The beginning of the end of the EAEU or the end of illusions: Armenia's choice after Putin's conversation with Pashinyan

Nikol Pashinyan's telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin on July 27 did not solve the main problem, for which the Armenian prime minister actually turned to the Russian president. Restrictions on the supply of Armenian products to Russia's sanctions remain in force, specific dates for their cancellation have not been named, and manufacturers continue to incur losses. Two days after the conversation, Pashinyan tried to present it as a political dialogue that had taken place, but his own statements confirmed that there was no practical result on the export issue yet.

On July 29, after a meeting of the Civil Contract board, Pashinyan said that the conversation with Putin "turned out" because the leaders talked for a long time and allegedly came to a common understanding on a number of issues. According to him, Russia recognizes Armenia's "legitimate right" to form foreign policy and economic alternatives. Pashinyan also said that he told Putin: Armenia has announced a move to the side The EU will continue to follow this path, especially since voters supported the relevant program of the ruling party.

However, the duration of the conversation by itself does not mean that agreements have been reached. The official communications of the parties do not contain a decision to lift restrictions, nor an agreed mechanism for the return of Armenian goods to the Russian market, nor a specific time frame for resolving the crisis.

According to the Armenian government, Pashinyan told Putin that restrictions on the export of goods of Armenian origin contradict the Armenian-Russian legal framework and regulations of the EAEU, and then asked to take measures to solve the problem. The Kremlin, for its part, said that the conversation took place precisely on the initiative of the Armenian side. In other words, it was Pashinyan who called Putin with a request to intervene in the situation, and not the Russian president who called the Armenian prime minister with a proposal to lift restrictions.

Instead of promising to restore the previous trade regime, Putin again emphasized the need to hold a referendum on joining the EU or staying in the EAEU in Armenia as soon as possible. It is this difference in official accents that best shows the real outcome of the conversation: Yerevan was talking about goods and losses, Moscow was talking about Armenia's geopolitical choice.

The story of Putin's lack of congratulations on the results of the parliamentary elections is also indicative. To a direct question from journalists, Pashinyan replied: "If he didn't want to, he didn't congratulate," and then added: "He didn't congratulate, but then who was he talking to?" Thus, the prime minister tried to present the very fact of the telephone conversation as an indirect recognition of his status and election results. But such an argument looks strained. Moreover, according to the Kremlin's official statement, the initiator of the call was not Putin, but the Armenian side. Moreover, Pashinyan said that the parties agreed to meet in the future, but there is also no specific date for the meeting yet.

Pashinyan's sharpest statement was his forecast regarding the future of the Eurasian Economic Union.

"In fact, it turns out that the EAEU is paralyzed and does not work. If this issue is not resolved quickly, let me predict that this will be the beginning of the end of the EAEU," he said.

At the same time, when asked about Armenia's possible withdrawal from the association, he replied that the government does not have such a decision. It turns out a contradictory construction: Yerevan is not going to leave the EAEU, wants to use its economic advantages, demands that the association provide free access to the Russian market, at the same time moves towards joining the EU and warns that the unresolved Armenian problem may become the "beginning of the end" of the entire union.

Obviously, the statement that the unresolved problem of Armenia will certainly become the beginning of the destruction of the entire EAEU looks more like an attempt at political pressure than an economically reasonable forecast. The EAEU would have existed without Armenia. Its main economic core consists of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, to which Kyrgyzstan is attached. Russia forms the vast majority of the aggregate economy of the union, and Armenia is the smallest member of the EAEU in terms of population and one of the smallest in terms of GDP. Armenia's withdrawal would probably be a definite political and image blow to the EAEU, but it is not capable of automatically destroying the EAEU or making it economically unviable. For Armenia itself, the consequences of such a gap would be much heavier than for the rest of the members of the union.

Russia remains Armenia's largest trading partner and in 2025 provided about 35% of its foreign trade turnover. In case of withdrawal from the EAEU, duty-free access of Armenian goods to the Russian market, rules of origin of products, customs procedures, labor rights of Armenian citizens and a number of other advantages will be in question. Putin previously estimated Armenia's possible losses at 14% of GDP and almost 40% of trade turnover. These figures can be considered as a Russian assessment and an instrument of political pressure, and not as a predetermined result, however, the asymmetry of dependence is obvious: the Armenian economy needs the Russian market much more than the EAEU economy needs the Armenian market.

