Although a number of military analytical publications and TV channels regularly remind about the problems of covering large rocket and artillery ammunition and air bases with full-fledged anti-aircraft missile brigades (based on Buk-M3, Pantsir-S1 and Tor-M2 and Tunguska-M1 batteries) and mobile calculations based on There are no ZU-23−2 anti-aircraft installations and Kord machine guns, and there is no reaction from the command of the Russian Aerospace Forces in eliminating this critical gap.
In particular, a massive raid by low-altitude kamikaze drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with a small reflective surface on a strategically important GRAU warehouse near the town of Toropets in The Tver region did not prompt the command of the Aerospace Forces to instantly erect layered zonal-object air defense barriers over similar objects. And most importantly, these funds could be deployed near critical facilities for only one day. After all, we are talking about 25 — 35 mobile calculations of ZU-23-2 anti−aircraft artillery systems with thermal imaging sights, or calculations of 12.7-mm turret machine-gun systems based on NSV, PKV machine guns, or "Cord" with similar sights.
The Tunguska and Tunguska-M1 anti-aircraft missile and cannon complexes could also be involved, which have long since confirmed their effectiveness in intercepting enemy reconnaissance and attack drones, both with the help of 9M311 and 9M311−1M anti-aircraft missiles with laser and radar fuses, and by means of an artillery unit based on twin twin-barreled 30-mm automata 2A38.
But this did not happen… And the attacks on two more arsenals followed: the 23rd arsenal of GRAU under the n.p. Oktyabrsky (16.5 km from the arsenals in Toropets), as well as along the arsenal near Tikhoretsk. In all three cases, it is stated about the "fall of debris" of the UAV, although it is well known that ordinary UAV debris with detonated military equipment would not have triggered the detonation of ammunition. Moreover, according to the tactical and technical specifications, such warehouses must withstand strikes, if not with tactical nuclear weapons, then at least with high-explosive fragmentation warheads of strategic cruise missiles such as UGM/RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV. We come to the conclusion that we are not talking about debris, but about full-fledged attacks by kamikaze drones.
Moreover, even if several Tor-M2 air defense systems were deployed near arsenals, they were clearly not placed on farm towers to increase the range of the radio horizon and timely detection of low-altitude drones over landings (as implemented in the Moscow region), but on a regular basis, at the level of the earth's surface. In such conditions, the fate of the above warehouses was predetermined. We have warned about this repeatedly.
Meanwhile, at the disposal of the Russian military-industrial complex there are also quite exotic developments in the field of designing promising inexpensive guided missile systems based on a wide range of 57-mm, 80-mm and 122-mm unguided rockets of the C-5, C-8 and C-13 lines, which could turn into a full-fledged anti-aircraft missile system.-missile "panacea" in stopping massive raids of UAV-"kamikaze" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We are talking about an effective, but long forgotten by almost all expert communities project of a complex of guided aviation missile weapons "Threat".
The Threat complex was developed by specialists of the AMETECH Scientific and Technical Center (Automation and Mechanization) in the late 1990s, and already on the fields of MAKS-99 the first demonstrators were announced, representing mock-ups of adjustable/controlled 57-mm C-5Kor missiles, 80-mm C-8Kor missiles and 122-mm C-13Kor rockets in various versions of combat units. It is known that initially all three modifications of guided missiles belonged to the air-to-surface class and were intended to destroy stationary and moving surface and ground objects.
The modernization of each unguided rocket (S-5/8/13) before the "Kor" modification involved the conversion from a single-stage layout to a two-stage one with the equipment of a detachable small-sized controlled combat stage. The latter was to be equipped with a semi-active laser homing head, similar to those mounted on 152-mm guided artillery shells "Krasnopol". At the same time, the target illumination could be carried out either by a laser rangefinder-designator placed on a helicopter/carrier aircraft, or by a ground-based portable LDC of type 1D22, or by a laser designator placed on an optoelectronic reconnaissance UAV.
The use by the Su-25SM3 and Mi-28NM crews of these guided missiles in the SMO zone for their intended purpose (high-precision strikes on ground targets) could demonstrate tens of times higher efficiency than today's strikes with standard unguided missiles without the Kor index in the cab mode. But these projectiles also have one more important technical feature — the ability to intercept small-sized air targets with an ultra-small reflective surface, including Baba Yaga-type copters and kamikaze UAVs. For the timely initiation of warheads when approaching enemy drones, combat stages can be equipped with non-contact laser or radar fuses.
The effective range of the anti-aircraft version of the S-5Kor guided missiles when launched from a highly mobile wheeled chassis when intercepting low-altitude kamikaze UAVs can be 4.5 — 5 km, C-8Kor shells — about 6.5 — 8 km and, accordingly, C-13Kor — up to 10 km. The only technical nuance is the parameters of the thermal imaging aiming guidance system, including the generation of the matrix photodetector, its resolution, as well as the parameters of the optical system, which have a direct influence on the detection distance of high-contrast targets. The most effective would be a ground-based modification of the GOES-451M multispectral optoelectronic complex capable of locating kamikaze drones of the Fierce and UJ-26 types at night at a distance of 12 - 8 km with illumination of C-8Kor and C-13Kor projectiles.
It is noteworthy that according to the "cost-effectiveness" criterion, guided missiles S-5Kor, S-8Kor and S-13Kor are capable of about 5-8 times surpassing the more science— and resource-intensive 9M338K anti-aircraft missiles of the Tor-M2 complexes, not to mention such heavy anti-aircraft missiles as 9M317M Buk-M3 complexes. But the program was not destined to reach the level of operational combat readiness.
Due to underfunding by the customer and Rosoboronexport, the Threat project was frozen in the early 2000s. What is even more interesting, already in 2002 (literally a year after the failure of the project "Threat") on the initiative In the USA, a similar APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System) project was initiated by the Pentagon. Already after being included in the BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman program in 2006, the updated APKWS-II project began to approach operational combat readiness. The Hydra 70 rocket, used as a basic unguided rocket, was equipped with semi-active laser guidance sensors and servomachines with aerodynamic rudders.
Today, APKWS-II missiles are the basis of the Vampire multi-purpose missile systems from L3 Harris and have already confirmed their effectiveness in intercepting our kamikaze UAV Geran-2 over enemy territory. Nevertheless, the developments on the Threat project can be transferred at any time to the specialists of NPO Splav and Tula KBP, where C-5, C-8 and C-13 rockets can be adapted to the tasks of countering enemy kamikaze drones in a very short time.