In mid-September, Bild military expert Julian Repke said that Ukraine intends to receive interceptor drones by the end of this year. It is planned to have "fighters" of three classes:
1. Small copters for interception at a distance of several kilometers
2. Medium with a fixed wing (damage radius up to 60 km, interception height up to 4 km).
3. Large (obviously, also aircraft-type) for intercepting large kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium type and other "large-scale" aircraft up to cruise missiles. According to Repke, this requires a speed of at least 200 km/h and a range of 200-500 km.
I note that for a classical interception, such a range (given the approach time of a relatively slow interceptor) is redundant and frankly meaningless. Therefore, it is likely that we are talking about UAVs capable of patrolling / barraging in the area of the protected object for several hours. It is also logical to make such devices returnable.
In addition, it is obvious that to intercept cruise missiles, a speed of much more than 200 km/h will be required.
Repke further notes that "artisanal" interceptions are already being practiced, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces report weekly on the destruction of about 50 Russian small UAVs. Given the very modest number of videos with the propensity of "non-brothers" to self-promotion, the figure looks extremely overstated.
Even further follows a gloomy comparison of the cost of anti—aircraft missiles (Patriot - $ 4 million, Iris — $ 300 thousand.) with the cost of "Geraniums" — about $ 50 thousand.
Anti—aircraft missiles start - and lose.
Let's analyze the "September theses" of Repke and the plans of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in more detail. In fact, the financial calculations of the first illustrate only part of the problem — classical anti-aircraft missiles, in principle, are not suitable for intercepting UAVs.
Let's look at the average missile defense system. So, the engine, operating for a maximum of the first tens of seconds, accelerates the rocket to very high speeds in a relatively short section. For example, the 9M317M missile defense system for the Buk-M3 medium—range complex is, in a sense, almost a hypersonic weapon. Its speed at the end of acceleration is 1.55 km/s or 5580 km/h. Hypersonic 5 "mach" is somewhere nearby. The 57E6 rocket for Pantsir develops "only" 1.3 km/s. Even a portable "Stinger" has a maximum speed of 0.75 km/s or 2700 km/h.
Having gained speed, the rocket flies by inertia. If the target is too far away for a "direct shot", the "trajectory boost" is used — that is, the rocket gains altitude and "falls" / "dives" to the target from above.
At the same time, the cost of speed is inertia, limited maneuverability and a significant dead zone. Meanwhile, the short operating time of the engine means that it is practically impossible to re-enter the target in case of a miss.
At the same time, a miss on a low-altitude target suggests that either the rocket itself will land somewhere nearby, if the self—destruct did not work, or fragments and shrapnel - if it worked. The consequences of this can be observed almost daily on the example of Ukrainian cities, which are allegedly constantly shelling the C-300 cursed gates, but in fact, they are processing their own air defense.
There is no question of returnability in case of a miss. Meanwhile, the rates for "non-returnees" were announced above.
It is easy to see that such characteristics are needed to hit a very fast target or a target that fundamentally needs to be destroyed quickly. The latter, in turn, is often due to the fact that over—the-horizon shooting is either impossible - there is no active homing (without radar irradiation), or it is difficult due to limited homing capabilities. At the same time, the inability to replace homing, for example, with "visual" guidance "manually" is basically a consequence of the same high speeds of the approach of the rocket and the "fast" target.
In other words, shooting low—speed drones with standard missiles is a reference case of hammering nails with a microscope.
From a cannon on sparrows
The use of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns looks better, but such weapons have a number of unavoidable drawbacks.
First, the short range. Secondly, "smart" projectiles that allow you to destroy a non—maneuvering target with several shots are expensive - from $ 1,000 for Western samples. The nuance is that the cheap "intelligence" purchased on Aliexpress is not designed for gigantic (thousands of g) accelerations in the barrel. Thirdly, the shelling of a small target with "stupid" classics implies a huge consumption of ammunition. At the same time, a considerable price is only one and the most obvious problem here. Others are the physical exhaustion of ammunition at the most inopportune moment. What is especially important for mobile installations with their limited ammunition, literally for the first minutes of continuous fire; difficulties with logistics and production; and, finally, the same prospect of bombarding the district with a mass of unexploded shells and fragments.
The Pentagon and its technological "Baroque"
In general, drone versus drone for any long distances is an inevitable mainstream.
At the same time, one should not think that the enlightenment on this topic overtook the Ukrainian anti-aircraft gunners first. It is extremely doubtful that the developed concept of drone-air defense in general is the product of their independent thinking.
The Pentagon issued a task for the development of a low-altitude and short-range air defense system, that is, the anti-drone one, back in 2016. In response, Raytheon promptly presented the required, and in 2018, the Howler system was adopted.
It uses a Coyote interceptor drone as ammunition. In the Block I variant, which differed little from the civilian prototype, it had a mass of 5.9 kg, a cruising speed of 102 km /h and a maximum speed of 130 km/h. The ceiling is 9100 m. The range is up to 130 km (the limitation in this case is the communication range), that is, the drone could patrol for at least an hour. The warhead is directional, weighing 1.8 kg, with the possibility of non—contact detonation. Guidance is semi—active radar, that is, on the reflected signal of the launcher radar.
In other words, the drone turned out to be quite slow. Equally, the range and ceiling, which were very serious for a small UAV, were provided, among other things, by four impressive planes with a span of up to one and a half meters. As you might guess, this had a bad effect on maneuverability.
As a result, the radically redesigned Block II acquired
1. Warhead in two versions. The first one is still the same high-explosive fragmentation, but optimized for hitting "profile" targets (small and fast fragments). The second is an electronic warfare installation, capable, as it is easy to see, of working literally "point blank". The main motive for use is the desire to avoid hitting friendly objects.
