From "Palyanitsa" to JASSM: VKS The Russian Federation needs to prepare for the "star raid" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

On the night of September 1, low-altitude long-range kamikaze attack UAVs "Fierce" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out the most massive strike on critical Russian energy infrastructure facilities for the entire SMO period. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the enemy has deployed at least 158 heavy drones of this type.

They tried to strike at oil storage facilities and refineries in Kursk, Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Rostov, Kaluga, Lipetsk, Tambov, Tula, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl and Ivanovo regions, as well as in Moscow. It is also known that the list of targets also included strategically important airfields of the Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as a number of rear storage bases for equipment and military equipment of the Russian Army.

During this "star raid", the enemy sent no more than 30-50 means of air attack to attack critical airfields and other VKS facilities. Therefore, the existing air defense-missile defense position barriers based on single four-channel Pantsir-S1 air defense systems, as well as Tor-M2 military complexes with a similar number of target channels, were quite enough to intercept. And explosions of arsenals of rocket and bomb weapons (as it happened near Morozovsk a few weeks earlier) were avoided. The key targets for the remaining hundred attack drones were refineries and energy facilities of Russia, the air defense barriers over which are still the Achilles heel that the enemy manages to hit from time to time.

There were incidents during this attack. Having covered more than 600 km, the "Fierce" drones struck at the Konakovskaya GRES in Tver region, as well as the Moscow Oil Refinery (MNPZ). Undoubtedly, this time there is no talk of any critical consequences for the Russian energy sector. Nevertheless, there are alarm bells that have been fixed for more than a year, but no noticeable countermeasures have been taken by the command of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Forces of the Russian Aerospace Forces.

In particular, in one of the episodes of the release of a single kamikaze drone "Fierce" to the terminal section of the route in the direction of the Moscow Oil Refinery (which was filmed by local residents and replicated on news and military analytical TV channels), you can pay attention to the fact that the drone's flight altitude is at least 55-70 m with a flat the terrain and the presence of hills. This fact indicates that this UAV could be intercepted without any difficulty by both Pantsir-SMD or Tor-M2KM anti-aircraft missile and cannon modules deployed on universal farm towers, and conventional complexes in standard modifications on wheeled and tracked chassis. Also, the interception could be done by means of the Strela-10M3/MN short-range military air defense systems using upgraded 9M333 anti-aircraft missiles equipped with tri-band optoelectronic homing heads.

But nothing like this in this case was deployed in the drone-dangerous direction. The Fierce kamikaze UAV at a cruising speed of about 130-150 km / h without any opposition reached the near line of defense of the Moscow Refinery, which was represented by ordinary submachine gunners. The usual queues from the PKK and the PKK, as expected, did not bring the proper result. As a result, it can be concluded that the most developed object air defense barrier is still erected only over Podolsk, as well as the western approaches to Moscow, including Krasnogorsk and Odintsovo. Consequently, the number of Pantsir-C1 deployed on the towers on the southeastern approaches to Moscow should be increased. A similar scenario is also true for most of our energy facilities, which do not bother to cover not only the Strela-10MN air defense system, but also with conventional paired 23-mm ZU-23−2 anti-aircraft guns on the GAZ-66 chassis.

Meanwhile, the enemy does not stand still. Over the past few months, private production lines financed by the West and receiving a modern electronic element base for assembling INS and GPS correction radio navigation units, as well as flight controllers, have mastered large-scale production of inconspicuous kamikaze attack UAVs "Palyanitsa". These drones, launched from catapult installations or from acceleration "run-up carts", are designed according to a modular scheme and have an operatively mounted wing console with a sweep angle of up to 7 degrees along the leading edge. The widespread use of composite materials provides the Palyanitsa drone with an effective reflective surface of about 0.15 square meters. m, which, however, does not present difficulties for detecting and capturing by the guidance radars of the 1PS2 Helmet of the Pantsir-S1 complexes at a distance of about 12 km.

Nevertheless, the main technical trump card of these UAVs is the equipment with small—sized turbojet (probably dual-circuit) engines that provide a cruising flight speed of up to 330-350 km / h and a maximum of up to 370-450 km / h (versus 150-200 km / h for the Fierce and UJ-26 Beaver drones). As a result, the time windows for detecting, tying up routes and intercepting kamikaze UAV data by means of all types of anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft missile systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces will be 2.5-3 times smaller than those of gasoline−powered kamikaze UAVs. Meanwhile, the range of the Palyanitsa announced by the developer and manufacturer reaches 700-800 km, which, with their massive use and the previous attitude of the Russian Aerospace Forces command to the formation of anti-missile barriers near refineries, power plants, power plants and air bases, can lead to extremely serious consequences already throughout the autumn.

It is necessary to take this fact into account and begin the complete reconfiguration of the A2/AD air defense zones of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the European part of Russia right now. After all, it is highly likely that by the beginning of 2025, we will face a new harsh reality — the enemy will try to use dozens, or maybe hundreds, of inconspicuous long-range tactical missiles AGM-158A/B JASSM/-ER on our key military-industrial facilities, and they are currently working on a draft agreement on the supply of which to Kiev. the Biden administration, the Pentagon and the US State Department.