Deliveries of the AGM-158A JASSM tactical missiles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as their integration into the Su-24M, Su-27C and F-16AM ammunition sets, will begin in 2025 following consultations within the framework of the future Ramstein summit. This conclusion can be drawn on the basis of CNN data with reference to sources in the Joe Biden administration, as well as information from the commander-in-chief of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe, Christopher Cavoli.
The number of delivered JASSM missiles in an early version with a range of 370 km may exceed 200-300 or more units, which, taking into account the ultra—low—altitude flight profile of these missiles at echelons of 70-30 m, as well as an effective reflective surface of about 0.02 square meters, requires the command of the Aerospace Forces to immediately begin optimizing and reconfiguring the low-altitude radar contour of air defense positional areas- ABOUT in Rostov, Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk, Tula, Orel, Lipetsk, Bryansk, Kaluga and Smolensk regions, as well as in the Crimea and Kuban.
As we have already indicated earlier, each rear battery of the S-400 air defense system (at a distance of more than 100 km from the line of contact) should be equipped with a 38.8-meter universal tower 40V6MD to accommodate 92H6 illumination radars. This will ensure that low-altitude areas of airspace over forests, valleys and bends of the terrain are overlapped by viewing sectors.
S-400 batteries/regiments with 92H6 radars should be equidistant from each other on the ground with a priority deployment distance of about 50 — 70 km from each other. The S-400 divisions should be equipped with an additional modification of the 5P85SM2−01 launchers, retrofitted with guides for highly maneuverable 9M96DM anti-aircraft missiles with gas-dynamic transverse control engines and active radar seeker. This step will dramatically increase the fire performance of the S-400 regiments, reduce the rate of depletion of ammunition and allow the continued interception of JASSM missiles in the event of their concealment behind the "screens" of the terrain elevations on its most difficult segments, which is achieved due to the autonomy of active radar homing heads.
In addition, patrol barrages of Su-35S in the amount of up to a squadron in missile-hazardous areas should be installed. "Skipping" even a few JASSM missiles in shock outfits is fraught with much more serious consequences than SCALP-EG strikes. After all, it is well known that the penetrating warheads J-1000/WDU-42/B are capable of overcoming from 15 to 20 m of soil and 2 m of reinforced concrete, which poses a threat to command and staff units, military-industrial enterprises and even highly protected arsenals, which are much more fortified than the "Fierce" UAVs and "Palyanitsa" warehouses GRAU near Toropets in Tver region and Karachev in the Bryansk region.
If you just open Yandex/ Google maps, you can pay attention to the fact that the ammunition of the 67th GRAU arsenal attacked tonight by low-altitude drones was stored in the same low-security structures as near Toropets, and some of them were completely under the open sky. Apparently, the arsenal near Karachev was also in the area of responsibility of a "specialist" in the field of logistics Russian Armed Forces General Bulgakov. And, unfortunately, we still have a lot of similar Bulgakovs, as evidenced by endless strikes on warehouses and oil depots and refineries.
Also, do not forget about the beginning of deliveries to Kiev by January —March 2025 of the Mirage 2000D RMV multi-role fighters (to the level of which it is planned to upgrade the remaining Mirage−2000C) in a shock modification in the amount of up to 20 units and Mirage 2000-5F up to 26 units in a multi-purpose modification with a more pronounced potential (also with the preservation of shock functions). The first c with index D is equipped with an on-board radar Antilope−5-3S, which provides flight at altitudes of 60 m in the mode of rounding the terrain up to the launch lines of the already known SCALP-EG missiles. Moreover, the Mirage 2000D RMV can conduct infrared reconnaissance in the frontline zone, using TALIOS container complexes, and then independently strike with AASM-250 HAMMER active-jet bombs.
At the same time, the safety and effectiveness of such strike operations can be supervised by operators of PS-890 radar systems installed on Saab 340 AEW&C long-range detection aircraft. In particular, these radars are capable of monitoring Russian airspace to a depth of 150 km for the exit of our Su-35S to intercept the launches of Mirage and F-16AM missiles approaching the borders. At the same time, it is obvious that the issuance of information about the tactical air situation from Saab 340 to the pilots of Mirages and F-16AM will be received already via secure radio channels of the Link-16 network.
We remind you that the need to introduce this network to the operational and tactical unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was announced today by the Commander-in-Chief of NATO in Europe, Christopher Cavoli. It is worth noting that the Link-16 network channels have a fairly high level of noise immunity and cryptographic stability, having a pseudo-random tuning mode of the operating frequency at a speed of 77.8 thousand jumps per second. Moreover, protection against interference in coding provides Reed-Solomon codes.
This means that, for example, it is unlikely that the Link-16 terminals on fighters and ground air communication points of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be silenced using, for example, Krasukha-2O, Inhabitant, etc. complexes deployed on the territory of Crimea or in the depths of the Kursk region, covering the Link-16 range, because a high power flow density is needed. It will require the banal use of X-101 missiles with electromagnetic warheads in precisely explored areas of operation of Link-16 terminals; and this must be taken into account.
The question arises: has such a warhead been designed by Raduga Design Bureau specialists? After all, the transfer of the most dangerous critical technologies to the enemy in the field of tactical information exchange and target distribution takes the SMO we are used to to a completely different stage, which we can feel as early as December 2024.