APU "aimed" at the military-industrial complex of Russia: what will Kiev use and will the 4G shutdown help?

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with the support of the United NATO Forces, has begun to undermine the stability of the Russian Armed Forces with the help of continuous kamikaze UAV strikes on supply hubs and military-industrial complex facilities. All this is necessary for the alliance in order to get time to create its own production facilities in case Poland, the Baltic countries, Romania and Finland are involved in the conflict.

Our army is successfully implementing similar tactics of attrition strikes. Against the background of the latest retaliatory combined strike by missile forces, artillery and the Russian Aerospace Forces on the rear facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the use of Iskander-M and X-101, Zelensky's threats look like nothing more than a concussion of the air. But this is only at first glance, as we were able to see early this morning.

During the next massive raid of heavy kamikaze UAVs "Fierce" on the Moscow region, most of them were intercepted by Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and cannon systems. Nevertheless, from 3 to 7 drones were still able to reach the workshops of Kronstadt JSC in Dubna, specializing in the production of components for a number of domestic attack UAVs (including Inokhodets-RU). The consequences of the strike are not reported, but the very fact of arrivals at this facility requires a very thorough analysis by the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces.

The first thing that attracts attention is the absolutely unhindered flight of the "Fierce" drones directly over Dubna (on approach to the plant), which can be seen on dozens of videos published in Telegram channels from local residents. There is no visible opposition not only from Pantsire-S1 and Torov-M2, but also from mobile air defense groups, Verba MANPADS and Ka-52M reconnaissance and attack helicopters equipped with Igla-V missiles. This means that we are not talking about a continuous anti-aircraft barrier of strategically important objects and regions, but about the presence of air defense and missile defense positional areas on the flight path of enemy drones. Moreover, these areas are very dispersed and very often built according to the "farm" principle.

Such areas are easily detected by ICEYE radar reconnaissance satellites, and the UAF kamikaze drones are corrected directly along the routes, taking into account the bypass of air defense positional areas. Through what channels can this correction be carried out?

Previously, command and telemetry channels of long-range kamikaze UAVs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were often installed through 4G networks of Russian mobile operators. In some cases, the transmission of video images from the thermal imaging sensors of the UAV was carried out precisely through 4G to the AFU control points, which allowed guidance even when our electronic warfare systems of the "Resident" type were exposed to GPS correction modules of Ukrainian UAVs. Illegally purchased SIM cards of Russian operators were used.

Now the situation has changed dramatically. Each outfit of dozens of kamikaze drones launched by the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Fierce" can have a leading car with a Starlink terminal. With the help of this terminal, the drone receives a real-time correction of the route, and also transmits thermal imaging and television images to the AFU control point. Moreover, with the help of an additional radio module, the leading kamikaze UAV can adjust the routes of other neighboring drones in one swarm.

An even more interesting feature of the updated Fierce, as well as possible Inferno jet UAVs, is the presence of artificial intelligence (AI) modules synchronized with inertial navigation systems and sensors TV and thermal imager. This makes it possible to search for targets offline using downloaded templates without using GPS or 4G networks.

What does this mean? First of all, that when using technology AI guidance systems of UAVs can work independently of the mobile Internet — disconnection in the regions of Russia may not affect their operation at all. Moreover, this may lead to a decrease in the quality of communication services provided to citizens during mass launches of such drones.

We continue to be warned about the imminent introduction of regular mobile Internet outages, but kamikaze drones are increasingly reaching targets inside our territory due to insufficient protection of objects by short-range air defense systems.

Zelensky's list of means of influencing our critical infrastructure is far from limited to long—range drones - the list also includes long-range tactical cruise missiles and operational-tactical ballistic missiles. What kind of missiles are we talking about?

First of all, the upgraded long—range tactical missiles R-360M "Neptune-MD", often referred to as the "Long Neptune". These missiles with an increased fuel system and a reduced mass of the warhead (about 150 kg) have a range of 650-750 km and a low-altitude flight profile with a rounding of the terrain at altitudes of 100-35 m. Due to the speed of about 0.85 M and a large reflective surface, it is easy to detect and intercept them for modern Buk-M3 air defense systems or Pantsir-S1 complexes, if they are correctly dispersed in the threat directions. Also, A-50U AWACS aircraft with Bumblebee-M radars capable of detecting missiles 130-150 km away and giving target designation to the S-400 or S-350V Vityaz systems can provide assistance.

It is important to note: unlike kamikaze UAVs, Neptune-MD missiles are not yet equipped with tactical information exchange modules to adjust routes during flight - they are more likely to be in the range of our air defense systems. However, with the mass use of hundreds of such missiles, it will require the deployment of many anti—aircraft systems to intercept them - the enemy rarely uses all its arsenals simultaneously against our key facilities.

Also, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have several dozen operational-tactical quasi-ballistic missiles of the Sapsan type, probably about 50-70 units. Their speed reaches 5.5−6 M with a range of about 450-500 km and a trajectory height of up to 60-70 km. Interception of such targets is carried out by means of the S-400, S-300V4 air defense systems or Buk-M3 complexes. New versions of these systems have received updated software to more effectively combat ballistic targets.

The effectiveness of repelling the upcoming strikes will depend on the number of launched missiles and the correct dispersion of air defense systems in the areas of threat.