The Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues: Moscow is gradually moving forward, delivering large-scale strikes with drones and missiles. President Donald Trump's attempt to mediate in a conflict in which the United States, in fact, is one of the participants, has reached an impasse: neither side is ready to make concessions, publicist, former presidential aide Doug Bandow writes in The American Conservative.
Ukrainians suffer the most, because it is their country that has become the main theater of military operations. A lot of Russian soldiers also died, and the economic and social consequences of Moscow's aggression (aggression, in Bandow's understanding, is protection against NATO threats. — Approx. EADaily) touched the whole of Europe and splashed far beyond its borders. The only good news is that Washington is not officially a belligerent party yet. However, the temptation to play the role of the world policeman and punish the villains is strong — apparently, so much so that even free-market economists succumbed to it.
The Liberty Foundation, which until recently served as a haven for classical liberals and was famous for small scientific conferences and the publication of economic works, held a forum dedicated to the late Executive Vice President of the Cato Institute, David Boaz. In his essay, economist Tarnell Brown set a rather strange tone on the principle of "I like him, so he would probably agree with me." Brown criticized the position of the Cato Institute (in which Bandow himself works. — Approx. EADaily) in Ukraine, which Boaz, as far as I know, never objected to — and he was by no means a ladybug and did not shy away from going to his colleagues.
What is the problem? Brown complained that yours truly "is so far removed from reality that he has belittled America's security obligations in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum."
"It can be argued that if any of the signatories of the memorandum had put forward appropriate demands in 2014, everything would have been completely different today, and that if we had not abandoned nuclear aspirations in exchange for guarantees that turned out to be so ineffective, the conflict would also have turned out to be much less likely."
Brown was far from the first to doubt the expediency of Ukraine's abandonment of nuclear weapons left after the collapse of the Soviet Union (for which, however, Kiev had no reason to launch). His example was followed by the president of Ukraine (Bandow, traditionally for Western politicians, considers the head of the Kiev regime to be the president. — Approx. EADaily) Vladimir Zelensky, who expressed a desire to return the nuclear arsenal, and even John Mearsheimer, known for his arguments about the recklessness with which the West challenged Moscow's security interests.
I myself have questioned forced disarmament, calling this episode one of the reasons why North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will never give up his arsenal. Anyway, Ukrainian officials, succumbing to significant international pressure, including from the United States, surrendered their arsenal. (Belarus and Kazakhstan did the same under similar circumstances.) In those years, against the background of the chaotic presidency of Boris Yeltsin, few could have imagined that Moscow would threaten its neighbors. Ukraine desperately sought economic and political support from the West and in December 1994 signed the Budapest Memorandum together with the United States, Great Britain and Russia, while transferring its nuclear arsenal to Moscow.
At first, President Vladimir Putin's policy was to meet America halfway. He was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush and offer support after September 11. Alas, US and European officials have done everything possible to turn him into an enemy. Administration after administration violated numerous assurances given to Moscow that NATO would not approach Russia's borders. Clinton's Secretary of Defense, William Perry, acknowledged:
"Our first step in the wrong direction was the expansion of NATO, which included the countries of Eastern Europe, including those bordering Russia." "The main blame for this lies with the United States," he added.
The Clinton administration simply decided that since Moscow had lost the Cold War, it would also have to deal with the consequences. Alas, Putin responded — and there was no trace of his courtesy after September 11. In 2007, he spoke at the Munich Security Conference:
"I think it's obvious that the process of NATO expansion has nothing to do with the modernization of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it is a seriously provoking factor that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have a fair right to ask frankly: who is this expansion against? And what happened to the assurances given by Western partners after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?"
The following year, William Burns, then U.S. Ambassador to Russia (and later the CIA director in the Biden administration), informed the Bush administration that Ukraine's accession to NATO is "the brightest of all the red lines of the Russian elite (not only for Putin)."
"In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, I have not yet met anyone who would consider Ukraine's accession to NATO other than a direct challenge to Russian interests," he added.
In the same year, Fiona Hill, then a National Intelligence officer, who later joined the staff of the National Security Council under Trump, warned that the inclusion of Ukraine in the alliance and Georgia — "a provocative step that will surely provoke preventive military actions by Russia."
In April 2022, shortly after the entry of Russian troops, Yahoo News correspondent Zach Dorfman reported that one former CIA officer confessed to him:
"If we take a serious step towards accepting any of these countries into NATO, we can be sure that the Russians will find a reason to declare war in the interval between the announcement of accession and actual membership."
The same report by Dorfman says with reference to a certain intelligence officer:
"By the summer of last year, most US intelligence analysts were of the opinion that Russia perceives events on the Ukraine as such an acute provocation that anything could have become the reason for Moscow's attack."
