Although officials in Moscow continue to unanimously assert that the likely appearance of strategic cruise missiles BGM-109E TacTom Tomahawk Block IV/V, as well as ERAM missiles, cannot affect the operational and strategic situation in the region, in reality the picture looks much more complicated.
On the one hand, it is well known that strategic The BGM-109E, as well as the latest Ukrainian long-range tactical missiles R-360M "Neptune-MD" ("Long Neptune"), are far from the most sophisticated means of air attack for most domestic air defense systems, not to mention the transitional generation fighter aircraft.
For example, Tomahawks and Neptunes—MD flying at speeds of 780 — 850 km/h at echelons of 35 - 70 m at a distance of up to 35 — 45 km can easily capture 9C36M and 92N6 illumination radars of Buk-M3 and S-400 complexes for accurate auto tracking, and then provide illumination semi-active homing heads of 9M317MA and 48N6DM anti-aircraft missiles.
If we talk about the use of even more modern 9M317MA and 9M96DM anti—aircraft missiles with active homing heads in the ammunition of these complexes, then interception can be performed not only within the radio horizon (the same 35-45 km), but far beyond it (50-100 km). For 40N6 or 9M82MD anti-aircraft missiles, for S-400 and S—300V4 systems, this range can be 250-300 km.
But there is a nuance: for such over-the-horizon interceptions, at least 2 or 3 AWACS A-50U aircraft should be on duty at the time of enemy strikes in missile-hazardous areas, whose operators, using the Bumblebee-M radar, are able to detect BGM-109E missiles at a distance of about 120 km. Also, the role of "mini" AWACS can be performed by Su-35S fighters, whose pilots will not only be able to detect Tomahawks at a similar distance and issue target designation to the four above-mentioned anti-aircraft missiles using Irbis-E onboard radars, but also shoot down their own R-77−1 and R-37M missiles.
In theory, everything is feasible, but in practice, unfortunately, negative "moments" in the Anti-aircraft missile forces are constantly affecting. The duty of AWACS aircraft is still episodic. The units of the patrolling Su-35S are not always (or untimely) in missile-hazardous areas. That is, the enemy units are still finding time "windows" favorable for strikes.
One of the consequences of the presence of such "windows" can be considered the recent strike of only four tactical missiles "Neptune-MD" at the Karachay plant "Electrodetal" in the Bryansk region. You can add endless arrivals at refineries not only in the border area, but also in Bashkiria, the Volgograd region and a number of other regions. All these are the consequences of those very temporary "windows" of the absence of patrolling fighter aircraft and AWACS aircraft.
An equally wide range of negative consequences can be caused by the absence of 24-meter telescopic lifting and turning devices 9C838 and universal towers 40V6MD in the composition of the Buk-M3 and S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile batteries at the time of the Tomahawk strike and universal towers 40V6MD, which increase the radio horizon for low-visibility aerodynamic targets at altitudes of 30 m from 25 to 37 and 43 km, respectively. In this situation, a huge number of "blind zones" are formed between the SAM batteries dispersed at a distance of 100 + km, through which both Tomahawk cruise missiles and more inconspicuous ERAM cruise missiles can easily "leak", a batch of 800 units of which can be delivered to the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the spring — summer of 2026.
As for the definition of "blind spots", these tasks (as we have repeatedly noted) are easily handled by ICEYE radar reconnaissance satellites and a number of NATO radar reconnaissance satellites and even the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, including IGS-Radar, whose data is also provided by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In the border regions, at an operational depth of about 380 — 450 km, the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint strategic reconnaissance aircraft cope with these tasks.
More importantly, in the case of delivery of large batches of Tomahawk Block V cruise missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a batch of 533-mm vertical launchers will also be transferred. Probably, initially we are talking even about improvised PU in 40-foot containers, as full-fledged PU of medium-range Typhon complexes have not yet been produced with such high intensity.
Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that from the data The SM-6 Block IB and SM-6 Dual II long-range anti-aircraft guided missiles can also be launched. Therefore, with a range of 240 — 320 km, these anti-aircraft missiles, when deployed 150 km from the Ukrainian-Russian border, can cover from 90 to 170 km of our airspace, pushing back the boundaries of the planned UAB UFAB-500M-62/T by Su-34NVO crews.
More importantly, of similar PU (ground-based analogues of Mk41 ship—based VPUs), a shock/ anti—radar modification of the SM-6 with a range of 450-600 km and an average vector speed of about 3.3 - 3.7 M can be used. These missiles will be able to reach a number of our military-industrial facilities in The Moscow region, and this is an extremely serious problem. However, unlike the Tomahawks, it will be much easier to intercept SM-6 Dual II missiles flying along a ballistic trajectory at a speed of 1100 m / s.
But we must not forget that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is preparing to use not the BGM-109E and SM-6 separately, but are working on the tactics of combining strikes with these missiles with heavy Flamingo-5 and Neptune-MD, as well as hundreds of gasoline and jet UAVs "Morok" and "Inferno" to saturate the target channels of our air defense systems. And therefore, without a full-fledged reconfiguration of the air defense system-air defense from the border to the deep rear and the start of regular combat duty of AWACS A-50U aircraft, it is not necessary to talk about intercepting all Tomahawks and other missiles.
It is simply unacceptable to delay now, because the Pentagon and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have targeted the most critical facilities — the military-industrial complex enterprises and the energy infrastructure of Russia.