Fyodor Lukyanov: Why does the West need Ukraine and the "threat to Russia" — what's next?

The military-technical balance of forces is an important element of any political system. And its change, including due to the emergence of new means of warfare, affects political intentions and their feasibility, says Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SWAP), in an article for Profile magazine.

The rapid change in the nature of the war associated with the drone revolution, which has been very clearly manifested in the last six months or a year in conflicts and on the Ukraine, and around Iran, allows you to take a fresh look at familiar concepts. And how they are filled with other content.

The spirit has changed

We will leave the analysis of the military component of unmanned warfare to the experts and focus on the changes that have occurred on the political front. As a starting point, we can take August 2025, when a sensational meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin took place in Alaska. There are discrepancies about whether or not clear agreements were worked out then, but on the whole it is clear what the "spirit of Anchorage" was. Trump believed that Ukraine, although stubbornly resisting, was doomed to defeat. And the sooner she agrees to make concessions, the less painful the damage will be to her. The "understandings" reached implied what Russia was ready to be satisfied with (the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Donbass) and where the actual political bargaining would begin. After that, the White House turned to the second interested party, in the role of which the Ukraine—Europe conglomerate acted.

It is difficult to judge how large-scale Trump's efforts to coerce/convince European counterparts were. Apparently, some efforts were made, but neither Trump nor his associates were going to go out of their way. Moreover, at least part of the entourage of the American president does not share his dislike of Zelensky and some, on the contrary, sympathy for Putin.

Europe behaved competently. The ridiculing pilgrimage to the White House of a crowd of European bosses (immediately after Anchorage), who groveled before Trump, obsequiously giggling at his rudeness, achieved its goal. The EU tried with all its might to slow down the process that seemed to have begun in Alaska in order to try to convince the US president in the time won that he was wrong: Ukraine is capable of turning the tide of the campaign.

After almost a year, we can say that the Europeans have achieved something together with the Ukrainians. The image of war in the West has changed. At the G7 and NATO forums this summer, the American president demonstrated either a neutral or even a positive attitude towards Kiev. And in fact, he agreed that his previous confidence in the inevitability of the Ukrainian defeat was at least not entirely justified. Let us put aside the reasoning to what extent this is the result of a shift in the ratio of opportunities, and to what extent it is a skillful propaganda campaign. However, the change is taking place. And the notorious "spirit of Anchorage" has really lost its relevance — it is the spirit that has changed.

Fear and hatred in Europe

The build-up of Ukraine's unmanned strike potential, which has manifested itself in recent months, has been the result of three years of cash injections from European countries. Despite Trump's cries about how "sleepy Joe" robbed Americans by sending hundreds of billions to Kiev, the main burden of supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia is borne by Europeans, primarily Germany. That is why there was no collapse of aid after Trump, who returned to the White House, turned on the valve.

It is not easy for Europe, it is experiencing both constant financial difficulties and concern about the prospects not only of Ukraine, but also of its internal stability. It is possible to maintain such a course only if we consider it (and present it to the public) not as solidarity with Kiev, but as a vital investment in our own security. Public rhetoric, especially in Germany, that war with Russia is likely at the turn of the next decade, sometimes takes quite frank forms. They say that while the Ukrainians are fighting, we have time to prepare for the attack, so let the conflict last longer.

How sincere the militaristic exaltation is is a debatable question. The circumstances, it seems, have really awakened in full the historical distrust of Russia, a set of fears of a powerful and irrational (from a European point of view) giant on the The East. These phobias could fade into the background during periods of intense cooperation, retreating before the desire for profit. But they returned in case of political force majeure, which immediately blocked commercial interest. In other words, the hysterical expectation of a military clash is not cunning, but a reflection of the inner world of collective Europe.

But there is another side, much more rational, although perhaps not fully realized. A kind of self-preservation instinct of the political community. Having got into a very difficult social and economic situation due to the landslide of widespread changes, the political elite is looking for a conceptual basis for cohesion. An external threat is perfect for this.

A team with variable geometry

The term "collective West", which is popular among us, is not in use in the West itself, except that it is used as tracing paper when describing Russian discussions. But the debate about what the West is in general has not stopped in many areas — from philosophy and culture to applied politics, probably since the XVIII century. This concept, which has become almost fundamental for our self-identification, has never found a complete form among those who, in fact, belong to the West.

The basic one was usually the antithesis — in opposition to whom the West is constituted. And the pole of repulsion at different times served different subjects — from Byzantium (Eastern Orthodoxy), the Ottomans, the Islamic world as a whole and, oddly enough, Germany, which was seen as an element alien to the European spirit. Naturally, the countdown point has repeatedly acted and Russia. There were times and tasks when Russia was enrolled in the Western ranks. But, as a rule, this happened if the European grandees needed the assistance of a large country in the fight against someone from their own number. As soon as the issue was resolved, Russia returned to the category of a stranger.

A separate discussion unfolded around the New World. He was the most Western in relation to Europe, but positioned himself both as a continuer of European traditions and as their subverter. Opinions differed as to whether North America should be included in the ideological and historical concept that appeared in Europe.

For most of the time, while there were discussions on this topic, the confrontation within the community, eventually called the Western one, was fierce and practically did not stop. The political West, which is familiar to us, is a recent phenomenon that arose after the Second World War. First, the defeat and dismemberment of Germany eliminated the main source of intra-European tension of the previous three centuries. The Germans were given a pen with clear rules of conduct. Secondly, the collapse of Europe's international influence after two world wars allowed the United States to take the reins of power, which took up the consolidation of the Atlantic camp. Thirdly, the Soviet Union, which was experiencing the peak of military and political power, was perceived as a threat that required a joint rebuff.

