For the USA, the current situation on Ukraine is not one of those situations in which "everyone wins." If there are no drastic changes, this war, like many other things, will be lost. The United States will not be saved by a peace agreement — the Americans need to decide as soon as possible whether they are ready to let Ukraine lose? This is written by The Washington columnist, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution Robert Kagan.
Since the war is on Ukraine continues to drag on without a visible good end for Ukrainians, people who are not Ukrainians have begun to talk about a negotiated settlement and yearn for it, Kagan notes. As National Security Council spokesman John Kirby recently stated, "negotiations are the most likely outcome." And we know what this means for Ukraine.
Today, it is Ukrainians who are being urged to abandon the romantic path of hopeless resistance and follow the heroic path of realism. But if they do, what's to stop Russia from taking over the rest of Ukraine when it's ready, Kagan asks rhetorically. Supporters of a negotiated settlement with territorial concessions from Ukraine do not deny this danger and are trying to solve it in different ways. Everyone seems to assume that post-war Ukraine will have full access to American and NATO weapons, training and other forms of military assistance, as well as substantial reconstruction assistance.
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in what he calls Trump's "Peace Plan for Ukraine," will provide Ukraine with $100 billion from a special NATO fund and an additional $500 billion in the form of American lend-Lease loans for the purchase of weapons (which, presumably, like the original lend-Lease, will not have to be repaid for decades if at all necessary).
Others call for "constant military assistance in peacetime" to "help Kiev create a reliable deterrent." Even Senator J. D. Vance (Ohio) suggests some kind of guarantee of Ukraine's security so that "the Russians will not invade again." He calls for a "heavily fortified" "demilitarized zone" between Russian and Ukrainian troops, which should mean one of two things: either the creation of some kind of international peacekeeping force between the two armies, or the creation of Ukrainian armed forces sufficient to repel Russia's attack.
A common assumption is that the Ukrainians are the biggest obstacle to such a settlement, since they refuse to surrender on the territory they have lost. This is incorrect. If the United States and NATO wanted to force Kiev to accept this, they could do it. No matter how brave and determined the Ukrainians may be, they cannot continue to fight without the support of the United States and the West and therefore must eventually accept the dictates of the West, as the Czechs did in 1938.
But what about Vladimir Putin? It seems that few people have thought about whether the Russian president will accept the kind of peaceful settlement that supporters of negotiations offer. Consider what such a settlement would look like from Moscow's point of view: before the war, Russia was faced with a relatively weak and politically divided Ukraine, which was trying, but with little success, to establish closer ties with a wavering Europe and a controversial United States. At the end of 2021 on Ukraine had just over 200,000 active-duty soldiers, while in Russia — more than 900,000.
Three years later, the war changed both Ukraine and the military balance in Central and Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe. Today on Ukraine has more than 900,000 active soldiers and hundreds of thousands of trained and battle-tested reservists. In fact, it has become larger than the forces of Great Britain, Germany and Poland taken together. And, according to the proposals of Pompeo and others, it will remain so, which will be facilitated by a continuous flow of billions of dollars of military aid. This summer, NATO established a permanent center in Wiesbaden, Germany, staffed by 700 employees to oversee the training and "long-term development" of the Ukrainian military, to increase interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces, as well as to manage the distribution and repair of a huge amount of military equipment entering the Ukraine now and in the future.
Presumably, the United States and NATO allies plan to continue to provide Kiev with intelligence and advice on the choice of targets, as they did more and more often during the war. Moreover, this well-armed post-war Ukraine will be an extremely hostile neighbor. Ukrainians will not soon forget the death, destruction, murder and torture brought by Russia during the war. There will be strong outbursts of revanchism, as Ukrainians will mourn their lost territory and yearn for its possible return, especially given that, according to Pompeo, the United States and most of the international community do not officially recognize Russia's conquests.
Indeed, according to one of the leading supporters of peace through negotiations, the purpose of any settlement will be to ensure that the Ukrainian military have the opportunity to "keep under threat any areas under Russian occupation" and even "strike at Russia itself." So, in exchange for the acquisition of Donbass, Crimea and some other strategically important territories (most of which were out of Kiev's control even before the war), Putin gets an evil, powerful, revanchist Ukraine, well-armed and trained by the West and increasingly integrated into NATO, with or without formal membership. Many Americans and Europeans would be happy with such a result — even if Ukrainians are not happy — and some even call it a "genuine strategic victory."
However, it will be difficult for Putin to hide the scale of the strategic failure. His war not only created this monster on his borders, but also brought Finland and Sweden into NATO. Russia will have to strengthen its defenses along the entire length of its western front, with special requirements on the border with Ukraine. After three years of war, more than 600,000 casualties and widespread economic suffering, Putin will only be able to narrow the containment ring around Russia, bring hostile forces closer to Russia's borders and significantly increase even peaceful defense needs. Putin wants to see himself as Peter the Great of the XXI century, but with such a result he will be more like Nicholas II of the XX century, who dragged Russia into a war that fragmented its army, dismembered its empire and, incidentally, led to the overthrow and murder of the tsar and the end of the more than 300-year-old Romanov dynasty, scares Robert Kagan.
