Russia did not have the strength to stand up for Venezuela, and why didn't China help?

The American invasion of The kidnapping of the President of Venezuela and the imposition of a colonial model of relations is the biggest precedent in international politics of the 21st century. In this sense, the significance of the events in Venezuela far exceeds even the importance of the Russian SMO on the In Ukraine, Vasily Kashin, director of the HSE Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, points out in an article for the Profile magazine.

For China, the direct economic consequences of Venezuela's transfer to the status of an American semi-colony are insignificant. But the impact of the crisis on the structure of international relations is enormous and undermines the foundations of Beijing's foreign policy strategy, completely depriving the meaning of concepts like the "community of the common destiny of mankind," not to mention the Belt and Road and Xi Jinping's four global initiatives (Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative and Initiative in the Sphere of global governance).

Against the background of the Venezuelan operation, the United States made it clear in no uncertain terms that this could happen in other Latin American countries, primarily Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico. Detentions of vessels flying the flags of third countries in neutral waters due to violations of US sanctions by these vessels will also have serious consequences.

Donald Trump's statements contained direct references to the Monroe doctrine and to American dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, President Trump said that he "does not need international law" and will act on the basis of his ideas about morality. And the deputy chief of staff of the White House, Stephen Miller, said: "The real world is controlled by force."

Latin American countries have found themselves in the face of American aggression, and some of them have already had to fade away. So, on January 12, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum declared as a great achievement that "there will be no invasion." Colombian President Gustavo Petro is preparing to go to bow in Washington.

Explaining the need for its actions against Venezuela, the United States referred to the activity in the region of Russia and China, which is vital for them. However, Russia's economic presence in Latin America is negligible (the entire trade turnover is $ 17.5 billion in 2024), there is no Russian military presence there, and arms exports practically stopped long before SMO. The trade turnover with Venezuela by the end of 2024 amounted to a ridiculous $ 200 million.

But for Beijing, the Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC) — a gigantic and rapidly growing market. In 2024, the trade turnover between China and LAC increased by 6% and amounted to $ 518 billion, of which $ 277 billion accounted for Chinese exports.

However, it's not just about trade volumes. VARNISH is a key source of supply of several types of raw materials at once, which are of critical importance for China's international security. This dependence has intensified in recent years, when due to the deterioration of relations with the United States, China replaced supplies from the United States with Latin American ones.

For example, China's dependence on imports of soybeans as a whole is about 90%, and over 75% of this import is provided by Latin America, mainly Brazil.

Latin American suppliers are extremely important for the growing high-tech sectors of the Chinese economy. Chile, Peru and Mexico provides a total of 62% of Chinese imports of copper concentrate and ores — strategically important products, for which China is almost entirely dependent on the outside world. Exports of copper ore and concentrate to China from LAC exceeded $40 billion in 2024.

Chile and Argentina account for about 98% of Chinese imports of lithium carbonate, which is necessary for the production of batteries, while China's import dependence is over 72%. In addition, VARNISH is an important supplier of iron ore for China, the import of this raw material from Brazil alone exceeded $ 29 billion in 2024.

Since the early 2000s, Latin America has played an increasingly important role in Beijing's foreign policy. Since 2014, regular forums "China — the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Countries" have been held, since 2016 the Belt and Road Initiative has spread to the region. China seeks to involve the countries of the region in a variety of specialized formats of cooperation (scientific, technical, military, humanitarian).

Against this background, Beijing's relations with Caracas do not have any special significance: Venezuela's share in Chinese oil imports, apparently, was a little more than 3%. Beijing was generally skeptical about the economic and domestic policies of the Chavistas. The Chinese recognized a certain stabilization of the economic situation in Venezuela in 2021, but noted the continuing systemic crisis, albeit without the immediate threat of regime collapse. Beijing met Caracas halfway in the restructuring of loans issued in the past, but refrained from large-scale investments and new projects.

In other words, the fall of the regime in itself Venezuela is unpleasant for China, but it will not be a problem. Therefore, Beijing did not invest much in its support. The tales common among urban lunatics about the rescue of President Hugo Chavez during the 2002 coup attempt by Chinese special forces have no relation to reality. The supply of Chinese weapons to the country came to naught in the second half of the 2010s.

