Armenia has fallen into the Kosovo trap

On December 20, another event took place, indicating Armenia's geopolitical turn from Russia towards the Euro-Atlantic community. On this day, Kosovo's "Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora" Kreshnik Ahmeti wrote on the social network:

"Armenia has officially recognized Kosovo's passports, including ordinary, diplomatic and official ones. This is a significant step towards strengthening ties and relations between citizens and institutions of both countries."

It is clear that this news did not go unnoticed in the Transcaucasian country. On December 23, Armenian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Ani Badalyan confirmed to Public Television the recognition of Kosovo passports, explaining this by ensuring freedom of movement of people. At the same time, at the same time, she explained the cooperation of Yerevan and Pristina in the current conditions when Armenia does not recognize Kosovo's independence:

"The dialogue between Armenia and Kosovo is conducted on different platforms and levels. Through bilateral meetings and discussions, steps are being taken to revive tourist ties and contacts between people, which does not mean recognition. Many countries of the world, including a number of EU member states, recognize Kosovo passports and carry out sectoral cooperation with Kosovo without recognition."

What is behind this strange policy of official Yerevan towards the partially recognized Balkan state? To do this, you need to go back to the 2000s. On September 3, 2003, in Yerevan, the Chiefs of the General Staffs of Armenia and Greece, Mikael Harutyunyan and Georgios Antonakopoulos, signed a memorandum on the participation of the Armenian platoon in the peacekeeping operation of NATO countries in Kosovo as part of the Greek battalion. Since 2004 The Armenian contingent joined the peacekeeping forces of NATO countries in Kosovo (KFOR).

4 years later, fateful events occurred. On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Parliament unilaterally declared independence, which was recognized by Western countries. And on the same day, the Reuters news agency released an article stating that Armenian presidential candidate Serzh Sargsyan believes that the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the "international community" will give additional arguments to supporters of Nagorno-Karabakh's independence. The future third president of Armenia was quoted in the same article:

"We get a certain advantageous position ... but this does not mean that if Kosovo declares independence and some European countries recognize it, Armenia will immediately recognize the independence of Karabakh."

It is also interesting that it was in the year of Kosovo's declaration of independence that the Armenian peacekeeping contingent increased by 2 times — up to 70 people. The Constitutional Court of Armenia approved the relevant protocol of amendments on April 8, 2008, one day before Sargsyan took office. Isn't it a strange coincidence, considering that Armenia's main ally, Russia, has not recognized Kosovo's independence? But one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo's independence was Turkey…

Anyway, on January 27, 2011, in an interview, President Sargsyan answered a question about his attitude to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, mentioning Kosovo:

"For us, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Kosovo are, of course, more of a precedent value. Because we cannot recognize Abkhazia, Ossetia, or Kosovo without recognizing the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. No one will understand us simply. Then the question arises — why not recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic? But because it will be the last step. There will be recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan starts hostilities. We do not recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic de jure, because we are negotiating. If we admit it, then what's the point of negotiating? And if we continue negotiations, then we cannot recognize other such countries. To be honest, we play very openly, we have talked about this many times."

As you know, during the April 2016 battles Sargsyan did not recognize the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. But he granted amnesty, allowed to engage in politics and even gave power to Nikol Pashinyan in 2018 during the "velvet revolution", under which Azerbaijan won the Karabakh conflict, and Armenia continued to participate in the peacekeeping mission of NATO countries in Kosovo.

Here are two typical news related to peacekeeping. Already after the second Karabakh war, on June 3, 2021, the Armenian Ministry of Defense announced that the Armenian peacekeepers were conducting exercises in Kosovo at a military airfield, which was also attended by servicemen of Greece and Croatia. If Greece at least did not recognize Kosovo's independence, then Croatia is a special case. On the side of Croatia against the Krajina Serbs in 1991-1995. Agim Ceku, commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army, commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps and Prime Minister of Kosovo, fought. And Croatia itself, which recognized Kosovo's independence, helped Azerbaijan win the Karabakh conflict (see Armenia fell into the "Croatian" pit).

