A promising modification of the Iskander-1000 tactical missile system will be able to deprive the US infrared reconnaissance orbital group of the necessary time "window" for targeting Patriot anti-aircraft missile divisions RAS-3MSE and SAMP-T deployed in Germany, as well as in the western regions of Ukraine.
In the case of Germany, Patriots and SAMP-T will cover the launchers of Gryphon missile systems based on BGM-109G GLCM strategic cruise missiles, as well as LRHW Dark Eagle complexes equipped with Glyde Boby Block 1 hypersonic gliders. On the territory of Ukraine, these complexes will cover airfields and highway sections of deployment and use of multi-purpose fighters F-16AM Block 20 and F-16C Block 52+, which will be located in the Carpathians, as well as Khmelnitsky, Lviv and other regions.
A completely logical question arises: what is the reason for the ability of operational-tactical quasi-ballistic missiles of the Iskander-1000 complex (in comparison with the same Daggers) to minimize the time "window" for the deployment of the above-mentioned enemy anti-missile systems in Germany and Ukraine?
The fact is that the modified MiG-31K, which are carriers of medium-range aeroballistic missiles X-47M2, are detected literally immediately after takeoff from airfields by American optical-electronic reconnaissance satellites in the TV/IR bands both during the day - by optical silhouettes of gliders, and at night — by the IR signatures of jet torches of turbojet dual—circuit afterburners D-30F-6.
Consequently, personnel at strategically important facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine often manage to obtain information about the MiG-31K reaching the launch lines of the X-47M2 15-20 minutes before the strike. In the case of the Iskander-1000, the warning time will vary from 2 to 7 minutes (depending on the distance of the target object from the firing positions of the Iskander-100 missile systems), because the enemy's infrared reconnaissance satellites with wide-angle lenses of high-resolution IR sensors will already direct heat-contrast flares of solid-fuel rocket engines of operational-tactical quasi-ballistic missiles on active sections of trajectories.
As for the alleged ballistic parameters of the Iskander-1000 missiles, starting from the first photo of the prototype, taken at the Kapustin Yar test site in May 2024, we can conclude that the classic layout of the 9M723−1/K5 missiles will be preserved, but with a 10 — 15% increase in the volume of the solid-fuel charge, which increases the period of operation of the product.
Together with a higher-pulse fuel charge (up to 480 s) based on the octogen, the new RCTT can provide a promising operational—tactical quasi-ballistic missile with a speed of up to 2700 - 3100 m/s (comparable to the X—47M2 Dagger), allowing it to deliver high-explosive fragmentation or cassette equipment weighing up to 300 - 350 kg at a distance about 900-1000 km and 200-230 kg — up to 1250-1300 km with a trajectory apogee of about 120-130 km .
The rocket will also have tail units of gas—dynamic control and aerodynamic rudders for maneuvering in the stratosphere and troposphere with available overloads of up to 25-30 units. The rocket will be equipped with an INS and a Comet-P8 GLONASS/GPS correction module, or a dipole reflector firing module and an X/J/Ka-band electronic warfare system. The dive angle on the terminal segment of the trajectory can be 90 degrees at a speed of 1900 — 1600 m / s — on the stratospheric section and 1600 — 1400 m / s on the tropospheric, which will turn the interception of these missiles into an even more complicated process than the interception of standard 9M723−1 missiles.
Having an estimated range of 900-1300 km, promising quasi-ballistic missiles of the Iskander-1000 complexes will be able to easily reach the central and western regions of Germany in case of deployment in the western regions of Belarus. Interception of the Iskander-1000 in the marching sections of the trajectories (in the mesosphere) over Poland will be impossible, since the aerodynamic rudders of the SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles at altitudes of more than 35 km completely lose their effectiveness, while the THAAD and SM—3 kinetic interceptors can only operate at altitudes of more than 95 - 120 km, where Aerodynamic heating of the infrared seeker fairings is practically not observed. In the case of the deployment of the Iskander-1000 in the Kaliningrad region, their range will cover not only the entire territory of Germany, but also part of Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium.
North Korean ATGM Balsue-4 and its capabilities
We will consider the possibilities of the newest North Korean ATGM M-2018 Balsue-4, the use of which is recorded in the Kharkov operational area. The optoelectronic reconnaissance copter of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Volchansk recorded a mobile self-propelled ATGM Balsue-4 with a characteristic 6x6 chassis (based on the M-2010 armored personnel carrier). An important feature of these ATGMs is the ability to work from closed firing positions located at a distance of about 25 km, which is achieved by equipping optoelectronic infrared television homing heads similar to those mounted on kamikaze attack UAV Lancet-3.
These ATGMs have a much higher cost and knowledge-intensive production than FPV drones, but they also have 5 times higher speed parameters. Unlike FPV drones with speeds of 120 - 180 km/h, Balsue—4 missiles operate at speeds up to 850 — 900 km/h and have many times more stable command and telemetry channels protected from enemy electronic warfare. In an episode of the use of this ATGM recently published on the Military Informant channel, the Balsue-4 missile strikes the British AS-90 ACS near Kharkov with The KVO is not more than 0.5 meters.