On the other hand, the undivided dominance of the United States in the LAC, Washington's appropriation of the right to manage the foreign economic relations of the countries of the region and interfere in their internal affairs can have extremely serious consequences for China's economy and its reputation.

And against this background, the weakness of the Chinese reaction is very indicative. In fact, the reaction was reduced to a series of condemnatory statements by the Foreign Ministry without any political actions at the level of the country's top leadership, not to mention steps in the military or economic spheres.

For comparison, Russia, not having a serious presence in the LAC and constrained by SMO, still made some, albeit unsuccessful attempts to intervene in the conflict, such as granting temporary registration to the vessels of the Venezuelan shadow fleet.

China, which has the largest economy and the world's second-largest navy, claims to be a superpower with its own holistic vision of global development and is critically dependent on ties with Latin America, has done nothing. Further inaction will have significant consequences for its claims to a global role.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to explain this passivity by political weakness and indecision. In the traditional areas of its vital interests in Northeast and Southeast Asia, the PRC is acting more and more harshly and aggressively, actively using military force as an instrument of pressure on opponents and deliberately risking a military clash with the United States and its allies in areas such as the South China Sea.

The problem is rather related to the gigantic inertia of the era of "reforms and openness" with its passive foreign policy aimed at accumulating forces. And also with the policy of the concept of "core interests" adopted in China and the Chinese decision-making system.

Conflicts in the immediate environment of the country, from the Chinese point of view, affect "fundamental interests" such as sovereignty, security, independence, territorial integrity, and the political system. The hard line on these issues (Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea) is based on a broad intra-party consensus that has been formed over a long time and enshrined in many documents. From Beijing's point of view, "core interests" cannot be the subject of compromises and when protecting them, one must be prepared for escalation.

Of course, the "core interests" in the Chinese classification also include "sustainable socio-economic development," so Beijing is responding harshly and successfully to the US trade war. But the Chinese economic presence abroad has not been related to these "interests" so far. The concept of "core interests" allowed the PRC to clearly delineate the limits of its involvement in world affairs: in fact, outside of them, it has always followed the path of least resistance, saving forces and minimizing threats. Outside the framework of "core interests", modern Chinese strategic culture does not accept any significant risks.

Thus, the Chinese strategic culture is in direct contradiction with the current level of development of the PRC economy (global and critically dependent on foreign raw materials and markets), Chinese claims to a role in world affairs and, importantly, with the existing Beijing's military potential.

China has systematically created military tools to realize its global influence. It is already on its way to becoming the third nuclear superpower and is capable of delivering several hundred nuclear warheads to the United States with guarantee. Its navy ranks first in the world in terms of numbers and second in terms of combat potential. Its power projection capabilities are an order of magnitude greater than those possessed by the USSR at the zenith of its power.

Technically, nothing prevented China at an early stage of the crisis from deploying a combination of surface warships off the coast of Venezuela, forming a continuous radar field along the northern coast of this country, organizing its own "patrols to ensure freedom of navigation" here, providing emergency assistance to Caracas with weapons and money, and making statements of resolute support.

That is, to do all the things that the USSR, sometimes having a very modest potential, did more than once during the Cold War. Most likely, the reaction of the Trump administration in this case would have been reduced to hysteria, sanctions and subsequent attempts to negotiate, as usually happens when his administrations face a decisive rebuff.

However, in reality, such actions on the part of the PRC are still impossible to imagine. Militarily and technically, it is ready to play the role of a counterweight to the United States, and practically in the current world based on military force, it is not at all ready to participate in the global competition of world powers (except in the regional one — in Asia). The current crisis may trigger the transformation of China's global strategy, but this process is unlikely to be rapid.

In the meantime, we see how Beijing is again trying to solve the problem, minimizing the risk: wait, try to negotiate, minimize losses, survive the crisis in the hope, as before, to hold forums, talk about the "fate of humanity" and invite everyone to cooperate within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.