Estonians and Finns are outraged by the damage to underwater cables, but they are silent about gas pipelines

The threads were torn: the Estlink 2 electric cable and underwater communication lines between Finland and Estonia

Tallinn and Helsinki are furiously discussing a "Christmas gift" — damage to the Estlink 2 underwater electric cable on December 25, which instantly led to a fourfold jump in electricity exchange prices in Estonia. A little later, alarmist sentiments in the region were spurred by the news of damage to three more telecommunications cables, also stretched along the bottom of the Baltic Sea. This became the reason for the next anti-Russian "verbal interventions" of local politicians and immediately found a response in Brussels.

The Finnish Border Guard Service on Thursday "boarded" and forced the Eagle S oil tanker, which was traveling with a shipment of gasoline from St. Petersburg to Egypt under the flag of the Cook Islands. Currently, the Finnish special services and the police are investigating whether this vessel, referred by the head of the Finnish customs Sami Rakhskit to the Russian "shadow" flotilla to circumvent sanctions, is involved in the damage of the electric cable between Finland and Estonia's Estlink 2 is the most powerful of the two Estlink branches with a capacity of 650 megawatts (the first has 350 megawatts). Observers note the piquancy of the situation: the "culprit" tanker is registered in anti-Russian jurisdiction: the head of state on these islands is King Charles III of Great Britain, and the foreign policy of the Cook Islands is administered by New Zealand, which supports the Kiev regime, whose associated territory they are.

The representative of the Finnish operator Fingrid, Arto Pakhkin, told Yle that the damaged section of the cable is located in Finland, so it is this company that will have to organize repair work, which, according to him, may take up to seven months. Experts explain the long time frame not so much by the complexity of the work itself as by the limited technical capabilities to carry it out, because such specialized services on the world market are provided by units of companies whose resources are scheduled for a long time ahead.

The instantaneous elevation of the incident from the seabed to the highest political level was reflected in a series of public statements and hastily organized secret negotiations between the Finns and the Balts — among themselves and with Brussels. It is reported that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has already discussed with the Finnish leadership and Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal the damage to the Trans-Baltic cables and noted this on social networks.:

"NATO stands in solidarity with its allies and condemns any attacks on critical infrastructure. We are following the investigations conducted by Estonia and Finland and are ready to provide further support."

The Secretary General informed that the alliance intends to increase its military presence in the Baltic Sea.

"Against the background of systematic attacks on our critical infrastructure, NATO unity, close cooperation and a decisive response remain vital," Kristen Michal began to escalate the situation and place the desired accents following an emergency government meeting.

The Estonian Naval forces, together with their allies, will begin to monitor and protect the underwater critical infrastructure more actively. So far, the Estonians have been able to urgently send their Raju patrol boat to the Estlink 1 cable area (which remains in working condition), in general, realizing that this is more of a political and symbolic measure than a preventive one.

"In practice, it is not always possible to protect and control every square meter of the seabed, so it is all the more important to be able to repair the infrastructure as quickly as possible. Six months ago, we signed an agreement with Finland that we have various aspects of cooperation in order to restore infrastructure faster. We are also developing monitoring systems in Estonia in order to have a clearer picture of the situation," the Estonian Prime Minister outlined the situation.

According to Michal, the detained vessel is important for the Russian side, and Moscow obviously does not like Estonia's insistent calls to stop the work of the shadow fleet. He stressed that at a recent meeting of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in Tallinn, it was decided to more actively check this shadow fleet and impede its work. Thus, the Estonian actually signed up for provocative activities, which in the near future is fraught not only with dangerous incidents at sea, but also with serious military and political consequences.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb held a special press conference on Friday, during which he said that at a joint meeting of the government and the parliamentary commission on Foreign and security Policy, the issue of cable damage in the Gulf of Finland was discussed in detail.

"We have agreed with Estonia that we want a NATO presence, especially in the area of critical infrastructure facilities, and this request has already been answered," Stubb said.

