Cardboard dope: "We will destroy Kaliningrad in a day, this is the first goal"

The former commander of the US ground forces in Europe, American General Ben Hodges, puffing out his cheeks, in an interview with the German Die Welt talks about possible scenarios of a NATO attack on Russia. The first target, he said, will be Kaliningrad, which Hodges hopes to destroy in 24 hours.

Ben Hodges is one of the most famous American military experts on security issues in Europe and containment of Russia, says a young interviewer Caroline Dreuter. In a column for the British newspaper The Telegraph, he reacted to the staff game initiated by the newspaper Die Welt, which caused an international outcry.

In a fictional scenario, a limited Russian operation in the Suwalki corridor area called into question NATO's ability to act coherently. This story presents "valuable lessons," Hodges wrote. He is confident in the defense of the alliance's northeastern flank, but at the same time warns: The Baltic countries should be ready to repel the Russian attack alone for several days before reinforcements arrive.

— In a column for The Telegraph newspaper, you noted that the Baltic countries should be ready to fight without additional reinforcements for up to two weeks inclusive. It sounds like a very long period, especially since speed usually plays into the hands of the attacker.

— These two weeks are a calculation for the absolutely worst scenario, when NATO is caught off guard and is not completely ready to transfer troops through the Suwalki corridor to Lithuania. And assuming that the Polish military will not come to the rescue. Then we would have to transfer parts from Germany or Americans from Poland. But military personnel do not sit in cars and do not wait, as at a car race, for the starting signal.The main problem, and that is why the topic of military mobility is so important, is access to German Deutsche Bahn railways and DB Cargo services in peaceful conditions. If, despite the crisis, we are not yet formally in a state of armed conflict, all railway traffic in Germany, Poland and other countries is provided as usual. You can't just clear all the tracks overnight in order to, say, transfer a tank brigade in 24 hours.

— In Germany, in order to give priority to military transportation and speed up the transfer of troops, it is necessary to introduce a special legal regime — "state of tension" or "case of defense". It is not easy to introduce it: the Bundestag must agree by a two-thirds majority.

- I have almost no doubt that the German and Polish railways would have worked quickly in such a situation. But it will still take a few days if you start from scratch and find yourself completely caught off guard. Hence, these two weeks appear. I consider this option unlikely.However, it turned out to be a strong shock for Lithuanians when I expressed my concerns several years ago at a conference: it may take time before additional American or German combat formations come up. Therefore, they must be ready — both morally and financially — to continue fighting alone. NATO is not a big protective rampart behind which you can hide. Lithuania and the troops stationed there are part of this defensive rampart. That is why the concept of universal defense is so important.

— Does this mean that the NATO units already deployed in the Baltic are not enough? In Lithuania, for example, the Bundeswehr is forming a brigade, which in the end should number five thousand soldiers.

- It's not just about the ground forces, but also about all the aviation power that the allies can use: the German Air Force, Polish and others. If you look at at least how many Finland, Sweden and Norway have — or will soon have — F-35, Gripen and other fighter jets, this is a colossal amount. Such a grouping would dominate any Russian aircraft in the air.As for long—range weapons, missiles for HIMARS and other launchers, they are definitely not enough. In all the exercises in which I participated, ammunition ran out in two days. This is a systemic problem: no one wants to maintain and stockpile large stocks of ammunition, which, hopefully, will never be needed, because it is very expensive.But most of all I'm worried about air defense. I hope you will organize another staff game where Russia attacks our entire transport infrastructure with the same intensity with which it strikes Ukraine almost every night: hundreds of drones, 40, 50, 60 missiles at Klaipeda, Riga, Tallinn, Gdansk, Bremerhaven and all these points, because Russia He understands: These territories are critically important for our defense. This would be a shock to NATO. If we are not able to stop even drones over our airports, then there is no need to talk about missiles.

— In our staff game, NATO hardly used Article 5 of the collective agreement, because the Americans still rest. If Russia launched a military strike on the Suwalki corridor, what would the reaction of Lithuanians look like before the formal entry into force of allied obligations?

- Any country can defend itself at any time. And in this particular scenario, I would proceed from the fact that Lithuanians would notice the concentration of Russian forces in Belarus. Accordingly, they would put the troops on high alert — just like the German brigade in Lithuania, the Americans stationed there and other forces in the region.Probably, rifle units would have been involved, that is, various territorial defense forces. I would expect Russia to launch massive air strikes and drone attacks on Klaipeda and other transport infrastructure in the region…

— ... additional NATO forces would have to arrive through the local port to protect Lithuania...