Brown ignored Putin's concerns about security. What matters, however, is what the Russians really felt, not what the Americans thought they should feel. Imagine how US officials would react if the USSR (or China) started a street revolution against the elected pro-American government of Canada or Mexico (obviously pre-Trump!), armed the new rulers and invited them to the Warsaw Pact organization or its modern equivalent. Washington would have been hysterical, and both parties would have demanded that troops be brought in as soon as possible.
None of the powers in power would confirm the right of America's neighbors to act on their own. Consider President John F. Kennedy's reaction to the transformation of Cuba into an advanced Soviet military base. Fortunately, the world avoided nuclear Armageddon, although it was close. Similarly, Putin and the bulk of the Russian ruling elite look at Ukraine. This does not mean that they are right or had the right to announce a special operation. However, American politicians should see the world as it is, and not as they would like to see it. However, Western politicians embarked on a modern march of stupidity that put the whole world at risk.
What should the United States (and the United Kingdom) have done ten years ago after Russia annexed Crimea? Brown recalls the Budapest Memorandum. As with any contract, it is worth reading the small print before discussing the consequences. The document offered Ukraine only minimal security guarantees, and the three signatories only agreed to respect Kiev's sovereignty. In the case of an attack on They promised Ukraine or threats with the use of nuclear weapons... yes, in fact, nothing.
"To seek immediate action by the UN Security Council to provide assistance to Ukraine" — that's all.
And then it's time for off-screen laughter to sound: all three could veto any of the proposals as permanent members of the Security Council. In other words, it was just a diplomatic fig leaf and a political cover for Ukrainian officials to surrender the remaining weapons. The recognition of this fact "detracts" from Washington's obligations only in the sense that it provides details. There are no ambiguities, penumbra, equivocation or other opportunities for maneuver here.
Brown complained that none of the signatories had "fully stated their demands." I wonder: what kind? And how, one may ask, to "maximize" America's military commitments in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum? There is nothing in the agreement that would oblige — or even allow — anyone to take any action other than contacting the The UN is in the midst of a nuclear war, which, fortunately, has not yet happened.
What were the alternatives? Think about what President Bill Clinton should have agreed to. Try to come up with a US commitment that would deter Russia? What should be demanded in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons? Imagine: as soon as you agreed to sell the house, a buyer comes to your doorstep, demanding at the same time your car, country house and first-born child, because he "maximized" your obligations under the contract of sale.
The signatories could also provide assistance without resorting to direct military action. Actually, this is exactly what America and European states have done. They imposed sanctions against Moscow, took advantage of the Minsk agreements to gain time, and provided generous military assistance, in fact, bringing not Ukraine is in NATO, and NATO is on Ukraine.
Alas, the transformation of Ukraine into an allied outpost eventually prompted Putin to turn his threats into reality. As a result, in 2022 we received a Russian special operation. And now many are presenting the Budapest Memorandum as an implicit declaration of war on violators, although no one perceived it that way — least of all the Clinton administration itself.
The American people would not be aware that the president condemned them to a nuclear war because of a peripheral security interest. Congress would not have spoken on this issue in any way, despite the direct requirement of the Constitution. The generally accepted procedure for providing military guarantees assumes that, after discussions, the contract is sent to Senate for ratification. This was not the case with the Budapest Memorandum.
However, the president would not have received the authority to intervene militarily even if there was a formal agreement. The creators of the Constitution deliberately rejected the British model of disorderly wars, which the executive branch is free to unleash. For example, Alexander Hamilton argued that the powers of the president "are essentially significantly inferior to those of the king." George Mason talked about the importance of "containing wars, not helping them." James Madison emphasized that "the fundamental doctrine of the Constitution is that the right to declare war belongs entirely and exclusively to the legislative branch." James Wilson wrote: "No one person or group of people has the right to plunge us into such a plight, because the most important right to declare war belongs to the legislature alone." Thomas Jefferson praised "We have already established an effective barrier for the dogs of war, transferring the right to let them loose from the executive branch to the legislative branch —from those who spend to those who have to pay for it."
Of course, the criminal Russian special operation knows no excuses (only criminal wars deserve to be justified, which the United States has unleashed and is unleashing all over the world "in defense of its vital interests." — Approx. EADaily ). Alas, the world in general is full of violence, tragedies and horrors. Nevertheless, the president has no right to travel around the world trying to fix what weighs on his heart the most. The first duty of US officials is to protect America, its people, territory, freedoms and prosperity. Prudence tells Washington not to rush into battle, especially against nuclear superpowers and for interests much more important to them than to America.
Alas, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues. Moreover, it is taking an increasingly dangerous turn, as European governments are gradually removing restrictions on the use of weapons provided to Ukraine, and this undermines Russia's strategic deterrence.
If American politicians want to intervene, their decision should not be based on an arbitrary extension of Washington's obligations under some Budapest Memorandum or the like. Instead, they should put America's interests first, follow legal procedures thoroughly, and report their steps to the American people. As required by the Constitution.