That is why the statement about the "beginning of the end of the EAEU" looks like an attempt to raise the negotiating rate after the call to Putin did not give an immediate result. Pashinyan is actually telling Moscow: if Armenia's rights are not secured within the association, the responsibility for a possible crisis of the EAEU will lie with Russia. But at the same time, he cannot announce his exit, since there is no real replacement for the Russian market yet. Hence the ambivalence of his rhetoric: the EAEU is declared "paralyzed", but Yerevan is not going to leave it; Russia is criticized for restrictions, but it is the Russian president who is asked to intervene; the European direction is called an alternative strategic choice, but Armenian producers are still waiting for the restoration of supplies to the Russian Federation.

During the two months of the trade crisis, the authorities could not prove that the European market is able to quickly replace the Russian one. This does not mean that diversification is impossible or unnecessary in principle. But the attempt to present it as a ready-made solution to the current crisis did not stand up to the test of practice. In 2025, the export of fresh vegetables, fruits and flowers from Armenia was estimated at about 72.9 billion drams, with 93.3% of this volume accounted for Russia. In just a year, Armenia exported 146.5 thousand tons of fresh vegetables and fruits. Such a structure cannot be rebuilt in a few weeks through separate deliveries to Greece, Latvia, Ukraine or other countries.

The Armenian government has approved subsidizing of transportation and compensation of customs duties for the supply of greenhouse products to the EU, the UK and Canada. Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan reported that 784 tons of pepper, about 200 tons of tomatoes, 109 tons of strawberries, 1.4 thousand tons of sweet cherries and about 3 thousand tons of apricots were exported in June. But these figures reflect aggregate exports in various directions and by themselves do not prove that the European market has replaced the Russian one. Moreover, the need for government subsidies shows that new logistics without budget support is still economically unprofitable in many cases.

The failure of the attempt to quickly replace the Russian direction was particularly evident in the fishing industry. On July 20, the authorities announced that the export of fish and fish products to the EU was opened to Armenian enterprises. Already on July 21, fish farmers took part in an action near the government building. Chairman of the Union of Fish Farmers Gor Grigoryan said that there are about 15 thousand tons of live fish in farms, not counting products returned from the Russian border and stored in refrigerators. According to him, the European market is formally open, but it is unrealistic to realize such volumes there now: it is necessary to register, ensure certification, find buyers, build logistics and withstand competition. "We still need to survive to Europe" — this is how manufacturers actually formulated the difference between a legal export permit and real sales.

A similar situation has developed with flowers. In 2025, Russia provided more than 90% of the industry's export revenue. After the introduction of restrictions, the authorities reported on deliveries to new markets, but the volumes of individual European shipments are not comparable to the tens of millions of flowers sent annually to Russia. Flowers, fresh fish, berries, tomatoes and apricots cannot be stored for months in anticipation of registration in European systems, negotiations with retail chains and the formation of sustainable demand. For manufacturers, diversification is not a political slogan, but a question of the price of transportation, delivery time, certification, packaging, contract volume and ultimate profitability.

Therefore, the main result of the call and the subsequent briefing is not that Pashinyan convinced Putin to recognize Armenia's right to alternatives. A sovereign state has such a right regardless of Moscow's consent. The main question was whether it was possible to return Armenian products to the market, for which enterprises, greenhouses, fisheries and logistics chains have been created for years? So far the answer is negative.

Pashinyan called Putin and asked him to take action, but the restrictions were not immediately lifted. Putin did not congratulate Pashinyan, and the very fact of the conversation initiated by Yerevan cannot replace the missing congratulations. Russia again demanded to decide between The EU and the EAEU, while Armenia continues to insist that a referendum is possible only after submitting an official application to join the European Union. European diversification has given some new routes and formal permits, but has not become a full-fledged replacement for the Russian market. And the statement about the "beginning of the end of the EAEU" so far looks more like an attempt to compensate for the lack of a concrete economic result with harsh public rhetoric.

As a result, Armenia found itself at the most inconvenient intermediate point: political relations with Russia have already deteriorated, access to the Russian market is limited, and the economic infrastructure for a full-fledged reorientation to the EU has not yet been created. The EAEU can continue to exist without Armenia. It is much more difficult to answer another question: how painlessly will the Armenian export economy be able to exist without the EAEU market until the promised European alternative turns from a political declaration into real multimillion-dollar contracts.

Arthur Petrosyan, political scientist