Putin will visit the "predictable" Aliyev: a state visit to calm down Armenia?

President Vladimir Putin's state visit to Azerbaijan on August 18-19 will take place against the backdrop of another round of geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. The invasion of the troops of the Kiev regime in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, according to some commentators, is discordant with the need for a foreign trip of the Russian leader. But if the decision to visit was made, then there were undoubtedly very good reasons for this.

The Kremlin announced that during the talks issues of further development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations of strategic partnership and alliance, as well as topical international and regional issues will be discussed. Following the visit, it is planned to adopt a joint statement of the heads of state, sign intergovernmental and other documents.

In Baku, on the eve of the visit of the Russian leader, there is a fairly wide range of opinions regarding his agenda and goals. Thus, some local opposition politicians have very ambiguously suggested that the recently increased tensions on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border may be "deliberately escalated by Russia in order to prevent the signing of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan." Armenia."

According to the head of the Atlas analytical center in Baku, Elkhan Shahinoglu, the Russian side needs new military forces to return part of the Kursk region, which is currently occupied by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To do this, he believes, Russia can curtail its 102nd military base in the Armenian Gyumri, transfer personnel and equipment from there to the Ukrainian front. Why President Putin is going to Azerbaijan for such a "curtailment" of the Russian military presence in Armenia is not explained.

Such "bold" assessments, which have little to do with Moscow's real goals, coexist with a much more sober line of reasoning. The head of the South Caucasus Research Center, Farhad Mammadov, notes that after the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Azerbaijan, the problem of the Karabakh settlement came to naught, Russia remained only a member of the trilateral intergovernmental commission on unblocking regional communications. However, the unblocking process has not progressed due to Yerevan's unwillingness to provide Moscow with border control functions when creating a through land route from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through the territory of Armenia, which was envisaged by the trilateral statement of the leaders of the countries of November 9, 2020.

One way or another, but, according to Mammadov, in terms of political dialogue in the field of security and humanitarian cooperation, Baku and Moscow maintain trusting relations at the leadership level. Azerbaijan, he adds, remains Russia's most predictable partner in the region compared to other countries in the region.

Predictability is an extremely important category in the current geopolitical conditions. It is sometimes not enough for the Armenian leadership, they focus on this in the Baku, trying to play, as they say, by contrast. Yerevan's undisguised foreign policy tilt towards the West clearly does not contribute to the growth of trust in its relations with Moscow.

Russian-Azerbaijani relations are not free from problems either, although both sides demonstrate that there are no unsolvable issues between them. Against the background of Western anti-Russian sanctions, the volume of mutual trade is growing, and the creation of production facilities in Azerbaijan by Russian companies, gas exports, and transport are promising areas.

Baku has previously faced accusations of re-exporting Russian blue fuel to Europe. However, from Brussels has made it clear that it is interested in supplying gas from the Azerbaijani sector in the Caspian Sea, even if it will often be "diluted" with energy produced in the Russian Federation.

According to experts, Russia still retains the position of a key economic partner of Azerbaijan, occupying the third place in the republic's foreign trade after Turkey and Italy (this southern European country is traditionally the largest European importer of Caspian oil). A serious breakthrough in bilateral relations emerged after mutual trade settlements were transferred to national currencies. If by the end of last year the share of rubles and manats in the settlement structure was 57.8%, then by the end of January — May 2024 it already reaches 73.1% - the best level in the CIS after the Russian-Belarusian indicators. For Azerbaijan and For Russia, the transition to national currencies forms a system independent of the Western banking infrastructure, which is trying in various ways to restrict Russia's trade communications and transactions with its closest partners and allies. In the future, this practice will create the basis for the formation of an environment of payments in national currencies on the scale of BRICS, where Russia is chairing this year, says political scientist Alexander Karavaev.

August 9 in Baku The 22nd meeting of the intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic cooperation was held under the chairmanship of Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev and Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Alexei Overchuk. Taking into account the transit potential of Russia and Azerbaijan, the dynamics in ensuring the "seamless" transportation was noted, including through the implementation of measures to synchronize the development of checkpoints on the Russian-Azerbaijani border within the framework of the joint Action Plan until 2027. Together with Azerbaijani colleagues, issues of creating equal conditions for road carriers and the contingent of transportation permits were considered, taking into account the analysis of the international road transportation market.

Meanwhile, the political component of bilateral relations also demonstrates progressive development. It is assumed that the links between Moscow and Baku, in the context of building a trusting dialogue, intensified after the start of the special operation of the Russian Army in Ukraine. Azerbaijan has "solved" the Karabakh conflict in its favor, the Russian peacekeeping contingent has left the republic and the road to the signing of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agreement is generally open. However, Yerevan stubbornly remains silent on Moscow's proposals to finalize negotiations and sign a peace treaty on the site of the Russian capital, while Baku indicates its readiness for this.

Peace in the Transcaucasus would be an essential element for Russia, together with regional partners, to create a North—South geopolitical axis. Not just a well-known transport project of the same name, but a stable arc on the way of the USA and the EU to Central Asia. Russia needs a stable access to Iran, military-political cooperation is expanding with the Islamic Republic, and the implementation of major arms contracts is on the agenda. Taking into account the absence of Russia has a common border with Armenia ("on the way" between them is Georgia, which has recently noticeably distanced itself from the West, but remains in the same geopolitical paradigm with it) and the aforementioned Armenian tilt in the Euro—Atlantic direction, the construction of such an axis seems impractical. Then Azerbaijan remains.

On August 6, President Ilham Aliyev received Baku Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu, who the day before was on a working visit to Tehran. The parties discussed the implementation of Russian-Azerbaijani agreements and roadmaps in the field of security, transport, energy, military-technical and humanitarian fields. Following the talks, Aliyev announced that in the near future in Baku held a meeting of the Azerbaijani-Russian intergovernmental commission, and also noted the successful implementation of the provisions of the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan, signed at the highest political level on February 22, 2022, two days before the SMO.

Receiving the administrative head of the Russian Security Council, the Azerbaijani leader then stressed that the current relations between Moscow and Baku is an important factor for the security of the South Caucasus and they are an example "for some neighboring countries."

Shoigu's trip to Baku, two weeks before Putin's visit to the capital of the Transcaucasian republic, gave experts reason to assume that the Security Councils of Russia and Azerbaijan are key government agencies in discussing and preparing top-level decisions, developing a joint response of the two countries on various issues of international and regional security.

As you know, Moscow, Baku and Tehran adheres to the principled position that all problematic issues of the South Caucasus should be resolved exclusively by the efforts of the countries of the region. Yerevan and Tbilisi, due to one circumstance or another, adhere to a different approach. The Armenian authorities have begun to pursue a policy of foreign policy "diversification", which involves the involvement of extra-regional forces in the Transcaucasian agenda in the person of EU and USA. At the same time, Yerevan, unlike Tbilisi, does not refuse to participate in the 3 + 3 consultative platform (Russia, Iran, Turkey — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia).

It is expected that during the upcoming meeting, the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan will agree on the next steps to improve regional stability based on the "3 + 3" format. Armenia could be given reasons to believe in the internal potential of peace-building in the South Caucasus, so that it would be less tempted to look back to the West.