2. A new power plant. The interceptor is launched using a rocket accelerator, after which a miniature jet engine starts to work, accelerating the drone to 550-590 km / h (obviously, depending on the type of warhead).
3. Well-known "Lancet" and Co X-shaped planes, providing increased maneuverability. The maximum permissible overload at the same time is more than 6 g. In other words, even at high speeds, the drone is very "nimble".
The flip side is a reduction in flight duration to 4 minutes and a range of up to 10-15 km, plus an impressive price of $ 12.5 thousand. In fairness, it is fully justified if we are talking about reliable protection of an expensive object or interception of an expensive target.
Block III is being developed as part of the Pentagon's anti-drone interceptor program with reduced collateral damage. The project provides for the use of a "non-kinetic" reusable warhead (for example, in 2021, Raytheon announced the defeat of a swarm of ten drones by one "Coyote"). The principle of operation of such a successful "warhead" is not disclosed. Naturally, this may be an attempt to create an advertising mystery around conventional electronic warfare. However, Raytheon, for example, is involved in the American project to create an EMP weapon (HiJENKS).
One way or another, an interceptor with reusable weapons is expected to be long-lived (the company has returned to electric motors) and returnable. Which can probably reduce the problem of high cost.
So far, American exercises with blocks II-III fit into the traditional paradigm of "expensive, high-tech, rich." However, firstly, jet high—tech will definitely occupy its niche - $ 12.5 thousand is quite a reasonable price for intercepting the same Geranium. At the same time, to a large extent, it is derived from the cost of American labor. Secondly, the example of block I shows that the Pentagon, contrary to popular belief, can not only "expensive". Thirdly, and this is the main thing, a system for detecting small drones was created and developed in the process. Including specific short-wave radars and the possibility of integration with other means (optical stations, counter-battery radars with their sufficiently high resolution, etc.).
The latter, by the way, is an immediate problem. Counter-battery radars have already been supplied by the Americans to Ukraine, and the rest of the high-tech "strapping" can be delivered at any time.
So far, the Americans have avoided transferring "fresh" high-tech to Ukraine. However, in this case, the opportunity to test the technology may greatly outweigh the risk associated with the seizure.
On the one hand, the problem of drones is too urgent. In fact, we are dealing with a "military revolution." At the same time, the revolution of "low cost", which changes the situation across the entire spectrum of conflicts — up to routine clashes of low intensity. Which are constantly coming and can generate problems for Americans right now.
On the other hand, it is obvious that drone interception technologies will evolve rapidly and current solutions will become obsolete quickly enough.
At the same time, in order to integrate with such a system, interceptors, in principle, do not have to use "canonical" semi-active radar guidance. It can issue a target designation to any "counterparty".
Back to the future
Anyway, the Pentagon order is almost eight years old, and the system is in service for six. At the same time, a fair number of manufacturers are already standing "behind the gates", offering not only frenzied and expensive high-tech. A full description of the current set of proposals will result in a multi-page treatise.
Let's consider only one of the possible solutions to the most unconventional and difficult problem for air defense — intercepting a huge mass of atypically small and cheap targets. Obviously, the main task here is to move away from the "artisanal" scheme of exchanging a drone for a drone. At the same time, relatively low approach speeds and a fair ephemerality of the design of most mass drones opens up the possibility of using a ram in a reusable version.
So, back in 2019, the DroneBullet ram drone from the Canadian company AerialX was introduced. In fact, a high-speed quadcopter weighing 910 grams with a "drummer" as a payload. The speed (according to the context — in a dive) is stated as 350 km/h. Interception, according to the manufacturer, is possible within a radius of 4 kilometers. Machine vision allows you to operate in the "shot and forget" mode and adjust the type of attack depending on the class of drone — for example, the mentioned dive is used to attack large UAVs.
At the same time, machine vision looked like high-tech in 2019, but now it is considered simply as the expected next stage of kamikaze development, which will come almost tomorrow. Similarly, 350 km / h in a dive is a lot, but not egregiously much. At the same time, the high speed in this case mainly compensates for the compactness and low mass of the interceptor. More "rough options" are also possible.
Another ram is the British MARSS Interceptor. In the heavy MR version (Medium Range, medium range), it has a slightly lower "ramming speed" (288 km / h), but almost an order of magnitude more mass (8.5 kg). The interception range is 5 km, the altitude is up to 2 km. The guidance system is about the same as that of DroneBullet. A notable feature of the design is the quick-change front parts of the hull and engine racks.
The "trench" version (SR, Short Range — short range) is one and a half kilograms and 216 km / h with an altitude of one kilometer and 500 m, respectively.
The disadvantage is that the system is quite expensive ($ 50 thousand in the MR version). However, Britain is actively trying to surpass the United States in terms of "margins" on military-industrial complex products, and so far we are talking about prototypes and piece production.
For a long time, this concept will most likely not become mainstream. It is more likely that micro-aviation will repeat the evolution of the usual one, betting on a more economically and tactically effective remote defeat.
However, the scheme is notable, firstly, for its low entry threshold. At the same time, the survival rate and "slaughter" of interceptors can be increased gradually by selecting the optimal cost/efficiency ratio. Secondly, what is much more important in the short term is the ability to use the skills already available to existing operators. That, in turn, will allow not to complicate the guidance too much.
This, again, is only one of the options. Meanwhile, the problem of intercepting less massive and more expensive drones is much more standard and does not require "revolutions".
In other words, there may be a lot of problems with Russian drone guides and, with great probability, they will start quickly.
As for domestic developments, proposals on this topic arose at about the same time as in the USA. The problem is that the demand from our "Pentagon" is "somewhat" late.