The united Air Forces of NATO and the United States are working on the isolation of Murmansk: details of the Baana 24 exercises

As part of the Baana-24 exercises regularly conducted by the Finnish Air Force, the deployment of tactical aviation units and squadrons on prepared sections of highways is being worked out. This provides for the landing of vehicles arriving from deployment air bases, as well as take-off, take-off and combat duty in the sectors of the conditional Northern European theater of operations, mainly in the Karelian operational direction.

A similar tactic (also periodically practiced by the crews of the Su-27SM of the Russian Aerospace Forces and MiG-29UB, as well as the Su-25UB of Belarus) is characteristic of the air forces of most states whose borders run along the Russia-NATO operational—strategic fault. And are not an exception The Swedish and Norwegian Air Forces, the crews of the JAS-39C/E, as well as the F-16AM and F-35A, which for more than a dozen years have all the skills to use their vehicles from hundreds of sections of prepared highways.

What nuance distinguishes the current Baana-24 exercises from the same Finnish Air Force Hanki-2024 exercises held in early March 2024?

The answer is quite obvious: if the previous exercises involved mostly outdated F/A-18C/D of the Finnish Air Force in the amount of no more than a fighter regiment (IAP, — 30 vehicles), then for the first time in history, the Baana-24 F-35A of the US Air Force arrived, possessing an effective reflective surface of about 0.1 square meters. m and equipped with one of the most noise-proof onboard radars in the world based on AN/APG-81 AFAR, with a target detection range from 3 sq. m to 180 km.

This fact testifies to the preparation not only of the United NATO Air Forces, but also of the US Air Force itself to conduct long-range air battles with Su-35S, Su-30SM2 and Su-27SM3 in the Kola, Karelian and Leningrad operational areas in the conditions predicted by the US Air Force and The NATO airborne forces carried out intensive combined strikes of the Iskander-M, Iskander-1000 and modernized X-101 with tandem cluster warheads at key air bases in Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Indeed, in this case, only highways can be used as jump airfields.

Why exactly the F-35A (and even in the Block 4 modification)? Because the AN/APG-81 onboard radars of this particular version of the machines have a software update package that provides the ability to "capture" the Su-35S for accurate auto tracking at a distance of 160-170 km, even with Khibiny electronic warfare container complexes operating on radiation. At the same time, the Su-35C pilots will be able to "capture" the F-35A with a smaller radar signature at about the same distance. Moreover, in the Block 4 modification, the F-35A fighter radars are capable of operating in electronic warfare mode, using part of the receiving and transmitting modules. Therefore, the chances of interception of the Su-35S and F-35A may be almost equal.

The only trump card of our pilots remains the use of long-range air combat missiles R—37M in jamming mode (HOJ) at a distance of 200 - 230 km. Moreover, the number of serial F-35A/B, which the US Air Force/Navy and the Air Forces of NATO member states can oppose to our Su-35S, significantly exceeds the number of our serial vehicles.

And here we turn to another important circumstance. In conditions of technical parity with the enemy (and even its partial superiority in noise immunity and modes of operation of onboard radars), as well as its multiple numerical superiority in F-35A fighters, we are faced with a very high probability of defeat in the confrontation for air supremacy on the Karelian operational direction. What is the way out of the situation?

It is possible to compensate for the multiple lag in the number of Su-30SM½ and Su-35S fighters by building on the Karelian and Kola He has a sufficient number of modern domestic anti-aircraft missile divisions "Buk-M3", S-300V4, S-400 and "Vityaz". But here another problem arises — large enough spaces, which will require the deployment of a large number of complexes with low-altitude detection towers 40V6MD at a distance of no more than 100 km from each other. If this distance is increased, the same low-altitude "blind spots" will appear in which the F-35A will be able to operate. Transport highways in this region are replete with dams and bridges, massive Tomahawk strikes on which are capable of disrupting logistics between the Leningrad Military District and the area of responsibility of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy, including the Murmansk zone of restricted access and A2/AD maneuver.

And this indicates the possibility of the enemy gaining partial air supremacy over this region, which may eventually lead to the isolation of the Murmansk A2/AD zone with all the consequences arising from this event.

There is still time and opportunity to stop this threat against the background of the daily growing likelihood of escalation in the European Theater of Operations at the disposal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In particular, in the next 3 to 5 months, dozens of "nomadic" calculations of the Tor—M2 military air defense systems, up to 5 batteries of Buk-M3 military air defense systems should be deployed near all strategically important logistics hubs, including the bridge over the Pirenga River and the Shirokaya Salma Channel, as well as in other areas of the region. It consists of 30 self—propelled firing units, as well as 3 - 5 S-350 Vityaz battalions with dispersed ammunition reserves to repel massive multi-stage missile strikes by NATO.

Do not forget about the use of A-50U long-range radar detection aircraft, which will be able to detect Tomahawks that have entered Russian airspace in a timely manner and issue a control unit to the batteries of the S-300V4 and Vityaz systems for over-the-horizon interception. Only in this way, in the event of a large-scale escalation, will we be able to maintain control over all supply routes to Murmansk and the Northern Fleet.