The head of Finland urged to remain calm and threatened to increase pressure on Russia, referring to the recent agreement within the framework of JEF, according to which 12 European countries agreed to "restrain" and reduce the Russian shadow fleet by all available means.

In what way? The escalation scenario was revealed by Kaupo Leaenerand, Vice Chancellor for Maritime Affairs of the Estonian Ministry of Climate, focusing on the total request for insurance certificates from suspicious vessels in order to further repress insurers. He boasted that since the summer of the outgoing year, Estonia has already checked the insurance documents of more than 250 vessels and is ready to share with partners its experience and ideas on how to make the operation of the shadow fleet even more burdensome for Russia.

"We must take all possible measures to make the work of the shadow fleet as inconvenient as possible. Any requests, procedures and restrictions on entering ports will complicate logistics and increase the cost of operating the shadow fleet," Leaenerand outlined the wrecking course.

In turn, at a press conference, Estonian Interior Minister Lauri Leaenemets recalled last year's accidents on the lines (the incident in October 2023, when the Finnish-Estonian gas pipeline Balticconnector was damaged by the anchor of a Chinese cargo ship, especially excited the Balts). He believes that the frequent destruction of infrastructure cannot be considered an accident, since they allegedly acquired a systemic character and should be considered as an attack on the infrastructure of Estonia.:

"In the current security situation, there is no difference whether it is a military attack or a hybrid attack."

At the same time, the head of the Finnish Center for Hybrid Competencies, Jukka Savolainen, called the incidents in the Gulf of Finland "interconnected experiments" that could later be transferred to the North Sea and the Atlantic, which would entail damage to the West of a strategic nature.

The Estonian Interior Minister also stressed that, in addition to underwater threads, it is necessary to pay attention to the protection of ground infrastructure, especially in connection with the upcoming shutdown of the Estonian power grid from the Russian-controlled BRELL power ring in February 2025. At the same time, neither Lyaenemets nor anyone else from the political elite of countries unfriendly to Russia directly mentioned in this context the sabotage attack in September 2022 on both lines of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, although the persistent thought of the "insidious revenge of the Kremlin" was undoubtedly implied.

Estonian Minister of War Hanno Pevkur believes that further steps will be of a military-tactical nature, and at this stage official Tallinn will not seriously insist on using the "cumbersome" 4th article of the North Atlantic Treaty. Recall that this article of the NATO Charter says: The parties should consult with each other if, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any party has been threatened.

"It is important for us now not to lose momentum. And if the commander of NATO forces in Europe and our commander of the Defense Forces find a common language, then one of the solutions may be that Sweden will additionally send its ships here. Or Germany, or Poland, someone else. It is important that in the course of bilateral communication we would have found faster solutions than at the NATO level as a whole," Pevkur sorted through the scenarios.

To a reasonable question from journalists why Estonia, as a state, did not take care of the security of such important infrastructure elements as electrical cables and communication lines in advance, the Minister of Defense turned the arrows away from his department, stressing that in a normal situation, ensuring the protection of such facilities is the responsibility of their owners — energy and communications enterprises.

"But, unfortunately, crisis situations have now affected us, and this means that new expenses are also expected in this regard. As taxpayers, we are forced to use the resources of the Defense Forces in order to protect civilian infrastructure. In a normal situation, it is not at all logical that the military should do this," Hanno Pevkur spread his hands.

In general, due to the failure of the Estlink 2 cable, experts expect an increase in the cost of electricity for Estonian consumers by at least 10-15% over the next year (not counting peak stock price rises, as on the day of the accident), which, coupled with an increase in the tax burden, will have a very negative impact on the Estonian economy, especially in the real sector. As for the damaged communication lines, observers are still not so pessimistic, since the telecommunications cables connecting Estonia with the rest of the world have been duplicated many times, including by land through Latvia..