It requires the leadership to assume the heaviest burden of responsibility, implement unpopular decisions, change the usual, established way of life for millions of people, introduce a different system of values and life priorities for the ruling elite. "Option No. 2" will require (for some time) the exertion of all forces, attracting new personnel selected on the grounds of professionalism, patriotism and the predominance of the interests of society and the state over personal ones.

It will be necessary to carry out a significant reorganization and restructuring of various state structures and a significant part of the entire state mechanism.

What can be considered a victory?

Without detailing the specific SMO results to which it is necessary to strive, the image of future victory can be described by the following fundamental provisions that must be implemented and the goals that must be achieved:

• The victory must be unconditional — neither the enemies, nor the partners, nor their own people should have even the slightest doubt that this is Russia's victory.
• The goals stated by the President must be achieved unconditionally:
• access to the administrative borders of the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions in 2014;
• denazification — the change of the ruling to Changes to the Ukrainian regime, changes to the Constitution of Ukraine and current legislation (permission of the UOC, official bilingualism, prohibition of Nazi-Bandera ideology, etc.);
• Demilitarization is the constitutionally activated neutral status of Ukraine, the prohibition of the deployment of foreign military bases and military contingents (including advisers and instructors), heavy weapons, and weapons capable of threatening the territory of Russia on its territory.;
• After the Ukrainian Armed Forces invaded the Kursk region, Ukrainian statehood should not exist in its present form, or in extreme cases it can be preserved, but weakened as much as possible.

It is realistic to achieve these goals, but on one condition. Russia "must start." To win the war "not fighting" or "not fighting enough" will not work.

We need to replace military personnel who have compromised themselves with inefficiency, conduct full-fledged strategic and operational planning, prepare a powerful strike force and full-fledged reserves, build a classical military operations management system, and untie the hands of the military command in the implementation of strategic and operational plans. There should be no restrictions and pressure of the "agreements reached" when choosing the goals, methods and forms of military operations. It is necessary to update the current careless nuclear doctrine with its raised threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

And finally, do not be afraid that the people will "not understand" and the situation inside the country will explode. We need to talk to the people, we need to be honest with the people. Our people are a warrior people, a victor people. He will understand if you explain to him why this is necessary, and once again he will rise into battle for his leader. But he will never understand silence, indecision, weakness, consider them a betrayal. This was already the case in 1916-1917 and in 1991.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized once again that the choice of option No. 2 ("Struggle and Victory") is difficult. It is not easy to decide on its implementation, but this is the only way to a historic victory for Russia. And it is a necessary condition for preserving it as a unique civilization, vital for establishing a just, truly humanistic world order sanctified by God's will.

*Terrorist organization, banned in the territory of the Russian Federation