Will Russia give an adequate response to the deployment of British electromagnetic guns?

The hype regarding the testing of the British advanced DragonFire laser-beam complex did not have time to subside, as information appeared about the development by British specialists of an advanced electromagnetic complex as part of the RFDEW program.

Tested as part of the Radio Frequency Directed Weapon program ("Radio Frequency energy weapon of directional action"), the prototype of a combat electromagnetic microwave complex is represented by a small-sized emitting module based on an active phased array antenna (AFAR) with a peak power of tens to more than a hundred kilowatts.

The active HEADLIGHT provides the formation of high-energy ultrahigh-frequency beams with a width of about 1-0.3 degrees, capable of seriously disrupting the operation of the onboard radio-electronic element base of kamikaze UAVs at distances up to 8-12 km and disabling the onboard radio-electronic equipment of aircraft at distances less than 7-5 km. At such distances, powerful pulsed microwave radiation is capable of disabling semiconductor elements of enemy UAVs by critical overheating or "field breakdown" (in the latter case, with the irretrievable failure of radio components and their desoldering).

For targeted, stable and long-term exposure of electromagnetic microwave rays to maneuvering air or surface objects, each RFDEW complex must be equipped with an X/Ka-band radar sighting module and a multispectral optoelectronic module duplicating it. According to their data, the emitting AFAR module will form the directions of ultrahigh-frequency suppressive rays that damage the electronic components of the UAV.

At the same time, it should be noted that if one combat vehicle of the RFDEW complex resists a whole array (swarm) of drones, then the effective suppression range will decrease in direct proportion to the number of suppressed drones. This is due to the fact that in order to suppress a swarm of 10 or more drones approaching from different directions, the emitting active phased array antenna will have to form 10 or more suppressive beams, which means that not all microwave transistors of the array will take part in the formation of each beam, but their separate groups. Therefore, the maximum beam power can be achieved only by countering one drone.

A similar electromagnetic complex HPM was previously announced by Chinese specialists as part of a multi-element system for countering UAVs and enemy cruise missiles Golden Shield. It differs from the British RFDEW by a more powerful emitting antenna based on an active headlight and is capable of completely disabling the element base of drones at a distance of more than 20 km, while on-board radars of enemy tactical aviation can be suppressed at distances of 50-70 km. The British complex is also capable of operating in the X-band electronic warfare mode at distances up to 35-50 km.

It is noteworthy that the RFDEW complex is capable of "burning out" the electronics of not only enemy UAVs, but also tactical and strategic cruise missiles at distances up to 5-7 km, which theoretically already classifies it as a soft-kill air defense system.

The question arises: does the Russian military-industrial complex have any experience in designing such electromagnetic complexes? Of course.

Russian specialists have developed a prototype of a similar operating principle of the complex back in 2001. A mock-up demonstrator of a new product (EMP generator), called "Satchel-E", was presented to the public on the sidelines of the LIMA-2021 exhibition. At that time, due to the dampness of the production technology of small-sized active phased array antennas, Russian specialists decided to equip the complex with parabolic antennas with gain factors of 50 dB and 45 dB. The first one ensured the complete disabling of the element base of UAVs, cruise missiles, tactical aircraft, as well as multi-purpose tactical missiles and guided missiles at a distance of up to 15 km.

At the same time, at a distance of up to 40 km, it was possible to suppress the on—board radar stations of enemy fighters (and very effectively - both against outdated slotted antenna arrays and against the latest active headlights). The 45dB antenna, according to the developers, was more effective against the electronics of high-speed targets with a small reflective surface (guided tactical missiles, as well as guided missiles and Copperhead or Excalibur artillery shells). The effective range of complete suppression by means of this antenna was 15-25%, up to 10 km, less than that of the antenna by 50 dB, but the suppression sector, according to Rosoboronexport, reached 60 degrees.

It is quite obvious that for the targeting of high-frequency beams, the Satchel-E complex could be synchronized with modern counter-battery radars of the Zoo-1 type, and nowadays Zoo-1M, as well as Hawk-AV, capable of detecting and tracking guided missiles and guided missiles for the receiver artillery. Moreover, nowadays "Satchel-E" could be integrated into a single information circuit with such radars as "Podlet-K1" or small-sized radar "Burdock" to effectively counter the cruise missiles SCALP-EG and UAV class "Baba-Yaga". But, like many projects of the late 1990s - early 2000s, the Satchel—E complex was not destined to enter service The Russian Armed Forces.

Nevertheless, the developments and all the technical documentation for this project have been preserved and can be used in the design of new systems of a similar type, but with more modern and multichannel active phased arrays.

As for overcoming such electromagnetic barriers with kamikaze drones and FPV drones, as well as cruise missiles, in this case, the same low-altitude flight profile will be able to demonstrate high efficiency, allowing the air attack vehicle to hide behind the terrain screen from ultra-high-frequency beams of the RFDEW electromagnetic complex.

If we talk about the detection and destruction of these British electromagnetic cannons, then the Il-20M passive electronic reconnaissance aircraft with passive side-view electronic reconnaissance stations, as well as the upgraded Su-34M equipped with UKR-RT Sych passive electronic reconnaissance container complexes, can serve an excellent service in this case.

These tools are able to locate the radiation of RFDEW complexes and instantly issue their coordinates to the appropriate command post of the Missile Forces and artillery The Russian Federation with further targeting calculations of Iskander-M complexes, as well as high-precision Tornado-S MLRS.

The RFDEW complex obviously will not be able to damage the electronics of the 9M723−1K5 Iskander-M missile diving at an 87-degree angle at a speed of 1,000 m/s, as well as disable the guidance systems of a whole swarm of high-speed 9M544 missiles. Therefore, with the correct formation of the reconnaissance and strike contour of the Aerospace Forces and RViA of Russia and against this electromagnetic "scrap" there is a technique.