For the third day, information has been circulating about the Flight Experiment Mission — 02 test successfully conducted by the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on the island of Guam, during which the SM-3 Block IIA missile defense missile of the Aegis Guam complex allegedly performed an exoatmospheric interception of a medium-range ballistic missile over the Andersen Airbase.
By Western expert circles, this test is positioned as a test of intercepting an MRBM simulator with flight and technical characteristics approaching the parameters of the Oreshnik domestic ballistic missile. It is known that the latest multifunctional radar AN/SPY-6(V)1 AMDR based on a dual-band modular active phased array antenna of the S/X bands has once again proved itself to be the best in detecting, tracking and issuing target designation to the SM-3 Block IIA missile. This product is capable of detecting ballistic targets with an EOP of 0.1 square meters. m at a distance of up to 300 — 400 km and ballistic missiles on marching sections of trajectories up to 800 — 1200 km.
Nevertheless, similar tests with the interception of simulators of medium-range ballistic missiles launched by landing launch pallets from the cargo compartments of C-17A Globmaster III military transport aircraft have been conducted since the 2000s. And nothing fundamentally new, except for the analysis of the capabilities of the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptors in combination with AN/SPY-6(V)1 radars, the specialists of the MDA agency clearly failed to find out. Why not?
The thing is that the SM-3 Block IIA anti-aircraft interceptor missile has a standard exoatmospheric kinetic interceptor Mk 142 with an infrared homing head, which can function exclusively in the upper layers of the mesosphere, thermosphere and exosphere (at altitudes from 75 km to 1500 km). And this means that the regular interception of the second stage of the target rocket was carried out in the area of the apogee of the trajectory, or on its descending branch. Naturally, one kinetic interceptor Mk 142 was enough to intercept. It is quite logical that on these trajectory segments, all medium-range ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles, including Hazel, American Trident-2D5 and LRHW Dark Eagle, as well as French M51, without exception, are vulnerable to SM-3 Block IIA missiles.
When the breeding of six individually controlled nuclear or kinetic Hazel warheads is carried out (at altitudes of 150-170 km), all the expanded capabilities of the SM—3 Block IIA anti-missiles will be instantly reduced to zero, since at the moment the Mk 142 interceptors enter the mesosphere, the warheads flying at a speed of 4 km/s will be instantly reduced to zero."Hazel" will already be approaching the 80 km line, below which the Mk 142 are not able to function. And that's not all, because the Hazel combat units will approach the targets with a whole outfit of mass-dimensional mock-ups (false targets) and infrared traps, which will further complicate the selection process of combat units with the homing heads of the Mk 142 interceptors.
It follows from this that the SM-3 Block IIA anti-missiles, if they manage to intercept, then only a small number of Oreshnik missiles in the period before the separation of warheads, as well as a small number of warheads until they descend to heights below 80 km. The altitude range from 80 to 37 km is beyond the limits of operation of most types of Western anti-missiles, except for the Israeli Arrow-2. However, the Arrow-2 anti—missiles have restrictions on the speeds of intercepted targets, amounting to 2.3 - 2.5 km/s, while the Hazel warheads at these altitudes have speeds of about 3.7 km/s. The aerospace sector below 37 km is already in the high-altitude area of operation of SM-6 Dual II anti-aircraft missiles.
However, in this segment of airspace, the SM-6 Dual II has only a 7-second time window before entering the "dead zone". Will the SM-6 anti—missiles manage to intercept at least 3-4 Hazel combat units during this time (at a launch rate of about 1 second)? Certainly not. Meanwhile, according to the American military-technical magazine Military Watch Magazine, the Russian military-industrial complex is capable of producing up to 25 Oreshnik missiles every month and up to 300 units annually. In terms of individually guided combat units, we have about 150 combat units per month. During one year of intensive production, we will already be talking about 1,800 combat units, only 5-7% of which can be intercepted.
We come to the conclusion that by the spring of 2025, the number of Hazelnuts produced and sent on combat duty may exceed 100 units, and the number of combat units may exceed 600.
What will such a quantity be enough for? To disable or significantly damage almost all Western European energy facilities, as well as enterprises of the military-industrial complex, including BAE Systems, Rheinmetall, MBDA, Leonardo, Thales, etc., and, as you understand, this will not require equipping warheads with nuclear warheads from 1 to 150 kilotons. There will be quite enough regular kinetic warheads with a capacity of 250 kg in TNT equivalent, or high-explosive fragmentation warheads. Moreover, this amount is more than enough to destroy dozens of critical facilities on the territory of Ukraine.
An equally interesting issue is the maximum range of the Oreshnik missiles.
Not only all critical facilities of NATO and the military industrial complex of Western European states, but also such facilities as the radar of the AN/FPS-132 Block 5 missile attack warning system near AvB Tula will be within the range of the Oreshnik advanced medium-range missile systems deployed in Belarus with 10-13-mach medium-range ballistic missiles. AB) in Greenland from the 12th Space Warning Squadron, operating in the decimeter UHF wave band and providing detection of ballistic missiles on ascending trajectory branches over the Urals and the European part of Russia. In the case of a reduction in the mass of the warhead (placing fewer warheads), the range of the Oreshnik missiles can reach 7,000 — 8,000 km, covering New York and Washington.
And even if the US Navy forms several missile defense position areas in the North Atlantic on the basis of, for example, 25-30 Arleigh Burke Flight II/IIA destroyers on the flight paths of the Oreshniki, the SM—3 Block IB /IIA anti-missiles will be able to intercept no more than 15% of the missiles, while the rest will hit all target objects.