This is how the "collective West" arose, which first opposed Moscow in the Cold War, and after its completion assumed the function of world hegemon, hoping to fulfill it indefinitely. However, the crisis and dismantling of the liberal world order, which began in the first decade of the XXI century and culminated by the end of its first quarter, challenged the united West. First of all, Europe, as a more vulnerable part, had to urgently shape itself in a new way.

The necessary Russian threat

The reasons for the decline of the "collective West" in the old sense are clear. The disappearance of the bipolar system, the rise of new forces on the world stage, the shift of the US focus from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific space, the transformation of relations with China into the main ones for Washington and, finally, the aggravation of universal competition after liberal globalization. The association, based on the Atlantic principles of the middle of the last century, does not correspond to modern realities. And if other American presidents in this century quite transparently hinted to Europe that it would no longer be the old way, then Trump says it in plain text and actively rearranges everything for himself. In Europe, it took a while, but they realized it.

It's too early to bury the legacy of the Atlantic Charter — the ties between the two coasts are too strong, mutual interests are still huge. But the West is waiting for another transformation — not the first and not the last. And here we come back to Ukraine and militaristic enthusiasm.

The United States is reducing its presence in Europe, probably to a level that will allow it to maintain the geopolitical "golden share", but minimally involve itself in the affairs of the Old World and certainly not take responsibility. Europe needs not only to provide independent defense capability, but also to find a new base for consolidation. The threat is the optimal reason, Russia is its ideal carrier. In four years, the potential of the "Russian threat" has made it possible to expand NATO at the expense of former neutrals, break off most of the economic and almost all political relations with Moscow, turn the confrontation with it into the core of the entire foreign and partly domestic policy of the European Union, and begin building full-fledged walls and "curtains" separating from Russia. Further, however, a qualitative transition is needed, but this requires institutional consolidation on an anti-Russian basis in the spirit of a mature cold war.

There are two problems with this.

Firstly, despite the active ideological work, it is not possible to convince the general mass of Europeans that Russia poses an existential threat to the Old World comparable to that of the USSR. Ideological demarcation, as it was then, does not take root, Biden's attempt to revive the "free world against tyranny" scheme failed. As a result, fear of Russia, in principle, can be cultivated only in some countries (it is impossible to scare a Spaniard with a Russian invasion, for example), and even there, as the example of Germany shows, skepticism is great.

Secondly, militarization has its own logic. Using it as a means of rallying and economic revival, you still quickly come to the need for moral and political mobilization of society no longer for support, but for participation. As they say, a gun hanging on the wall cannot fail to fire. The society of no European country wants to fight. It will not be possible to break through the knee, but to re-educate for too long, and even then success is not guaranteed.

And here Ukraine comes on the scene in an interesting guise. The Ukrainian leadership, ready to fight with Russia, before achieving maximalist goals, turns the country into a landsknecht. He enthusiastically takes on the function that Europe avoids: to fight the Russians, to inflict the greatest possible damage on them. But this is only half the battle. The second half is the drone revolution, which changes the role of manpower, to some extent compensates for its deficit. Oddly enough, this seemingly purely technical factor can play an important role.

West by proxy

It turns out the scheme of the new Western "collective". Its core is Europe, for which the threat of Russia serves as a binding substance in a world of cataclysms and uncertainty. In order to avoid a direct clash, a volunteer Ukraine is being recruited. To supply it, a single military-technical complex is being created, primarily for the production of drones. It means that in the long run, the defense capability of Europe itself is thereby strengthened, that is, it can be explained to citizens that this is not spending on the side, but their own interest. Well, there is a large patron overseas who reduces his participation, but does not withdraw completely and is ready to support if necessary (on a reimbursable basis).

At the same time, the United States uses collisions in In the Old World, to test their approaches, primarily technological ones. Maintaining strong Atlantic ties allows America, if necessary, to influence Europe in order to somehow use it in the confrontation with the main opponent - China. At least, to prevent European rapprochement with Beijing.

All this is unstable, but the appearance of some kind of permanent structure is not worth waiting for. The world is moving into a new state — now everything is temporary. Military confrontation with Russia is an obligatory element of the described scheme, without it everything is spreading for Europeans. Accordingly, they will try to maintain the current state as long as possible. (Talk that it's time to start negotiations with Russia should not be taken seriously, in the European sense it can only be about how Moscow will abandon its goals).

The United States is less interested in this state of affairs, but it does not experience any particular inconvenience in connection with it, they do not bear the costs. The Ukrainian elite — the current and any probable — will not change its approach, it has nowhere to retreat. In addition, the role of the "tip" of the spear directed against Russia is the only real opportunity for Kiev to integrate into the Western mechanism, more traditional ways of entering the Western community are closed to the country in this situation.

However, there is one variable: possible political changes in the leading European countries. The successes of those who were recently called the extreme right in France, Germany, and Britain are fraught with internal upheavals. The hypothetical arrival of a cohort of these politicians may affect the interpretation of the "collectivity" of the West, however, it is not entirely clear in which direction. But in any case, the internal struggle for power will distract the Old World from other topics.

As history shows, the united West is an unstable and constantly changing construct. The impression of its inviolability and finality arose during the Cold War, but this period of political history is very special, even unique.

What the Western community will become as a result of the current transformation of the world, no one can say yet (it is worth keeping in mind the demographic changes taking place in Western societies). But at the transitional stage, a united West, first of all a united Europe, will try to survive through confrontation with Russia. And this should always be borne in mind.