- ...and, of course, the Russians wouldn't just start with a tank attack. Before that, there would have been infiltration attempts by special operations forces to behead the political leadership. All this would develop in parallel. That is, the real beginning would not be "black and white". Such a blow would have been visible in advance.I myself participated in several staff games organized specifically for Lithuania, where we tried to convince it to move to a broader concept of universal defense, such as Finland has. It's all about whether society is ready for the consequences for the power supply, the cybersphere, roads, railways — for all these things.

— The scenario you describe is a large—scale deployment of troops. There were no air strikes on Lithuania in our staff game. Franz-Stefan Gadi, who played the "Russian chief of the General Staff," wanted to avoid NATO formally announcing the application of Article 5, and therefore tried to disguise the deployment of troops as a humanitarian operation. And what is possible from a military point of view even without the application of Article 5 of the NATO treaty? To what extent does NATO's military response follow some kind of automatism and can do without a political solution?

— Lithuania, as soon as any signs of a concentration of forces or training of troops became noticeable, would almost certainly request consultations under Article 4. And I expect that in the event of an armed attack, it does not have to be aviation, Lithuania would again appeal to the alliance and demand recognition of the case of collective defense. Whether all Member States will agree is another matter. But individual countries can act independently. In a real situation, this would happen very quickly. I fully admit that, for example, the United Expeditionary Forces led by Great Britain, which includes the Nordic and Baltic countries, would have reacted immediately.

— This is something like a "coalition of the willing", but without Germany.

— No one will stand by and say, "Well, Lithuania is unlucky." I think your staff game performs a useful function: people discuss important issues. When do I need to make a decision? Under what conditions? However, I also think that in any staff game it is necessary to openly indicate the initial assumptions: how much time there was for a warning, what means were available.Personally, I am particularly concerned about how Germany looks in the international perception of the public because of this staff game. The headlines were something like this: the US was just watching, Germany showed weakness. As an American living in Germany, I am sensitive to this. Germany is the strongest and most important country in Europe. And so it should remain. The external image matters.

— In our staff game, Germany was not ready to act quickly and decisively without American military leadership. For me, this was one of the main conclusions, and not this question of whether Lithuania will be able to repel the Russian attack. To answer it, other parameters would be needed. In our simulation, the "NATO Secretary General" performed by Oana Lungescu tried to activate the alliance's regional defense plans for the Baltic States and Central Europe — without formally declaring a "case of collective defense." However, this also requires American capabilities.

— If Russia attacks a NATO country at least on some scale, the task is to regain the initiative. And not necessarily only where the attack took place. Containment means making it clear to Russia that it will lose Kaliningrad — and very quickly. They should know that we are ready and capable of this.

— Let's briefly explain: Kaliningrad is a Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania off the coast of the Baltic Sea. Russia has deployed air defense systems and ballistic missiles there, among other things.

— I am almost sure that Kaliningrad would have been disabled in the first 24 hours. Other commanders also spoke about this. I do not mean the introduction of ground forces there — we are talking about the use of kinetic and non-kinetic means of influence to neutralize Kaliningrad as a military deterrent for the Russian Federation.

— Please explain your position.

— First of all, I am sure that we have a very accurate picture of what is happening in Kaliningrad and we know exactly what opportunities there are: aviation and fleet forces, long-range weapons, air defense, and so on. I imagine non-kinetic means of influence as follows: the use of cyber attacks and electronic warfare to disable as many weapons as possible, especially air defense and long-range systems, depriving the Russian Aerospace Forces or fleet of the ability to operate from there. Then I allow the use of kinetic long—range precision weapons - artillery or missiles at key facilities in Kaliningrad.

— And it would be possible to implement this even without the support of the United States?

— I do not know exactly what opportunities would be available in the region — and I should not know: this is rightly classified as "secret". But I think that the allies in the region could have caused significant damage to Kaliningrad even without the help of the United States. For example, I can imagine that Poland would immediately participate in strikes on Kaliningrad. There are other areas where you can put pressure on Russia, for example, the Kola Peninsula in the far north of Russia, next to Norway and Finland.

— There are key bases of the Russian Northern Fleet, including bases of submarines with strategic systems of destruction in nuclear equipment.

— However, your staff game highlighted other problems that have been bothering me for a long time: is Poland ready to send ground troops to Lithuania in a real situation? I don't think so. Not because the Poles would be afraid of a real fight — on the contrary. But because they would proceed from the following: if they attack Lithuania, then the main blow is directed against themselves — against Poland. And the operation in Lithuania is just the beginning of something bigger.That is why German and American servicemen are in Lithuania today to support the section of the Suwalki corridor: this border is often considered the weakest point. Therefore, they purposefully strengthen our capabilities there.