To date, the successful offensive of our troops continues in the Kupyansky, Krasnoarmeysky, Kurakhovsky and Velikonovoselovsky directions. Due to the terrain, the high density of deployed artillery, the units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation manage to deprive the enemy's developed fortified areas of combat stability in a short time, pushing it to the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region.
Good results are also demonstrated in undermining the enemy's logistics potential at an operational depth of 45 — 55 km, and sometimes 100 — 120 km, where crews work out with high efficiency according to target designation from the operators of the optical-electronic reconnaissance UAVs S350M Supercam and ZALA 421−16E HD at headquarters, BC warehouses and transshipment bases in the near rear Su-34NVO (with the use of planning versions of FAB/ODAB bombs), calculations of the Tornado-S 300-mm MLRS, as well as Iskander-M tactical missile systems.
For the most part, it was this tactic that allowed the Aerospace Forces, as well as the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Russian Federation, to at least partially shake the stable delivery of ammunition and provisions to the firing positions of the enemy's 155-mm artillery in the Kursk region, which led to a decrease in the intensity of the fire impact on our strongholds. As a result, the units of the 106th Airborne Forces, the 155th separate brigade The MP of the Pacific Fleet, as well as the Kursk Knights and Arbat detachments, managed to dislodge the enemy from a number of settlements in the Kursk region, including Olgovka, Novoivanovka, Lyubimovka, Zeleny Shlyakh, Pogrebki, Russian Transverse, Plekhovo, etc.
Nevertheless, such tactics of the RF Armed Forces contribute to the results only at an operational depth of no more than 100 — 150 km. In the deep rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they still feel safe, including as a result of our regular and "decapitating retaliation strikes" carried out by 10-mach Daggers and 12-mach Hazelnuts, hundreds of cruise missiles X-101, as well as inconspicuous tactical cruise missiles X-69. Why not?
The answer to this question is extremely simple. All bridges across the Dnieper continue to function unhindered, providing phenomenal throughput for the transfer of light and heavy armored vehicles supplied by the West, artillery, as well as barrel and high-precision rocket artillery and air defense systems on the Left Bank. These bridges provide supplies to both the South Donetsk and Zaporozhye, and Kursk fronts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
A year and a half earlier, most of our media military "experts" foamed at the mouth and proved that only "heavy FABs and BetABs" with the enormous power of their combat equipment could solve the issue of disabling bridges across the Dnieper. And so, the specialists of NPO Basalt in the shortest possible time develop and bring to the level of operational combat readiness the widest range of universal planning and correction modules (UMPC) adapted for placement on bombs from FAB-250M-62 to FAB-3000. The planning range of these products when descending from the Su-34NVO suspension units at altitudes of 12500 m with speeds of about 1050 km / h can reach 45-75 km.
Today, this range is quite sufficient for regular strikes on bridges in Zaporozhye with discharge lines south of Tokmak, which will eventually disrupt all transport routes between the right and left banks of the Dnieper in Zaporozhye without exception. Consequently, to supply the Zaporozhye front, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be forced to use the Southern Bridge in Dnepropetrovsk, and this is already an additional "shoulder" with a length of several tens of kilometers. It is logical that the efficiency of actions and combat stability of the AFU units near Orekhovo and Gulyai-Pole will decrease by 25-35%. And this result is quite capable of ensuring our more effective advance to Zaporozhye and other rear cities of the region.
Then the bridges in Dnepropetrovsk, Kamensk and Kremenchug. A number of our mass media for more than 2 years continue to saturate the Runet with "fables" about the low efficiency, or even complete incapacity of aeroballistic missiles X-47M2 "Dagger", inconspicuous cruise missiles 9M728 and quasi-ballistic BR 9M723−1 Iskander-M complexes, as well as X-101 in the tasks of destroying large bridges in the rear cities of Ukraine.
But let's recall the practice of using 227-mm GMLRS guided missiles from the enemy's HIMARS systems on the Antonovsky Bridge in Kherson: only one and a half to two dozen cheap guided missiles M31A1 with high—explosive warheads weighing 91 kg, stacked in a circle with a diameter of 5-10 m on the bridge bed, was enough for the facility to almost completely lose its bandwidth abilities (especially for the passage of heavy armored vehicles).
Against this background, the Aerospace Forces, as well as the Iskander-M calculations, can literally cover the bridges across the Dnieper with dozens of X-101, 9M728, 9M723-1 and 3M14T Kalibr−NK missiles every week, the circular probable deviation of which also does not exceed 7-10 m, taking into account the cover of the enemy's electronic warfare, performing jamming of GLONASS correction radio navigation modules located on the above missiles. And even in the case of withdrawal to the "milk", powerful combat units weighing 480 — 700 kg would completely disable most of the bridges over a certain period of time, and the AFU grouping on the Left Bank of the Dnieper would, as they say, be taken "tepid".
In reality, we do not observe any strikes on bridges at all, and the enemy's military-technical "express" continues to saturate with equipment and ammunition not only large transshipment bases and warehouses in Zaporozhye, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava and Kharkov regions, but also in Sumy, as well as Chernihiv regions, where the enemy continues to form mechanized fists in the deep rear in preparation for new offensive operations on the Starodubsky, Trubachevsky and Sevsky directions of the Bryansk and Kursk fronts.
These fists are formed in dense forests of the northern regions of Ukraine at a distance of about 150-200 km, which makes it extremely difficult for our optical—electronic reconnaissance UAVs to detect accumulations of AFU equipment, which are extremely rarely barraging at such a distance from the line of combat contact.
As we have already noted earlier, for this, the Russian Aerospace Forces must immediately begin using Tu-214R strategic radar reconnaissance aircraft with multi-band MRK-411 Earth surface monitoring radar systems. But like strikes on bridges, the use of Tu-214R aircraft is not observed, and at a distance of more than 150 km from the line of combat contact, the enemy is absolutely not constrained in action and has the ability to quickly and flexibly deploy the necessary chain of fuel depots, repair and recovery points, communication and data exchange nodes in the tactical link, etc.
It is worth noting that, according to a number of sources, the intensity of fire exposure from the enemy over the past weeks has sharply decreased in a number of areas, including Sumy and Glukhov, which may indicate that rocket and artillery units have accumulated the necessary amount of arsenal for powerful artillery training on our positions in the border area and further fire support for fresh mechanized units numbering from 4 to 7 brigades.
And the primary task for the command of the Sever in this situation is to maintain at least partial situational awareness in tank and infantry-hazardous areas to a depth of up to 70 km (which can be achieved through the "dense" operation of the S350M Supercam UAV), as well as the availability of the necessary number of remote mining engineering systems (ISDM) "Agriculture", mining complexes based on heavy hexacopters, carrying out the setting of the widest range of mines (from POM-2/3 to PTM-4M).
Otherwise, we risk getting another extremely "painful" and tactically difficult direction.