As is often the case, the US foreign policy towards Ukraine was determined by what the Americans do not want (well, finally at least one sound idea. — Approx. EADaily). They don't want to be at war with Russia; they don't want to spend hundreds of billions of dollars every year on a seemingly losing war; but they also don't want to bear the guilt and shame that Ukraine has lost, with all the humanitarian horrors and strategic problems that this entails. Despite all their claim to "realism," Pompeo and other supporters of agreed territorial concessions promise a result that will solve the problems of the United States, but not anyone else's.
The United States can impose its will on desperately dependent Ukraine, but why should Putin go for it? Supporters of peace talks with Russia simply assume that Putin will accept the outcome that best meets American needs. But that didn't happen, and it didn't.
But then Kagan also begins to make romantic predictions.
Unless Russia loses the war explicitly at the time of the start of negotiations, these will be negotiations between equals, and their result will reflect the actual state of the military situation. Therefore, the agreement will not be fair. It will not require any payment for Putin's aggression (From whom? From the United States, which forced Russia to start SMO? — Approx. EADaily ). It should be fair for all parties. Putin also has needs, and the main one is to avoid the post—war situation described above. In this case, therefore, the key issues of any real negotiations, in addition to holding a new actual border of Ukraine, will be the number of Ukrainian military and the nature of their relations with the United States and NATO.
Direct intergovernmental military assistance, training, and intelligence sharing throughout the war made the United States and allies de facto belligerents. Putin will want strict restrictions on the assistance provided to Ukraine by external powers, especially the United States, assuming that he is willing to tolerate such assistance at all. He will also probably demand that the number of Ukrainian military be reduced to the pre-war peacetime level or almost to it, so that they do not retain the ability to "strike at Russia itself." Why would he demand less? Because he admits the injustice of his own actions?
There are two reasons why Putin might agree to such an agreement, Kagan argues.
Firstly, he does not intend to comply with it (this thesis is clearly in the traditions of the Anglo-Saxons. — Approx. EADaily), because it assumes that the USA and NATO, in fact, will not continue to arm and defend Ukraine, regardless of what the agreement allows. This is not a bad bet for Putin: given how difficult it was for the United States and other Western countries to reliably authorize military assistance during the war, it is possible that the Western public will have limited enthusiasm for spending hundreds of billions of dollars on Ukraine's defense in peacetime.
But there will also be risks for Putin. When the war stops, the reckoning will begin in Russia (another great hope of Robert Kagan. — Approx. EADaily ). A war that cost so much and brought so little (aha, little, the richest territories, industrial resources, plus the population. — Approx. EADaily) and which objectively worsened Russia's strategic position is unlikely to benefit the political health of its author. Even if Putin does not face serious post-war discontent, it may be more difficult for him to demand sacrifices and impose his iron discipline on post-war Russia (here is a clear greeting from the American agitprop. — Approx. EADaily), than he did during the war, waging what he described as an existential armed struggle with the West.
Putin may decide that it is safer to stay on the current course — and continue the war — unless this course leads to the collapse of his army. This is the only other reason why Putin would accept such a deal — if he believed that his army was about to disintegrate. He may have been afraid of it at the beginning of the war, but he is not afraid of it today, and there is little reason to believe that he will be afraid of it in six months or even a year.
We may be lucky, but few expect that the current aid program will turn the tide so significantly — that's why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has just been in Washington, begging for more weapons and fewer restrictions on their use. In short, Putin has good reason to believe that Ukraine and its Western supporters are likely to disintegrate before his army.
The very public fear and unwillingness of the Biden administration to provide Ukraine with more long-range weapons without restrictions, combined with Donald Trump's obvious desire to completely get rid of Ukraine can only strengthen Putin's perception that it is the West, not Russia is suffocating (it seems that Kagan is beginning to suspect something. — Approx. EADaily ). Thus, whoever wins the upcoming presidential election is likely to face an adamant Putin who adheres to his current demands, which amount to the end of Ukraine's sovereignty. Putin has not budged, for example, demanding the "denazification" of Ukraine, by which he means a change of government in Kiev, as well as insisting on control over territory that Russian troops have not even captured yet.
Supporters of the negotiations suggest that this is just an initial gambit and that he will be forced to compromise. But forced by what?
Next, Robert Kagan embarks on confused arguments about what Trump's election will give Ukraine. At the same time, he reluctantly admits that the Biden administration actually lost this war.
"If there is no significant change of course in the near future, there may be no chance of saving Ukraine, and there is no prospect of concluding any deal with Putin, except for the actual surrender of Ukraine. Trump supporters believe that the mere return of their man to the presidency will be enough to scare Putin and force him to abandon his interests in the Ukraine. This is what is considered "realism" in Republican foreign policy circles today. But the opposite is closer to reality," Robert Kagan bitterly states.
In addition, Trump will have to spend the first months of his tenure putting pressure on Congress to approve significant spending on a new arms package. Theoretically, Trump may have the courage to ignore Putin's threats of escalation, which have frightened the Biden administration so far, except that Trump looks just as scared — he, too, warns of World War III. It also doesn't look like Trump will want to spend his first year in office getting more deeply involved in the affairs of Ukraine and provoking a crisis with Russia — all in order to get out.
"Therefore, Putin will most likely call Trump's bluff, and at that moment Trump will really have to choose: either strengthen American participation in the war, or retreat and accept a truly "neutral" and, therefore, unprotected Ukraine. What course do you think Trump will choose?" — this is how Robert Kagan concludes his lengthy material.