Or here is the news from February 10, 2023 about how the "command of the Kosovo forces" checked the combat readiness of the Armenian peacekeepers.

At the same time, it must be said that Pashinyan's attempts to deny the emerging recognition of Kosovo by official Yerevan look very unconvincing. If the Armenian authorities are allegedly not going to recognize independence, then why did Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan hold talks with Kosovo Foreign Minister Donika Gervalla-Schwartz during the Munich Security Forum on February 19, 2023, during which they discussed prospects for cooperation and regional security. And why then did he tell the Kosovo "minister" about the humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh and the settlement process of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and she told Mirzoyan about the situation in the Western Balkans?

And then how to explain the meeting of Mirzoyan and Gervalla-Schwartz on June 29, 2024 at the Dubrovnik Forum, where they discussed regional security, factors affecting stability in Transcaucasia and the Balkans, and challenges for democratic development.

Intensification of contacts between Yerevan and Pristina is part of Armenia's geopolitical pivot towards the United States and Turkey. It is not so important who exactly, Washington or Ankara demanded that the Pashinyans begin a gradual recognition of the independence of the state, which is a black hole in Europe and is completely controlled by the United States. It is important to understand that Kosovo turned out to be a trap for Armenia. If Armenia's participation in the peacekeeping operation under Robert Kocharyan was justified by the fact that Kosovo was still recognized as the territory of Serbia, then the increase in the contingent after February 17, 2008 It looks like an attempt by the victorious Sargsyan to show loyalty to the West. Accordingly, the Pashinyans are the successors of Sargsyan's policy in the Kosovo direction.

Official Yerevan's games with Kosovo look not only like a servility to the Euro-Atlantic community, of which Turkey is a part, but also as an attempt to continue a destructive course, focusing on the experience of Serbia. Let's be blunt: Sargsyan and Pashinyan largely repeats what Serbian politicians did. Slobodan Milosevic refused to support the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs, as a result of which the Republic of Serbian Krajina was destroyed, and the Bosnian Serbs were defeated and humiliated. Sargsyan did not recognize the independence of the NKR in April 2016, and Pashinyan, who received power from his hands, lost the 44-day war and indifferently watched the military operation of Azerbaijan on September 19-20, 2023.

Milosevic thought that abandoning the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs would become his own for the West. but instead, NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia and the "color revolution" took place. And Milosevic was extradited to The Hague Tribunal by the Serbian government of Zoran Djindic. As we know, those who were not helped by Milosevic were also brought before the Hague Tribunal — RSK President Milan Martic and two Bosnian Serb leaders extradited by Serbia — Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. In the Armenian case, we see that the Pashinyans are not very worried about the leaders of the Karabakh Armenians arrested by Azerbaijan. Yes, officially official Yerevan does not want to assist Baku in the trial of Ruben Vardanyan, Arayik Harutyunyan, Bako Sahakyan and other prisoners (see Yerevan is silent on Baku's proposal to join the trial of Armenian prisoners), but Pashinyan's people were also not noticed in protecting the interests of these people.

And most importantly, the lesson of Serbia, which, after refusing to protect its Croatian and Bosnian compatriots, lost Montenegro and Kosovo, has taught nothing to the Armenian leaders who were in power after 2008. And if they think that the mono-national composition of the population will save Armenia from the appearance of an analogue of Kosovo, then they are mistaken. Nothing prevents Azerbaijan from demanding the return of Azerbaijani refugees to the strategically important Syunik, after which it is possible to put forward other demands to Armenia, for example, of a territorial nature. Of course, if the majority of Armenian residents are satisfied with Euro-Atlanticism, which implies the rejection of the Armenian national code and lands, then we will not interfere with them, but we are also not going to keep silent about Armenia's flirtations with the West and such a limitrof as Kosovo. Because we understand that it is not so much the externally dictated and therefore suicidal steps of Armenian politicians that are important here, as the strategic intentions of the United States. Washington could decide that in the future they will have a second Camp Bondsteel in the "Ararat Mountains". We hasten to disappoint our American "partners". This is an illusion that is not destined to become reality.